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INTRODUCTlQ;;f 
l. statement of purpose. 
It is the purpose of this investie;atl.on to d:!. scover 
and evaluate the cJlace Paul Tillich gives to reason in 'J.is 
conception of God. 
2. Area of the investigation. 
This investigation attemots to express synootically 
Tlllich' s s catements about the natur0 of God as these bear 
upon the place of reason in God. There is no attenpt here 
to trace a development in Tillich 1 s thought nor is there an 
attem-s:>t to relate the conclusions of this Investisation to 
the whole of Tillich's th_ought. The attempt here is rather 
that of' )resenting clearly and in brief compass a categorical 
study of' the rationality of' Tilllch' s God. In order to dis-
cuss his doctrine of God it is necessary to begin with man, 
to determine the nature of reason in man and the function of 
reason in the knowledge of' God. 
'l'he inves"Gigation is witlc.in the w}•ole field of' Tillich' s 
writings. But it is oriented specifically to TilJ.ich 1 s most 
recent and most sysuematic effort to express his t'·ought, 
Volume I of' the Sv.stematic Theolor;y, puiJlisi:ed in 1851. It 
is not presumptuous to write about 'l'!.ll:;_ch 1 s 'Oonce~;t of God 
with only Volume I of t 1lG Svstc;matic Theology in hand for two 
reasons. In the first place, the sections on reason and God 
are included in Volume I and conta1n Tillich' s basic thought 
in these regards. In the 'second place Tillich has kindly 
v 
provided a mimeographed copy of his "F ronosj_ tlons" which will 
l be the basis of Volume II of tlcG Systematic Theology. 
within the field of Tillicnean writing, then, and 
especially within the Systematic Theology, an attempt has 
been made nere to understand fairly and to criticize coheren"G-
ly Tillich 1 s view of the place of reason in God. 
3. Review of the work of other investigators. 
Though Tillich has been writing for several decades, 
in German and in English, it was not until 1_951 that he pub-
lished a cor.1prehensive and systematic account of his thought. 
With the exception of articles such as "Religionsphilosophie," 
collections of essays such as The Internreta-r;ion of cTistory or 
The Protestant collections of sermuns such ae The Shaking 
of the Foundations, and less comprehensive works such as Die 
Religiose Lage der Gegenwart (transhted into English in 1902 
under ihe title, The Religious Si"Guation) and Der Religiose 
Verwirklichung were the only sources of' Tillich's thought avail-
able to the reauing public. PtJ!'haps this accounts in large 
measure for "Ghe scarcity of' work uone oy otner inveswigators. 
James Luther Adams of the Federated Paculwy of the Uni-
versity of Qlicago has been whe chief inter~reter of Tillich 
to American reaaers. Adams selected and translated the essays 
contained in Tne Prutestant Zra wnich was published in 1948. 
1. Tillich, STP. Henceforth all references to books and arti-
cles wi1_l concern tLose written by Tillich unless otherwise 
inuicated. Abbreviations are explained under t\e author's 
name in the bibliography. 
vi 
Tillich confesso~ in his introduction that it was Adams' en-
couragement that led to the publication of these essays. 1 In 
addition to selectinc;- and translating the essays Adams writes 
as the final chapter ln the book a splendid interprotation of 
Tillich 1 s LhOU[;rlt entitled "Ti.Llich 1 s Concept of the ?rutestant 
Era." Adams also broucht Till:ch to the attention of the English 
reading world through the exercise of his office as editor of 
the Journal of Liberal Reli>':lon. Adorns translated a chayLer vf 
Tillich' s Religiose Verwirklicnung and ~mblished it in Lhe jvur-
nal,2 asking W. M. Urban to write a critique which appeared in 
the same issue of the journal under the tit.Le, "A Critique of 
Professor Tillich' s Theory of the Religious S;rmbol. 113 
The other evidence of investigation in this field is an 
article written by Dr. Georgia Harkness, "The Abyss and the 
Given. 11 4 All of these investigations are acknowledged in tb3 
text of the dissertation, with neither of them contributing 
without qualification LO the l-'resent lnterprctatlon. 
It is difficult to account f'or the sl'"'a.Ll numiY3r of in-
vestit_;aJ;ors of Tillich 1 s thought. The factor mentionea above 
is certainly an important one. But perhaps equolly important 
is the ambiic_uity and obscurity of Tillich's language. Dr. 
HarKne"s compares Tillich wi.th Vlhi t13head not only as regards 
their intellectual, cultural .. nd · istorical grasp of things 
1. TP'~, ix. 
2. "The Re.Licious Symbol, 11 Journal of Liberal Religion, 2 (Sum-
mer, 1'<~40), 1~-34. 
3. Journal uf Libera.L Religion, 2(Summer, 1'<~40), 34-36. 
4. Cnristendom, 3(1~38), bOB-5~0. 
but also as regards their style of wr' tirl£. !I ooth, it 
might be added, write books which in general are hard to 
read; for, thinking unconventional t.c10cc(';;Tts, they use un-
conventional language to express t1-.em." 1 
vii 
There is indication, however, that wlcat has been is not 
predictive of what is to be. T."ne I·'acr:dllan Company has an-
nounced Volume I of a I,ibrary or" Livinc; Theoloc;y for June, 
1952, containinc; thirteen essays on various aspects of Til-
lich• s thought by men like w. ;.:. T"orton, T. :''· Green3, George 
F. Thor:ms, Charles Fartshorne, Heinhold 1']iebuhr an<i J. L. 
Adams. Entr.usiastic reviews of 'J'illich•s Syst:omatic Theolo,~y, 
Vo1Uo'11e I, also indicate an upsurge in the nur1ber of investi-
gators of Tillich' s thought. 
4. The method to be followed. 
The method followed in this investigation is that of 
synopsis, elauoration and critical appraisal. Tillich•s state-
ments about man, knowledr;e and God w;Jich have to do w:'.th reason 
have been taken from their s OL'rces 8nd placed together. Then 
the central emphases of Till:tch' s t 1::tOc<:'lt will oe elaborated 
to reveal the implic!.t ideas as well as the explicit statements. 
As a rule, critical appraisal has been reserved until a thorough 
elaboration of r:Ls position has been made. 
Perhaps it would be appropriate to include in tl-cis !.ntro-
ductory consideration of method Tillich' s definition of reason. 
1. Earknes s, Art. ( 1938), 508. 
viii 
The title itself and the success of the dissertation hinge 
around the meaning of reason. As an understanding of what 
Tillich means by reason is presupposed in the structural part 
of the dissertation, it is important that his definition of rea-
son be made explicit at the outset. A consideration of Tillich 1 s 
view of reason will also lay before us an example of the ambig-
uous, almost inconsistent, way Tillich treats m8ny topics. 
Tillich is on firm historical ground when he speaks of 
two concepts of reason, the ontological and the technical. 
Ontolo,;ical reason is reason in the classical sense, the 11 struc-
ture of the mind which enables the mind to grasp and to trans-
form reality. 111 ontological reason is compar«ble to the nous 
in Plato's theory of knowledge, the intuition or illumination 
in Aristotle and Plotinus, the intellectual love of Spinoza, 
the Vernunft of Kant. 2 Ontological reascn refers to the verti-
cal dimension of tl"'·e human mind through w:Cich r.1an seeks and 
knows structures, Gestalt processes, values and meanings, 
through which man is aware of God. Ontological reason deter-
mines the end toward which human life is directed. 
11 0ntolo;;ical reason can be defined as the structure of 
the mind which enables it to grasp and to shape reality. 113 At 
this point Tillich subtly changes the course of the discussion 
to give reason the unique meaning he wishes to attribute to it. 
l. ST, I, 72. 
2. nastin[;s, ERS, X, 593-598; Muller-Freienfels, EWBP, 705, 
706; Lelande, VP, 669, 670; Schmidt, PWB, 
3. ST, I, 75. 
ix 
Ontolot;ical reason has in essence a capacity which in exist-
ence it has lost. In essence ontoloGical reason is in unity 
with being-itself. 1 As being-itself is God for Tillich it is 
proper to say that ontological reason in essence is in unity 
with God. In essence, then, ontological reason is transparent 
toward God, God is essentially manifest in reason. 2 
but under the conditions of existence ontological reason 
is fallen, distorted; 11 it is subjected to f:tnitude and separa-
tion.113 All of the judgments of existential reason are ambigu-
ous, and there is no clear and direct knowledge of God. 
In the light of this distinction within ontological rea-
son one may understand Tillich' s assertion that ontological 
reason enables the mind to (irasp and sl'ap8 reality. One would 
assume that reality refers to the substantially or ultimately 
rreal, to God. But Tilli ch does not use the word 11 reali ty11 in 
that sense. Reality in this connection means the phenomenally 
real for Tillich, the world which man experiences. Man can 
grasp and shape the phenomenal world, but man cannot grasp and 
shape being-itself, God. 
Having made these distinctions, but not too cleaP.Ly, Til-
lich speaks of subjective and objective reason. Subjective rea-
son is a structure of' centeredness which makes the self a uni-
fied self and not a conglomoration. 4 As a centsred structure 
1. ST, I, 75. 
2. ST, I, 80. 
ontolo~o;ical 
3. ST, I, 74. 
4. ST, I, 171, 
Whethn this unity J.s an 11 :ldenti ty11 
reason will be considered below. 
172. 
of God and 
X 
man grasps and shapes 1-:cis world thro~gh ontoloe;ical reason. 
Grasping means receiving rea~onably. It means seeing the 
essentj_al nature of a thing or event. It means understanding 
1 
a thine or an event.~ Shap~nt, means imparting a form to a 
mass of material or experience. In actuality th.ese functions 
are never completely separated, for "we transform reality 
according to the way we see it, and we see reality according 
t t h t f . t n 2 o _,e way we rans orm l • 
Objective reason refers to the world as a structured 
whole. World does not mean the sum total ot all things, but 
rather 11 a structure or a unity of manifoldness. 113 The world 
is objective reason, then, as an ordered and unified whole. 
The Logos of God is borne in the orderly form of the world as 
objective reason and in the centered structure of t'"'e indi-
vidual as subjective reBson. This logical tmity makes it pos-
sible for man to know his world. 
This rathe:" lengthy discourse on the depravity of onto-
logical reason has been necessary as the basis for a further 
consideration. Ontological reason in existence cannot know 
God unambiguously. The only certain knowledge existential rea-
son has is that it csnnot express tbe depth of reason, the 
ground, the abyss, beir:g-itr;elf or God in t•Jrms of rational 
knowledge. 4 Indeed, in the discussion followin;;, it is ques-
l. ST, 
2, ST, 
I, 76. 
I, 76. 
3. 
4. 
I_, 170 
I, 81. 
xi 
tioned whether God is in any sense an object of msn 1 s knowl-
1 
edge. 
One may ask, then, what functions remain for ontologicaL 
reason in existence. In the light of Tillich 1 s professed 
11 learned ignorance" conc8rning God one would not expect existen-
tial reason to have any important f'unction remaininc;. But that 
is not the case. T~cllich attributes to existential reason the 
hit;h importance of S'lekins;, receiving,criticizing and evaluating 
revelation and of relating revelation to other expsriences.2 
In so doint; 'Tillic:C. suggests a cri tericn of truth of 11 experi-
ential effi.cacy" which is very near rational coherence.3 
This discussion was begun by sayin;:; tha:C l'ilUch thinks 
of reason under two categories, the ontolo;:;ical and the tech-
nical. The consideration of ontoloe::;ical reason has led us to 
the suggestion of a criterion of truth whbh combines the func-
tions of ontolo;ical and techni8al reason. More specifically, 
tecb.nical reason is the capacity for 11 reasoning," for working 
deductively from a premise. Technical reason is discursive 
reason, operatinG on the basis of consistency whereas ontologi-
cal reason is mora intuitive, operating on the basis of ocher-
ence. It is technical reason that is the tool of the theologian 
who wishes to construct a systematic t.heolo,sy. ~cst2tic or 
ontological reason is grasped into union with God. 4 This un-
ion is ontological and epistemological, or rather, in Tillich' s 
1. See pp. lOlff. 3. See pp. 133ff. 
2. See pp. 167ff. 4. ST, I, 53. 
xii 
way of puttint; it, the union is epistemological because it is 
ontological. The task of expressing this new truth in a 
methodical and systematic way, !:owever, is the task of techni-
cal reason. 
If one r•3gards these functions of r·eason as highe1· and 
lower he will immediately see that there is a tension here 
wl:ich su;:;c;ests a question aoout the continuity and unity of 
1 
reason. But the tension is broader ti1.an that within reason . 
.Lt is rather what may be called the basic tension in Tillich•s 
system, the tension between question and answer, between phi-
losophy and theology, and between man and God. But Tillich 
holds to the tmi ty of reason in exercisin;:; ooth functions. It 
is the same reason that is grasped by the contents of faith 
which must simultaneously see this new :l.nsicht formally related 
to all other exporiences. 2 
T'-·eoretically, then, Tillich recognizes both fcmctions 
of reason, that o:C coherence and t':at of consi~tency, tJcat of 
intuition and that of deductive rerson:\nc;, t>at of 'lernunft 
and that of Verstlmd. Eut in his Systematic '.I'heolor,y one has 
the feelint; that Tillich actually works on the assunption that 
reason i.s simply consistent thinkinc; and an orderly rel!lting 
of ex::Jeriences into a system. Tillich' s remarks about the higher, 
i.nt"C_itive, synoptic function of reason are almost as much Til-
lich' s attempts to convince himself as they are ho_s at l;empts 
l. see pp. 
2. ST, I, 54. 
xiii 
to convince the reader. Tillich's repeated use of the word 
"structure" in connection with reason suc;cests a formal sort 
of pattern into which all ccntont nust fit. 'l'he contrast of 
the two elements J.n man 1 s nature, the v' t;;l founc'ation as tl:e 
source oi' power and the conscious center of reason as the source 
of fo~m 5_mplies that Tillich means form when he says logos or 
1 
reason. 
In discussing the nature of God Tillich speaks of two 
aspects of God's nature that a~e analogous to the two aspects 
of man 1 s nature. God is the ground and abyss of power and mean-
inc. God is inexhaustible depth, me on, as power or potentiality 
and God is Locos or forrn. 2 Though Tilli ch states explic )_ tly 
that God as spirit is the dynamic unity of power and meaning, 
depth and form, 3 he nevertheless regards form in Ciod as sub-
4 
ordinate to power. In both cases reason or ]:ogos_ seems to 
bave the connotBtion of pure form, soBtic structure. 
Tillich' s bmdency to regard reGs on as static form is 
also evident in the methocl he foL:ows in constructin;; his S;rs-
tematic Theology. Reason seems to mean consistency and logic 
in the construction of a system.5 In a revi3w of Tillich•s 
SystGmatic Theology H· Richard Niebuhr has expressed the same 
feeling about Tillich' s concept of reason. Niebuhr suggests 
that reason is static for Tillich when he says that Tillich•s 
reason is non-historical. 
-----
1. see pp. lu, 19, below. 
2. see pp. lo8ff, 171, 175, 187, lts9. 
3. See p. 216, below. 
4. See pp. 2G~ff., below. 
5. see pp. 2,_,2, 254, below. 
While there ape many refGJ~onces to history as 
well as a section on the \·'Lstor·y of rGvelation 
the oroblem arises w~ether reason itself is 
not ~oncelved in non-historical fashion, whether 
the writer does not think of history as giving 
answePs to problems wt.ich reasoning existence, 
itself non-socl&l and non-historlcali presents. 
But is not reason itself historical? 
xiv 
It is not the pul"pose of these introductory remarks a-
bout Tilllch's use of reason to prove any narticular lnterpre-
tation. ]'(ather it is uesirable t1oat one recognize at the out-
set Tillich's basic definition of rea"on which includes the 
ontological and the technical functioc1s anC:• ttat one be alert 
through the pa,;es that follow to Tillich's tendency to neglect 
the higher function he has attributed to reason. 
5. The structure of tl'e disserbli;ion. 
In the ensuing discussion careful attention will be 
given to the place of reason in two d1stinct relationsh~ps, 
reason's place in Tillich's conclusions about the nature of 
God, and reDs on's place in Tillich' s procedural method by 
w· ich I:.e devG.Lops his doctrine of God. In order to determine 
what place reason holds in God, it will be necessary 1'irst to 
discuss human reason and human nature. This will be done in 
Chapter I under the title, man as a rational creature. The 
next step in the process will be to detc,l"mine t'ce :,ossibilities 
and limits of man's knowledge of God. After tl:,e enistemological 
discussion we will be prep&red to ex~mine ranson in God. As 
1. Niebuhr, Rev.(l951), 49. 
XV 
Chapter III, the consideration of divine reason will comprise 
the heart of the dissertation. Chapter I1J will cons:;_o_~r the 
place of reason in TilJ:ich' s method, attemptinc to answer the 
question: }!ow does Tillich use reason to arrive at, elaborate 
and defend "i.s conclusions re,sardi.n;:; nan, knowledge ancl. God? 
The appraisal of the rationality of Tillich's method and con-
clusions will be evident in coM:wnts and criticisms through-
out the paper as well as in the conclusion. 
CHAPTER I 
MAN AS A HATIOHAL CHEATUHE 
words as symbols have a direct connotation to man as 
an experienci:1g subject. If one wishes to understand reason 
in God, therefore, he should besin by studying reason in man 1 s 
nature. 
As we saw in the introduction, man as he is now is in 
11 ex:tstence, 11 in a spatio-temporal world of tension, partly 
separated from God. What Tillich understands about man' s_ 
essence or his eschatological fulfillment :ts of the nature of 
a calculation by analogy from his status in existence. This 
fact makes the study of man necessary before one j_s able to 
understand God, for all that can be sai.d or understood about 
God is in the form of analogues and symbols tal:en from the 
realm of :man's finite existence-- symbols w!"-ci.ch are partly 
true and uartl 'r 
- ,) false at t!:·e s2:me tine when apnlied to God. 
These an2lo0ues indicate something about the nature of God, 
but that indication is nev'lr precise, unam-Oi[;uous, literal. 1 
It is tre purpose of this c:'Capter to investi,;ate the nature 
of man to determine what positive statements may oe made 
about man and what these mean when applied to man. TLis 
study will prepare us to distinguish the literal from the 
s~'1ubol:tc elements in utterances about the nature of God. 
1. With the possible exceptions of the affirmations that God 
is love and that God is spirit. "But God is love. And, 
since God is being-itself, one must say that being-itself 
is love 11 (ST, I, 279). "God is spirit. This is the most 
embracing, direct and unrestricted symbol for t;::e divine 
life" ( ST, I, 249). 
2 
The plan to be followed is to state some basic defini-
tions which Tillich gives, then move through a study of man's 
three stages: his essential nature, his existential nature, 
and his eschatological nature. A discussion of reason in man 
will bring the chapter to a conclusion. 
1. Basic definitions. 
1. self. 
As the ontological question presupposes an asking sub-
ject and an object about which a question is asked, there is 
a subject-object structure of knowledge implied, which in turn 
implies a self-world structure as the 11 basic articulation of 
1 being." The word, self, now receives our attention. 
For Tillich the self is the original phenomenon. It is 
in correlation with its world; it is aware of its world and of 
itself. Any unified being which is self-centered has selfhood. 
By analogy Tillich would extend the concept of selfhood to all 
individual "Gestalten even in the inorganic realm. 112 If self-
hood is extended into the lower organic and the inorganic 
world, however, the word, "aware," must be given an extremely 
broad interpretation. In such a case "awareness" would not 
imply self-consciousness, but only a unified structure which 
reacts to an environment. There is a self, then, wherever 
there is a reaction to a stimulus, which reaction is dependent 
1. ST, I, 164. 
2. ST, I, 169. 
upon a structured whole "aware of its world and of itself." 
Any thing or baing, therefore, which has form or structural 
3 
unity and the capacity to respond to an environment is a self. 
Man is a self at the summit of the gradation of salves, 
He is the most fully developed and most completely cantered 
self because he possesses himself in self-consciousness. As 
an ego-self man is aware of the world as well as of himself. 
He is separated from the world, but he belongs to the world, 
Man can transcend avery possible environment, He has a world, 
he has a structured and unified environment. But as long as 
man is man he is not bound completely to any one environment. 
Man always transcends his environment in his power of appre-
hending universal norms and of shaping his environment in 
1 
accordance with them. 
Tillich intends that the term, 11 self, 11 be a mora embrac-
ing term than the word, "ego." Self includes the "subconscious 
and the unconscious •basis' of the self-conscious ago as well 
as self-consciousness. 112 The general definition of the self is 
that it is a 11 structure of centerednass. 11 Man is the most com-
pletely developed self in that he is an ago-self, a structure 
of cantaredness which is conscious of self. He possesses him-
self, and through the apprehension of universal norms and ideas 
he possesses the universe. Self and world develop correlatively. 
1. ST, I, 170. 
environment 
2. ST, I, 169. 
This is another way of saying that man's broad 
includes God and objective reason. 
4 
Each is dependent upon the other. It is for this reason that 
Tillich speaks of the self-world structure as the "basic ar-
ticulation of being." 
ii. Soul, person and personality. 
For Tillich the soul is the 11 prepersonal, vital, uncon-
scious, and collective ground out of which the personality 
1 grows." 
We shall define "soul" in this context as the 
vital and emotional ground from which the self-
conscious center of personality arises. The body, 
of course, is included in this definition in so 
far as the body is the immediate expression and 
the form of the self-realization of the soul. 
The relation of the conscious center to the psy-
chic foundation of the personality corresponds 
to the interrelation ~f the personality with 
things and community. 
In order to understand this definition of the soul we 
must consider briefly what "person" and 11 personality11 mean 
according to Tillich. Both person and personality imply self-
consciousness. Person for Tillich means the "reality out of 
which personality grows. 113 "This is the basis of personality, 
the individual human being, the person who alone among all 
beings has the potentiality of self-determination, and con-
sequently, of personality. 114 Though 11 person11 in these state-
menta appears to be synonymous with 11 soul, 11 the person is more 
than a soul. The concept of a person is a moral concept, indi-
eating a being whom man is enjoined to respect because that 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
TPE, 120. 
a sort of 
TPE, 131. 
TPE, 115. 
TPE, 115. 
The biological basis is meant here, along with 
psychic foundation. 
A person, then, is a potential personality. 
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person is a bearer of dignity equal to our own. The person, 
then, would seem to be a soul which has developed a self-con-
sciousness. This definition of the person sets the definition 
of the soul in clearer relief. The soul does not include con-
sciousness. Tillich is explicit above in speaking of the soul 
as the 11 prepersonal, unconscious ground" out of which the per-
sonality grows. The soul is the vital and emotional ground 
from which the self-conscious center of personality arises. 
A further distinction must be drawn, that between person 
and personality. Tillich says that the person is a unique being 
which has the potentiality of personality. Personality is de-
fined as "that being which has the power of self-determina-
1 
tion," or 11 which is free;" or "that being which has power 
over itself; 112 or 11 that individual being which is able to reach 
universality; 113 or "that being in which the individual is 
transformed by, and united with, the universal structure of 
being. 114 In each of these definitions except the last the 
element of 11 power over itself" is mentioned or implied. Per-
sonality, then, is a person which has realized self-determina-
tion, which has transcended its environment through an appre-
hension of universals, forms and structures. The power of 
self-determination is not a power without restriction. The 
"freedom" or the "power of self-determination" is within the 
1. TPE, 115. Tillich is not precise in his distinction between 
soul, person and personality. 
2. TPE, 115. 
3. TPE, 116. 
4. TPE, 116, 117. The element of actual transformation is 
clear here. 
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limit of the logos, the universal structure of being. Thus, 
the last statement above is not in contradiction with the 
former statements. Rather, it is only in the light of the 
limitation by the universal structure of being that one can 
correctly understand what Tillich means by self-determination. 
A personality is a being that has transcended its environment 
and determined itself through an understanding of the universal 
structure of being. 
To return to the definition of the soul we repeat that 
the relation of the conscious center to the psychic foundation 
of the personality corresponds to the interrelation of the 
personality with things and collllllunity. The "psychic founda-
tion" here is another description of the soul for Tillich. 
To delineate more carefully the nature of the soul and its 
relationship with the conscious center of personality, let us 
follow Tillich•s reference to comparable interrelationships. 
The interrelationship between personality and thing 
which Tillich advocates is a "mutual fulfillment. 11 A personal-
ity should not dominate things wilfully; he should not distort 
things and twist them to his advantage. The attitude of domi-
nation over things leads ultimately to man's enslavement by 
the machine (thing) as well as man's enslavement of the machine. 
The highest fUnctions of personality and thing are lost. Per-
sonality and thing must be seen in the larger framework of re-
ligion, of the structure of being. Personality and thing are 
united in the doing of a "work" in a way that neither is dis-
7 
torted and both are fulfilled. "The personal power of self-
determination and the determined power of things meet in the 
form of our work. 111 A sacrifice of theoretical power by per-
sonruity and thing is made in order for them together to enter 
into an actual and new creation. Personality and thing render 
each other a mutual service in which relationship personality 
and thing are mutually fulfilled. 
The interrelationship between personality and community 
is similar to that between personality and thing. The humanis-
tic ideal of personality "tends to cut the individual off from 
his existential roots, from the social group, its traditions and 
symbols. 112 The individual personality cannot aouse the community 
without distorting it, without doing violence to other persons 
by treating them as things, as means, and not as self-determina-
tive ends in themselves. on the other hand, the community in 
its power cannot rule the personality without violating the 
dignity of personality. Both personality and community must 
submit to the ground of real community and individuality if 
they are to be mutually complementary. A new spiritual center 
for personality and for community must be found in God. 
Putting this principle in the terms of immediate concern, 
we !'ind that the "conscious center" and the "psychic foundation" 
of personality are interrelated under a broader principle of 
1. TPE, 1~4. Yet it seems that using things in the doing of 
a "work" twists them to man's advantag~. 
2. TPE, 130. Tillich does not name the author of tne "human-
istic ideal" he rejects. 
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the structure of being in such a way that they are mutually 
fulfilled. Neither is enslaved or aisturted. Both contribute 
to the achievement of "personality," and personality is possi-
ble only as they fulfill each other through submission to the 
structure of being, through being "possessed from above." 1 
The Protestant tradition following Luther has emphasized 
personal dec1sion and faith, both being acts of the conscious 
center of personality. The aspects of psychic life have been 
left to secularization. The church made a law of Luther's prin-
ciple against law. The church repressed the psychic forces, 
emphasizing the conscious center of personality. But in Tillich•s 
view the psychic foundation cannot be denied, and the emphasis 
on the conscious center has repressed the psychic foundation 
and distorted it. The result of this process of repression is 
the "explosive re-emergence of the vi tal forces." Repression 
is not solid ground for the building of personality. Mutual 
fulfillment is the only way personality may be realized fully. 
And mutual fulfillment is possible only under "grace," the 
possession from above, the embodying of a "constructive struc-
2 
ture" originating in the divine ground. 
The definitions of soul, person and personality are now 
clearer. In essence, soul is the prepersonal, unconscious, 
psychic foundation of personality. A person is a soul which is 
1. TPE, 134. A tendency toward mystic pantheism is apparent here. 
2. Tillich•s criticism of Protestantism here is valuahle. His 
suggested solution to the inadequacy in terms of a broader 
understanding of a "Gestalt of grace" is sound(TPE, 133-134, 
209-216). Man's internal and external harmony is gained not 
through repression but through the service of God. 
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conscious of se·lf and world and has the capacHy for self-
determination. A personality is a person w:'o has actually 
realized self-determination, a free person who transcends 
his env~~ronment through a relation to the universals. 
ThB most difficult proolem involved in giving basic 
definitions concerns tloe definition of r1an. Tillich con-
fesses the difficulty when he indicates that it is the nature 
of man to be a·ole to change his nature. Yet Tillioh feels 
constrained to c;ive some definition of man. 
!can is t 1::~at being wl:o is able to determine 
his being in freedom through history. And if 
we attempt to formulate a definition of free-
dom we should say: Freedo~J is that facu.lty of 
man by which he is able to deterr:-tine his be5.ng 
through history. And if we attempt to formulate 
a definition of history we should say: Fistory 
is that happening through which nan determines 
his own being, including his freedom.l 
The difficulty in the attempt to define rran is preci.sely that 
"human nature changes in history. 112 3eyond ticis major obstacle 
to a definition of man there is the dif'flculty of tl-ce cor.JPosite 
nature of man. Nan is a unity and a totalJ ty. l'an includes 
in himself "all elements of reality, every straturJ of being. 11 3 
But these difficulties are not insurmocmtable for Tillich. Pe 
speaks of man under three categories: man as finite freedom, 
man as spirit, and man as a rational self. 
--------
l. Art.(l940)3, 124. "In freedom," then, adds nothing to the 
first sentence. 
2. ST, I, 167. 
3. Art.(l939), 201. 
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The most pervasive idea in all of Tillich 1 s utterances 
about man is that man is freedom. Closely related to the idea 
that man is free is the idea that man is finite. In numerous 
instances man's nature is spoken of as 11 finite freedom." 
Freedom is a concept of extreme importance for Tillich. He 
speaks of freedom as the distinguishing characteristic of 
man, as man•s essential nature. 
Since freedom is the characteristic that dis-
tinguishes man from all other beings and since 
all other human characteristics follow from this, 
the doctrine of human nature has its center in 
the doctrine of human freedom (the doctrine of 
man 1 s essential nature).l 
Tillich writes again: 11 Man is man because he has 
freedom. 112 In indicating the ambiguity of freedom Tillich 
writes: "Everything except freedom is determined by its own 
nature. Its actualization follows its nature by necessity. 
But it is the nature of freedom to determine itself. Freedom 
is the possibility of transcending its nature •••• Freedom 
makes man man. 113 Perhaps Tillich becomes too impressed by 
11 freedom11 in the last quotation. It is difficult to understand 
him when he says that man's nature is freedom and then that 
freedom is the possibility of transcending its nature. Substi-
tuting equivalents the sentence would read: freedom is the 
possibility of transcending freedom. Perhaps he means that 
man grows in freedom. 
1. Art.(l939}, 202. 3 • Art • ( 1940) 3, 123, 124. 
2. ST, I, 182. 
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Though Tillich makes radical claims about freedom, these 
statements must be balanced against others. For example, he 
says tbat freedom which has ceased to be the power of determin-
ing itself in history has ceased to be freedom, and men who have 
lost this power have lost their full humanity. 1 But none of 
these statements, contrary to their surface meaning, implies 
that man is completely free, completely self-determinative in 
history. Man cannot change his nature for another nature in 
history. 2 Man is finite freedom, freedom within a limit. He 
cannot become a stump or a stone. 3 Man is not free to create 
unity with God, either by works of piety or by works of morality 
or by works of the intellect. 4 Man is not free in the capricious 
sense of being able to do whatever he wishes to do. He is under 
the constraint of the Logos. His freedom is within limitation. 
Freedom has meaning in Tillich 1 s use only as it is understood 
within the form of being. Man develops as a personality in 
correlation with the world. 11 World 11 involves laws of structure 
and form which man is not free to alter. Rather it is in the 
awareness of these forms that man is enabled to transcend his 
environment, to determine himself to that extent. 
Human freedom is identical with the fact that 
man has a world that is at once unitary and 
infinjte, set over against himself, from which 
he is separated and to which he belongs at the 
same time. • • • Being between himself and his 
world, man is free from both of them even 
1. Art.(l940) 3 , 125. 3. Art.(l939), 213 
2. TPE, 116. 4. TPE, xv; ST, I, 258. 
while he is bound to both of them. • • • A re-
lation between the self and the world is possible 
only if the world is a structural unity and man 
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is able to understand these structures and, through 
them, his world, And man is able to do so because 
the structural unity of his self and his world 
correspond with each other •••• Having a world, 
therefore, means having the structural forms of a 
meaningful unity in which infinite elements are 
related to one another and to the whole. These 
structural forms are universals, such as categories, 
concepts, laws, and principles, which make every 
single experience intelligible as "belonging to our 
world" or as 11 being a possible content of our self-
consciousness.111 
The structural unity of man 1 s world limits his freedom. 
His own structural centeredness as a personality also limits 
man. Man is limited in his freedom also by the fact that 
nothing can come into existence except under the formal struc-
ture of being. 2 
Tillich insists that man's nature is freedom. This 
means that man is able to transcend his environment through 
his awareness of universals. 11 It is freedom for universality 
on the basis of individuality. 113 It is freedom according to 
the law of the self-centered structure, the person, and accord-
ing to the laws of the larger units in which the person is in-
4 
eluded. It is for this reason that Tillich, when discussing 
1. Art.(l939). 205, 206. 
2. "Only those things can live which embody a rational struc-
ture. Living beings are successful attempts of nature to 
actualize itself in accordance with the demands of objective 
reason •.•• Neither nature nor history can create anything 
that contradicts reason •••• Objective reason is the struc-
tural possibility, the logos of being11 (ST, I, 78, 79). 
3. TPE, 116. 
4. ST, I, 186. 
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the ontological elements, places freedom and destiny in a 
polar relations hip. By 11 destiny11 in this connection Tillich 
means the 11 concrete totality of everything that constitutes 
my being which decides, not an epistemological subject ••• 
It is myself as given, formed by nature, history, and myself. 
My destiny is the basis of my freedom; my freedom participates 
in shaping my destiny. 111 Again we reach the same conclusion. 
Man is free within law, he is free within the context of the 
logos of his nature and of the world. 
Summing up we can say: Human nature demands the 
freedom of historical self-determination. His-
torical self-determination demands a realm of 
creative freedom. Creative freedom presupposes 
the freedom of meaningful creativity, the free-
dom of autonomous creativit~, the freedom of 
self-fulfilling creativity. 
"Meaningful creativity" is freedom within the structure of 
meaningful form. "Autonomous creativity" is centered in the 
nomos of autonomy. "Self-fulfilling creativity" is within the 
context of the nature of the self, else it might be self-de-
stroying creativity. Man is free, but he is free within the 
logos of his nature and of his world. 
The other basic statement which Tillich makes about 
man along with the claim that man is free is that man is finite. 
"Man, being aware of his •structure of subjectivity, 1 finds him-
self at the same time free and finite; he finds that he has 
1. ST, I, 184, 185. 
2. Art.(l940)3, 134. 
the nature of' finite f'reedom."l Again Tillich writes: 
Theology, in dealing with man's nature as 
that of' "finite freedom," shows that man's 
freedom drives him into a tragic estrange-
ment from himself, from the other beings, 
and from the ultimate ground and meaning of' 
his existence •••• Freedom is the structure 
of' a being {body, psyche, mind) that is able to 
know and to act according to universal prin-
ciples and to fall under the swing of' self-
destructive compulsions. Finitude describes 
the human situation as being threatened by 
non-being and, consequently, as a situation 
of' basic anxiety, ~ermanently overcome by 
venturing courage. 
Man• s finitude, then, indicates the split nature of' 
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man in existence. He is able to know and to act according to 
universal principles; but in his actual existence man turns 
away from these universal principles and falls under the sway 
of' self-destructive forces. Man's predicament is that he is 
estranged from his essential nature, from himself' and f'rom his 
destiny. 3 Man's anxiety, his Angst, comes from the realization 
that he is not what he ought to be, what he essentially is. 
This realization is the first step toward the use of' freedom 
for the achievement of' personality. In this light Tillich in-
terprets the inscription on the temple at Delphi to mean: 
"Realize thy f'initude." 4 
A number of Tillich • s other remarks about man may be 
considered under the category: man is spirit. In saying that 
1. Art.(l946), 676. 
2. Art.(l946), 676. 
3. Art.(l946), 677. 
4. Art.(l946), 676. 
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man is spirit Tillich intends to state again what he main-
tains in saying that man is freedom. But there is a slight 
difference, there is something unique in the idea that man 
is spirit. 
Man is spirit: that means that he is the dynamic 
unity of reason and power, of mental universality 
and vital individuality. Human freedom is iden-
tical with the fact that man is spirit. Man is 
not only mind, statically related to the uni-
versals, but he is spirit, dynamically creating 
a world of his own beyond the world that he finds. 
And man is not only vital individuality, dynami-
cally realizing himself in a natural process, but 
he is spirit, creating in unity with the eternal 
forms and norms of being. He has the freedom of 
creation, which is the first and fundamental char-
acteristic of freedom.l 
The addition that "man is spirit" makes to the statement 
that "man is freedom" is similar to the addition that 11 man is 
personality" makes to the statement that "man is a person." 
The assertions that man is free and that he is a person are 
assertions about the nature of man abstracted from the living 
processes of personality and spirit. Personality and spirit 
here indicate the actual nature of man at work, in the process 
of realization, in the concrete. Hegel's influence upon Tillich 
is apparent here. Man is not only a mind in the sense of a 
static relation to universals, but he is spirit, "creating a 
world beyond the world that he finds. 11 Being is process. 
Personality is living. Spirit is active creation. 
There is something in the nature of man as spirit that 
1. Art. (1939), 206. The implication here is that reason is 
static, a sort of rigid structure or form. 
never can be reduced to theological or philosophical as-
sertions on the printed page. The calculations of reason 
seem to lag somewhat behind the movement of man as spirit. 
Calculations abstract, by 11 cutting out" something from the 
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context of dynamic movement. This is not to deny the logos-
nature of man. It is simply to insist on the dynamic reason, 
the creative unity, which is man. 
Here again the thought is expressed that man is freedom, 
but freedom to create only in "unity with the eternal forms 
and norms of being. 11 This insi stance brings one close to the 
assertion that the life of man as spirit is that of meaning, 
of creation in accordance with the logos of God. In one of 
Tillich•s first writings, he states this: "For to live spirit-
ually is to live in the presence of meaning and without an ul-
timate meaning everything disappears into the abyss of meaning-
lessness •••• If any present has meaning it has eternity. 111 
The presupposition of these remarks is that man is capable of 
knowing the 11 eternal forms and norms of being, 11 the logos of 
God. The kernal of the assertion here is that man is spirit in 
that he lives in correlation with God and conforms all of his 
relationships with the logos of God. Spirit is not a 11 part 11 of 
man. "It is the all-embracing function in which all elements 
2 
of the structure of being participate." Spirit defined above 
1. RS, 7. 
2. ST, I, 250. 
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as the "dynamic unity of reason and power" suggests an anal-
ogy between man's nature and God r s nature. For TilE ch says 
that the spirit as a principle of tr·e trinity contains the 
ot:'ler two principles, power and men~-inG, making t"sm act~ve. 1 
God as spirit for Tillich, then, is tl'e dynamic unity of mean-
ing and power. God is spirit and man 1_s spirit. The emphas:Ls 
on meaning (logos) in God and man and Tillich 1 s statement that 
any present which has meaning has eternity sugsest a comparison 
') 
with qegel.- Fegel 1 s priricipla that the real is the rational 
may be stated for Tillich with the suostitution of the word, 
"meanineful," for the word, "rational." For Tillich the real 
is the meaningful.3 
A t.llird group of Tillich' s utterances about the nature 
of man may be subsumed under the title: man is a rational 
being. Again, the somewhat arbitra~y nature of the categorical 
division must be emphasi_zed. All three categories -- that man is 
freedom, spirit, and rationality -- imply each other. In every 
statement abont tl-e natnre of man t".ere is an insistonce unon 
t}oe fact that man's nature is that of unity amidst plurality. 
Each category implies the oth0rs. )·Teith.gr is a separable "part" 
of man. The anal~rsis i_nto categories bas been made in order to 
l. ST, I, 250, 251. See the discussion of' the trinity belON, 
Chapter III, 3. 
2. "',"!hat is rational is real; what is real is rational" (Hegel, 
Vorrede, Grundlinien s!er Philosophie des Rechts, VI, 14). 
3. This is not, however, to deny completely everything which is 
not meaningful. Tillich' s difficult doctrine of the ~ on 
will be considered in Chapter III below. 
approach the concept of man's nature in different ways. 
The very possibility of' "freedom to transcend one's 
environment" implies a knowledge of that environment and of 
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something beyond that environment. In a quotation above Til-
lich says that a relation between the self and his world is 
possible only if the world is a structural unity and man is 
able to understand that structure~ Man is able to know his 
world because the structural unity of his self and of his 
world correspond to each other. Man is rational in that he 
is a structural unity. Without his "structural unity" in 
correlation with the "structural unity" of his world the dis-
cussion about freedom would be without content. There would 
be nothing to be free "from" or "to." We may also recall some 
remarks about reason made in the Introduction. Tillich speaks 
of' "subjective" and "objective" reason, of the self as a 
"structure of centeredness"--subjective reason, and of the 
world as a "structured whole 11 --objective reason. These cor-
respond with each other. 2 Then, again, in the discussion about 
the self it was stated that the self-world correlation is the 
basic ontological structure. In each of these instances the 
reason of man is emphasized. "Man is microcosmos. , •• Man 
participates in the unlverse through the rational structure of 
mind and reality."3 
1. Art,(l939), 250. 
2. ST, I, 171. 
3. ST, I, 176, 
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The fact that man is spiritual also presupposes that 
man is rational. The fact that as spirit man creates "in 
unity with the eternal forms and norms of being111 assumes 
that man is rational, that he has not only a power of crea-
tion but that he has an awareness of meaning, the logos of 
God, as the context for his creative activity. Indeed, for 
man to work against reason would not be creation, it would be 
destruction. In the assertions that man is free and that man 
is spirit there are strong affirmations that man is rational. 
But Tillich is even more explicit. 
In speaking of man's freedom, Tillich writes: 
The freedom of man cannot be separated from his 
freedom to determine his historical fate politi-
cally. Every human being, that is, everyone who 
has reason, is flaturally and, consequently, po-
litically free. 
The pertinent part of the quotation for our present considera-
tion is the appositional phrase which states that a human 
being is one who possesses reason. Man is a rational being. 
Wherever beings are, there is logos of being, 
a form and structure in which its meaning is 
manifest. But, although logos is in every being, 
it is outspoken only in that being which has 
the word, the rational word, the worth of truth 
and light -- that is, in man. In man the 
meaning of being can become manifest because 
man has the word revealing the hiddenness of 
being •••• Philosophical theology is and must 
1. Art.(l939) 206. 
2. Art.(l940)~, 127. This statement is not 
emphasize a doctrine of natural rights. 
is normative rather than descriptive. 
quoted to 
The "consequently" 
1 be logos-theology. 
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Man is man in that he has the rational word, the word of truth 
and light. Man is man in that he has reason. 
Tillich makes some important remarks about the relation 
between revelation and reason. He rejects the relation which 
identifies revelation with the creative power of reason be-
cause there is a mystery in human existence which is deeper 
than reason. He also rejects the relation which excludes reason 
from any participation in revelation because without reason 
man is not man and could not receive revelation. Revelation 
could not occur if it destroyed the organ of its reception. 
And this organ is reason. "Man, in contrast to all other created 
beings, can receive revelation because he is a rational being. 112 
It is clearly stated here that man is a rational being. 
The significance attached to the statement is also clear, that 
reason receives revelation. It is man's rational nature, there-
fore, that enables him to be in communion with God. Neither 
God nor the experience of God is the product of the work of 
reason. Reason is 11 graspad11 in an "ecstatic" experience of the 
manifestation of the mystery, the depth and ground of reason.3 
But reason is not destroyed. This experience is not anti-ration-
al. It is reason-fulfilling. The possibility of the experience 
1. TPE, 90, 91. It appears that 11 worth11 in the phrase, 11 tha 
worth of truth and light> 11 is an error and should be 11 word 11 
instead, reading 11 the word of truth and light. 11 
2. Art.(l943), 9. Yet Tillich 1 s statement "Thera is no common 
basis between theology and philosophy" (ST, I, 26) must be 
kept in mind. 
3. Sea Chapter II, 3, iii below. 
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is based on man's reason. Because man is a rational being he 
can be aware of God, he can have communion with God. 
Man is that being which is free, spiritual and rational. 
2. The three stages. 
A full picture of human nature must embrace three differ-
ent views of man. These three views are given names which imply 
that man's nature is three-fold -- his essential nature, his 
existential nature and his eschatological nature. 
The doctrine of man which speaks only of the 
existential nature of man necessarily leads to 
destructive pessimism without criteria and with-
out hope. A doctrine of man which ignores the 
existential nature of man leads to a shallow 
optimism without revel~ ion and without grace. 
Only the threefold doctrine of human nature 
which we have here suggested can be the founda-
tion of a Christian theology.l 
The outline of Tillich•s philosophy of history is seen 
in his doctrine of man. Spirit moves out of itself, becomes 
objectified in existence, and is reunited in an eschatological 
fulfillment. There is a note of driving power, of inevitabi-
lity in the movement, though it is carried out in relative 
freedom. Tillich speaks of the doctrine of human freedom's 
driving us to consider the doctrine of human servitude, which 
doctrine in turn forces us to consider the doctrine of human 
2 libera·~ion. Man is essentially freedom. But in the exercise 
of this freedom he does not decide compleoely logically, that is, 
1. Art.(l939), 214, 
2. Art.(1939), 214. 
the introduction 
215. 
This quite Hegelian statement suggests 
to Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind. 
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accordlns to the logos, reason. Thus by hls own act man sepa-
rates himself from hls own essential nature as well as from 
God. The separation is not complete, for nothing can exist in 
complete separation from God. But man in existence lives in a 
cleft world. He sees things, but not clearly; he does thincs, 
but not with power; he is outwardly calm, but inwardly tense. 
"And tbis tension,- in the last analys:ls, is the expression of 
man's basic situation: man is finite, yet at the same time he 
transcends his finitude."l Being finite, he is aware of an 
infinity to which. he belongs. 
But man '-s exi_stence is not the final state in whicl: he 
must be seen. One is forced to consider the doctrine of man's 
liberation. The process of healing, of reintegration, of re-
union, is the final consideration. In ti-e last days man will 
be saved. This third part, man's esc}latolo;i.cal nature, must 
be included in any thorough study of man. Tillich )cas expressed 
the entire process quite succinctly: 11 !~an is infinitely con-
cerned a oout tb_e infinity to which he belongs, from which he is 
separated, and for which he is longing. 11 2 Let us examine the 
three stages of man more carefully. 
i. }.'an 1 s essential nature. 
In the attempt above to define man we observed Tilli ch 1 s 
assertion that man is freedom and that this freedom is man• s 
l. ST, I, 231. 
2. S'~, I, 14. 
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essential nature. There was a qualification placed upon free-
dom by reason, however. "Freedom does not mean arbitrariness 
and decision does not mean choice without any criterion. There 
is an essential relation between freedom and reason. 111 
The relation between freedom and reason actualized in 
the spiritual life of a human being reveals the basis of the 
division of man's nature into three stages. Freedom is freedom 
to act according to reason, confirming and fulfilling itself, 
or it is freedom to act against reason, destroying itself.2 
Man's essence, then, is a spiritual unity of freedom and reason 
which implies the possibility that man can use his freedom in 
accordance with reason or against reason. 
Tillich does not speak extensively about the essential 
nature of man. But he does speak of ontological reason 11 in 
its essential perfection" in such a way that the essence of 
ontological reason is identical with the content of revelation. 3 
In man's essence he is united with God, 4 reason is transparent 
to the logos of God. There is nothing to dist crt the true nature 
of God. There is no possibility of misunderstanding, there is 
no misapprehension or anxiety. "The depth of reason is essen-
. 5 
tially manifest in reason." 
1. Art.(l939), 203. 
2. Art.(l~39), 2U3. 
3. ST, I, 74. 
4. ST, I, 206. 
5. ST, I, 80. About the depth of reason Tillich wri tea: 11 It could 
be called the •substance• which appears in the rational 
structure, or •being-itself• which is manifest in the logos 
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Tillich speaks of this state of essential unity as a 
state that is potential, a state that is actual only in the 
11 end, 11 in the eschatological stage. 1 Man's essential nature 
would seem to be a theoretical statement of what man is paten-
tially, what he might become actually. This does not imply a 
temporal progression between two states, a progression from 
. essence to existence, from potential to actual. For what is 
potential as man's essence is not temporal. Time begins with 
the divine command which threw Adam into self-actualizaoion.2 
The actual begins with creation. It is to state this that 
Tillich wri tea: 
Therefore, it is inadequate to ask questions 
concerning Adam's actual state before the fall; 
for example, if he was mortal or immortal, 
whether or not he was in communion with God, 
whether or not he was in a state of righteous-
ness. The verb 11 was 11 presupposes actualization 
in time. But this is exactly what cannot be 
asserted of the state which transcends poten-
tiality and actuality.3 
Though it is erroneous to speak of an actual state of 
Adam before the fall, it is informative to consider an essen-
tial nature before the fall. Tillich•s allusions to such a state 
of being, or the •ground' which is creative in every rational 
creation, or the •abyss• which cannot be exhausted by any 
creation or by any totality of them, or the •infinite poten-
tiality of being and meaning' which pours into the rational 
structure of mind and reality, actualizing and transforming 
them"(ST, I, 79). The depth implies something that is not 
reason, that precedes reason, but which is manifest through 
reason. The "depth of reason" means God in reason. 
1. ST, I, SO. 
2. ST, I, 260. 
3. ST, I, 259. 
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have been indicated, though he does not give the idea sys-
tematic and exhaustive treatment. The doctrine of man's 
essential nature is best thought of as a state of "dreaming 
innocence," a "stage of infancy before contest and decision." 1 
Man's essential nature is a postulate man makes in existence, 
a postulate that implies a state in which the question of the 
finite and the infinite would not arise because of man's unity 
with God. "Mythologically speaking, Adam before the fall was 
in an essential, though untested and undecided unity with God." 2 
It is clear from these passages that Tillich does not 
develop an elaborate doctrine of man's essence. He assumes that 
such a state is meaningful for a consideration of the doctrine 
of man, that man's existential servitude presupposes an essen-
tial freedom. He emphasizes the "pot en tiali ty" of man's essen-
tial nature against actuality, the "dreaming innocence," the 
"stage of infancy before contest and decision," the "untested 
and undecided unity with God" in man's essential nature. All 
of this is figurative language to suggest the non-temporality, 
the non-actuality, the non-existence of man in his essential 
nature. Man was not good, then bad. He was potentially free 
and actually used his freedom in existence, knowing that he 
thereby would be estranged from God and from his essential 
nature. Original sin means the universal servitude of freedom 
in existence. The fall is a universal and an individual event. 3 
1. ST, I, 259. 
2, ST, I, 206. 
3. Art.(l939), 214. 
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ii. Man's existential nature. 
11an 1 s existential nature is his situation as enslaved 
in the temporal world because of his misuse of freedom. Tillich 
speaks of the possibility that freedom can maintain itself; 
that is, that nan can retain his essential nature by choosine; 
tr,e content, t''e norm.s and t>:,e values in which our essential 
nat1"re expresses itself. But t'ois possioiHtv is scant if it 
is real at a11. 1 In actual fact, all men choose a;ainst 
freedom. ~he nossibility of choosing against freedom causes 
Angst, horror, anxiety: "the Angst of not actualizi"lt; all 
possibilities and t':le Angst of leaping fron possibil:tty to 
actuality. ]'cart is afraid not to use tl·is freedoJ:" and yei: he 
is afraid to use it." 2 Bu.'1!an freedon is t''erefore hunan peril. 
Freedom is in servitude even at the outset. 11 We can decide 
against our essential be1.ng, thus perverting our freedom into 
servitude. 113 
1. The possibility is theoretically t;ranted. But in actuality 
Tillich speaks of t 1~e UI1i vers al preponderance of servitude. 
11 The servitude of sin is universal. Onlv because t'ci.s is 
the case is it servitude. Otherwise, ev~ry individual would 
have the chance to escape servitude in all its fonns. But 
this is impossible. l"O one can escape, because the existen-
tial situation is t'"e universal situation"(].rt.(lS39), ~l{). 
Tillich also writes: "The finite character of immediate per-
sonal experience makes the 1 Fall 1 practically inescapable" 
jlrt.(l\!44), 6::). This does not mean t'Jat the fall is nearly 
inescapable. It means that actually, or in practice, the 
fall is inescapable. 
2. Art.(l939), 208. 
3. Art.(l939), 208. This seems to be sbwly another way of saying 
that all men act irrationally. The involved discussion about 
man's essence does not insist on an identity of consciousness 
between essence and exister~e and is trerefore of questionable 
value toward an understanding of man. 
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The fact that man does decide against his essential 
nature and becomes enslaved leads us to consider the second 
stage of maH 1 s nature, his existential nature. 11 We call the 
doctrine of man, from the standpoint of the ambiguity of free-
dom, the doctrine of human servitude (the doctrine of man•s 
existential nature .nl In another connect ion Tilli ch speaks 
of "existential" as that which "characterizes our real exis-
tence in all its concreteness, in all its accidental elements, 
in its freedom and responsibility, in its failure, and in its 
separation from its true and essential being •112 
The marks of man's existence are separation, self-con-
tradiction and estrangement. 3 There are two poles in this con-
sciousness. Man is aware of that from which he is separated 
as well as his actual state, else he could not feel separated 
at all. He is aware of the essence of what he is (what he ought 
to be) as well as what he actually is. Man knows an infinity 
from which he is estranged as well as his finite state, else 
he would not be aware of finiteness or of infinity. "Man knows 
that he is fini"e, that he is excluded from an infinity which 
nevertheless belongs to him. He is aware of his potential in-
finity while being aware of his actual finitude. n4 It is in 
the light of this religious a priori that Tillich would have 
us understand the ontological argument for God, not as a propo-
sition which gives the result as God, but as an indication 
1. Art.(l939l, 203. 
2. T?E, I, 88. 
3. ST, I, 66. Also Harkness, Art.(l938), 511. 
4. ST, I, 206. 
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of the ontulogical st ructw·e of finitude •1 
As man is now in his existential state Tillich speaks 
more in detail about man's existential nature than aoout his 
essential or his eschatological nature. The crisis of man•s 
existence will be discu~sed under two headings: freedom and 
reason. 
Much has been said about freedom as the essential nature 
of man. "Freedom either confirms itself or destroys itself, 
which is the possibility of good or evil. 112 As we have seen 
above freedom acts against reason and partially destroys it-
self. But this destruction is not complete. Our purpose now 
is to examine the extent to which man is free while he exists, 
while he is in servitude. 
Man does not lose his freedom completely in existence. 
He may allow his freedom to become enslaved through the mis-
use of freedom, but man in history is still free to some ex-
tent. History would have no naaning if all human freedom in 
history were denied. There is an element of human decision 
in history which "makes a difference" for man's existance. Liv-
ing in freedom is not a matter of indifference, 11 it means tm t 
we must accept the unconditional demand to realize the true and 
to actualize the good. 113 God's confronting man in history as 
the unconditional demand of being-itself, truth-itself, and 
1. ST, I, 206. 
2. Art. {1939), 
3. TPE, 198. 
See below, Chapter III. 
203. 
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the good-itself would be meaningless if man were not free to 
respond. There can be no 11 historical fulfillment" unless 
there is freedom of man. 
Meaning can be contradicted as long as history 
is going on. salvation can be accepted or can 
be denied. We can exclude ourselves from mean-
ing and no purgatory or hell can change this 
decision; or, more exactly, purgatory and hell 
themselves are the decision against the ulti-
mate meaning.l 
History is meaningful because man in history still has free-
dom. We saw history defined above as "that happening through 
which man determines his own being, including his freedom. 112 
History is history by virtue of man's freedom to act in it. 
The dynamics of history comes from the fact that man seeks 
more freedom in history. "The fact that man is free by nature 
3 
makes him restless until he has become free in history." 
Man in existence, then, has freedom, a realm of free 
creativity. Man's creative freedom in history has three con-
ditions: freedom for meaningful creativity, freedom for au-
tonomous creativity, and freedom for self-fulfilling creativi-
ty. 4 Meaningful creativity means a freedom to decide about 
the meaning and purpose of one's actions. Man is free to create 
according to meaning and purpose. Autonomous creativity means 
the freedom to "follow the objective demands involved in the 
l. IOH, 283. 3 2. Art.(l940) , 124. 
3. Art.(l940)~, 128. 
4. Art.(l940) , 131. 
30 
nature of one's work, unrestrained by heteronomous demands 
coming from outside. 111 Man is free to know the plan and pur-
pose of his creative activity. He does not have to bow blindly 
to a superimposed pattern which is alien to his nature. Self-
fulfilling creativity is toward the full actualization of one•s 
potentialities, attended by joy and happiness, eudaimonia. 
Man is free to choose those acts which will express and develop 
his essential nature. 
In each of these conditions a limitation is implied. We 
have seen in the definition of freedom above that freedom is 
not caprice, that it is always closely tied with reason. Man's 
freedom is within the logos structure of himself and of his 
world as well as within the unconditional activity of God. 
Man is free in ex:cstence to choose against reason and to that 
extent destroy himself. But man is not free to change the logos. 
Man is free in existence to transcend his environment and even 
to alter.the external world, but it is only as he participates 
in the universal logos that he can accomplish this. Man is free 
in existence to respond to God, to the offer of salvation; but 
man is not free to accomplish his own salvation. 
As there is a limit to man's freedom 11 at the· top," so to 
speak, there is also a limit 11 at the bottom." Man cannot abdi-
cate his humanity by any choice. As Tillich writes in connec-
tion with the discussion of sin, 11 man can never lose his in-
1. Art.(l940) 3 , 132. 
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finity and spirituality. He can never become a •stone and 
stump. ,.,l Within these limitations man is free in existence. 
It was seen above that the essence of ontological rea-
son, the universal logos of being, is identical with the con-
tent of revelation. 2 In man's essential nature reason and 
revelation are not distinguished, reason is revelation. It 
now concerns us to inquire into what happens to reason under 
the conditions of existence. It is already clear that exis-
tential man is fallen man. 
Man is not what he ought to be; his true being 
and his real existence contradict each other. 
Man is fallen, if not from an original actual 
goodness, at least from a stage of undeveloped 
innocence. He is estranged from himself and his 
true humanity, he has been dehumanized, he has 
become an object, a means of profit, a quantity 
of working power--according to Marx. He is es-
tranged from his divine destiny, he has lost 
the true dignity of his being, the image of God, 
he is separated from his fellowman by pride, 
cupidity, and the will-to-power--according to 
ChriStianity.3 
To what extent, then has man lost his true dignity, the image 
of God? 
Under the conditions of existence reason cannot behold 
its ground clearly. Its concepts are blurred and distorted. 
The structural elements of reason move against each other rather 
than in harmony. They never completely separate but they fall in-
to self-destructive conflicts which actual reason cannot solve. 
l. Art.(l939), 212, 213. 
2. ST, I, 74. 
3. TFE, 254, 255. 
The polarity of structure and depth within rea-
son produces a conflict between autonomous and 
heteronomous reason under the conditions of 
existence. Out of this conflict arises the 
quest for theonomy. The polarity of the static 
and dynamic elements of reason produces a con-
flict between absolutism and relativism of rea-
son under the conditions of existence. This 
conflict leads to the quest for the concrete-
absolute. The polarity of the formal and the 
emotional elements of reason produces the con-
flict between formalism and irrationalism of 
reason under the conditions of existence. Out 
of this conflict arises the quest for the union 
of form and mystery. In all these cases reason 
is driven to the quest for revelation.l 
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Theonomy means that autonomous reason is united with 
its own depth, that reason 
actualizes itself in obedience to its structural 
laws and in the power of its own inexhaustible 
ground. Since God (Theos) is the law (nomos) for 
both the structure and the ground of reason, 
they are united in him and thei2 unity is mani-
fest in a theonomous situation. 
But under the conditions of existence there is never a com-
plate theonomy. The elements which are essentially united are 
existentially separated, involved in strife with each other. 
There arises out of reason a quest for a reunion of what is 
split in time and space. In existential reason there is a quest 
for revelation. Existential reason is aware of its essential 
unity with God, but it cannot reestablish that unity. The image 
of God in man is man's rational nature, 3 but man's reason is 
under the destructive forces of existence. 
1. ST, I, 83. 
2. ST, I, 85. 
3. ST, I, 259. 
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Yet man 1 s reason is not destroyed. "In the actual life 
1 
of reason its basic structure is never completely lost." 
Even in existence reason performs a function which makes reve-
lation meaningful. Reason is in search of a unity, in quest of 
a being, in pursuit of an answer. Reason is asking a question 
in the light of which revelation can provide an answer. "Only 
those who have experienced the tragic ambiguities of our his-
torical existence can understand what the symbol of the King-
dom of God means. Revelation answers questions which have been 
asked. "Revelation does not destroy reason but reason 
raises the question of revelation. 113 
Tillich will not tolerate an anti-logos theology. He re-
fers to attacks upon reason as such as symptoms either of "theo-
--
logical ignorance or of theological arrogance. 114 He says toot 
the demand "to sacrifice one 1 s intellect is more demonic than 
divine. For man ceases to be man if he ceases to be intellect." 5 
Though God 1 s acting transcends all possible human expectations 
and all necessary human preparations, it does not destroy human 
reason. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
ST, I, 
ST, I, 
ST, I, 
For God acts t.hrough the Logos which is the 
transcendent and transcending source of the 
logos structure of thought and being. God does 6 not annihilate the expressions of his own Logos. 
83. 
62. 
81 
ST, I, 83 4 Art • ( 1944 ) , 3:::!4. 
ST, I, 57. 
In a review of H. Richard Niebuhr's book, The Meaning 
of Revelation, Tillich quotes Niebuhr with approval concern-
ing the raoionali ty of revelation. 11 •The revelatory moment is 
revelatory because it is rational, because it makes the under-
standing of order and meaning in personal life possible. •111 
Existential reason does not produce revelation but it seeKs 
revelation and realizes its fulfillment by receiving revela-
tion 11 for revelation means the reintegration of reason. 112 
Reason asks for revelation, receives revelation and appropria"es 
revelation in relation to the ordinary experiences of human 
life. It is not correct to say, therefore, that man's reason 
is destroyed. Man's hope in existence is in the power of rea-
son to seek God and to respond to God as much as it is in the 
"word" which comes from God. 
In existence man is in despair, or as Tillich prefers 
the German, man is Verzweiflung. Man is split, both in freedom 
and in rea~on. He is not what he knows he ought to be. He can-
not fulfill himself yet he feels an unconditional compulsion 
to fulfill himself. Because of his 11 fall" his freedom has be-
come servitude and his reason has become disharmunious and 
seLf-destructive. Existential man is in anxiety, in a ~tate 
of quest and longing for reunion with that which is his most 
true self. He hopes eschatologically for the "new being" in 
which there is "release co ohe captives, recovery of sight to 
1. Art.(l941)2 , 454. 
2. ST, I, 94. 
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the blind" and the reconciliation of' that which has been 
severed. He longs for that which Tillich envisions in the 
concep·~ of man's eschatological nature. 
iii. Man's eschatological nature. 
Man's existence is characterized by disruption, con-
f'lict, self'-d~struction, meaninglessness and despair. The 
question which arises out of man's existential experience, 
according to Tillich, is not that of a merciful God and the 
forgiveness of sins as it was in the Reformation; nor is it 
that of finitude, death and error as it was in the early Greek 
church; nor is it that of' the Christianiza tion of' culture as 
it is in much modern personal religious lit's. 
It is the question of a reality in which the self-
estrangement of our existence is overcome, a 
reality of reconciliation and reunion,of creati-
vity, meaning and hope. We shall call such a 
reality the "New Being."l 
Man's eschatological nature is in terms of Ghe manifestation 
of the New Being. This manifestation is actual to a degree 
in history and anticipated more fully oeyond history. 
Tillich believes that the announcement of' the New Being 
is the heart of the evangelical message. Circumcision or un-
circumcision, baptism or the lack of' it, sacrifices or not --
all of these things and acts do not matter, or at best matter 
only secondarily. What does matter is the new creation.<: 
1. ST, I, 49. 
2. Art.(l950), 5llff. 
, we, the ministers and teachers of Christiantty, 
do not call you to Uhristianity but rather to 
the New Being to which Christianity sr'ould be 
a witness and nothing else, not confusing it-
self with that New Being.l 
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Indeed, Tillich asserts that no religion matters, only a new 
state of t'oings, the new Being. Christianity's claim is not 
that of a better relicion, a more powerful baptism, more 
pious saints, or more efficient church organizations. The es-
sential message of the Chrtstian missionary is not to convert 
the hearer to "my kind of religion." It is rather to witness 
to sometbing he has seen and heard: "that in the old creation 
there is a new creatl.on, and that this new creation is mani-
fest in Jesus who is called the Christ ; 11 2 that 
we want only to ~omm~icate to you an experience 
we have had, that here and there in the world 
and now and then in ourselves is a new creation, 
usually hidden, but sometimes manifest, and cer- 3 tainly manifest in Jesus who is called the Christ. 
The new creation, the new being, this alone matters ulti-
mately, this is our infinite passion and our ultimate con-
cern. This is the heart of the Ch_xois tian Ler:'ema. 
And what is this New Being? 
It is the renewal of the old w 1~ich has been 
corrupted, distorted, split, almost. destroyed--
but not w~olly destroyed. Salvation does not 
destrov creation; it transforms the old crea-
tion into a new one. Therefore we can soeak of 
the new in terns of a re-newal, threefold--re-
conciliation, re-union-;-re-surrection.4 -
1. SOP, 103. 
2. J',rt.(l9b0), 51'"· 
appreciations of 
3. Art.(l9b0), 513. 
4. Art.(l950), 514. 
But surely there are less and mo.re adequate 
t;~·is "new creation." 
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It is important to note the continuity of identity which pre-
vails between existential and eschatological man. Ideas such 
as "total depravity," "man's righteousness being as filthy 
rags," "the more absurd, the more religious," are denied by 
Tillich through his insistence on the continuity of the es-
sential dignity and rationality of man. Man 1 s reason is "fal-
len" through its partial separation from God, but it is still 
reason and is in correlation with revelation. This correlation 
which in existence is a "pulling-in-two-directions" becomes 
integrated under the manifestation of the New Being. This inte-
gration involves reconciliation, reunion and resurrection. 
The reconciliation which the manifestation of the New 
Being effects within us is toward God, toward others and toward 
ourselves. There is a new reality that bEs appeared in Jesus 
that removes the hostility we have felt toward God, others and 
ourselves, replacing hostility with harmony and friendly under-
standing. That which was at warfare is now at peace. That which 
was involved in destructive effort now rests in friendly com-
patibility. The initiative is with God, with the New Being. 
Man does not seek to reconcile God or his neighbor. Man 
himself is reconciled. He is open to be saved by the inflow 
of a new reality which in its coming reconciles man to himself, 
to others and to God. 
Reconciliation makes possible the second effect of the 
New Being -- reunion. When man receives the New Being he is a 
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new creation. This new creation is a new reality in which 
that which was separated is reunited. Christ is the manifesta-
tion of unifying power because in him the separation from God 
and mankind and himself never overcame the unity with God and 
mankind and himself. The manifestation of the New Being achieves 
the reunion of man with God, "the ground and meaning of one's 
1 
exis te nee." Man feels united with God. The estrangement be-
tween man and man is transformed into a "feeling-with" mankind. 
Man feels united with himself. Life assumes an order, a pur-
pose, a meaning. 
Concerning this reunion with oneself, Tillich writes in-
terestingly about healing. The word, "salvation," is closely 
associated etymologically with healing; salvation meaning be-
ing healthy, being sound, whole. Health indicates wholeness, 
the opposite of disintegration and corruption. 2 Thus the work 
of the physician stands as a symbol for the ultimate ontologi-
cal restitution and reunion created by the New Being. In the 
deepest sense of the words man is not healed until ne is saved. 
Disintegrating servitudes and divided loyalties and demonic 
possession must be overcome as well as disease. The ontologi-
cal healing, therefore, must touch more than the conscious cen-
ter of the personality. It must penetrate every stratum of per-
sonality, the vital and preconscious affections as well as the 
1. Art.(l950), 515. 
2. TPE, 61. 
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center of consciousness. This reunion of man with himself, 
• 
this overcoming of schizophrenia, this "healing" of man is 
effected by the presence of the New Being. Man becomes a new 
creature because he is reunited with God, with mankind and 
with himself. 
The third effect of renewal which the New Being brings 
about in man is resurrection. Resurrection is not meant as an 
eschatological concept here. It means the "victory of the new 
state of things, the new being born out of the death of the 
old. 111 This birth is here >~nd now. The new being creates life 
out of death, meaning out of meaninglessness, victory out of 
defeat. The effect of the New Being is eternal life, the cre-
ation of eternal meaning out of the moments of time. 
Jesus as the Christ is the New Being which makes man a 
new creature. Jesus is the New Being because in him "essential 
God-manhood appears conquering the disruption of the unity be-
tween God and man. 112 Jesus overcomes the cleavage between es-
sential and existential being. Jesus represents the essential 
unity of finitude and infinity under the condition of their 
existential separation because Jesus shows the character of 
essential God-manhood, not in an uncontested unity of essential 
innocence, but "actualized and maintained against the dis-
ruptions of the Existential situation in which it appears. 113 
1. Art.(l950), 516. 
2. STP, III, 14. This is not consistent with Tillich's con-
tention that servitude is universal. 
3. STP, III, 16. Two centers of being and awareness are 
clearly indicated here, however. 
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What was retained as a theoretical possibility above, that 
freedom might choose according to the Logos and fulfill it-
self, is actual in Jesus and only in Jesus. Christ is called 
the Savior because he liberates and transforms existential 
being. Insofar as Christ reestablishes the unity between God 
and man he can be called the 11 Mediator. 111 
Where Christ manifests the New Being and reunites that 
which was separated, the church appears. 11 The church is the 
New Being as community or the community of faith and love. 112 
As the church is the community of faith she receives the New 
Being in Jesus as the principle of its life. As the church is 
the community of love, she actualizes the New Being in the 
relation between her members, between herself and all men, 
and between man and nature. 3 
The church has expressed her evaluation of the meaning 
of history in the conception of the Kingdom of God. As we saw 
above, there is no history in essential being. History pre-
supposes the actualization of human freedom and svirit. History 
contains creative and destructive elements within it, with no 
power of itself to reconcile these. It is thus that the "mean-
ing of history" depends upon the manifestation of a meaning in 
history, a meaning which overcomes the disunity of historical 
existence. Jesus as the Christ, the bearer of the New Being, 
.. 
1. STP, III, 19. 
2. STP, IV, 25. 
3. STP, IV, 25. 
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manifests this 11meaning11 and thus becomes the center of his-
tory, giving structure and purpose to all of history, either 
as preparation for or reception of the center. 
Christ represents the Kingdom of God in two ways, act-
1 
ually and by anticipation. It is in the light of the New Be-
ing, the Christ, the Church, and the Kingdom of God that man's 
eschatological nature is to be understood. The term, eschato-
logical nature, does not postpone all reunion to a future sal-
vation beyond history. Ultimate fulfillment is in the future 
as an eschatological hope, but man in existence experiences 
the presence of Christ; he knows as foretaste, as assured an-
ticipation, and to some extent as actually realized, what his 
escha-r;ological nature is. He is in a 11 theonomous Bituation11 
for a time. He is in an unamibiguous ecstasy for a moment, long 
enough to be assured about the nature of things in the ultimate 
2 
fulfillment of the Kingdom of God. "There is no complete the-
anomy under the conditions of existence. 113 But there is enough 
theonomy to give rise to man's hope for a complete theonomy. 
According to Tillich one must study man's essential na-
ture, his existential nature and his eschatological nature if 
one is to understand man. To look at man in any one of the 
stages is to see a "part" of man. Man in his essential nature 
is not actual, is not historical. He is in a state of dreaming 
1. STP, V, 10. 
2. ST, I, 54. 
3. ST, I, 85. 
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• 
innocence, of untested unity with God. It is the character 
of God as Being-itself, however, to actualize, to create, to 
1 
separate from self. The result of the operation of this power 
is the creation of man in freedom, the "pushing" of man into 
existence. In his existence man 11 falls • 11 In order to have 
freeaom he must be separated from his ground of being. Having 
this freedom he is in despair whether to use it or not, and 
if he should use it, how to use it. All men except Jesus 
have used their freedom against itself, against reason, thereby 
increasing the extent of the cleavage between man and God and 
accentuating the crisis of existence. 
Man's existence on all sides cries out in quest for a 
unity which it bas known but which it has lost. In existence 
there is a polar tension between the awareness of what one 
ought to be and what one is. God confronts existential man as 
the Unconditional, as truth-itself, as the good-itself, as be-
ing-itself. Of his own power man cannot secure that unity which 
he seeks. But again the initiative of being-itself acts in 
man's behalf. For 11 self-separa ting11 is only a part of the charac-
ter of the ground of being. 11 Self-returning" is the other part. 
Thus through Jesus as the Christ, the New Being, God liberates 
man from his existential servitude and makes him a 11 new crea-
ture" at unity with himself, with mankind and with God. Man 
experiences this New Being in moments of ecstasy which do not 
2 1. Art.(l949) , 15. This suggests an ultimate monism. 
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endure. But these moments give a certain hope as to what man 
shall be beyond hist.ory. These theonomous experiences trans-
form history for man, even while man is in existence. There 
is partial reconciliation, reunion and resurrection. And there 
is confident hope in the ultimate and complete reconciliation, 
reunion and resurrection in the Kingdom of God. 
Tillich•s analysis is more logical concerning man•s 
existential and eschatological naoure than about man's essantial 
nature. There is a definite continuity of consciousness and 
identity between existential man and eschatological man. 
There is a question about the reality of time and of the re-
tention of individuality by man in his eschatological nature 
and these are real problems in Tillich 1 s concept. But the root 
difficulties lie with Tillich•s concept of man's essential na-
ture. The two main difficulties with Tillich•s concept of 
essential man are: 1. What is the nature of the unity which 
prevails between man and God? and, 2. What sort of identity 
prevails between essential and existential man? 
If finite and infinite, reason and revelation, are not 
distinguished in man•s essence, then there seems to be ar1 ab-
solute identity. God and man seem to be one, man being simply 
a part of God. That is to say, if man in his essence is a merely 
potential being and not an actual being in any sense, it is 
doubtful that the concept of man 1 s essence adds anything to an 
understanding of actual man. Tillich 1 s concept of essential 
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man implies either the idea of man's coeternality with God or 
the ontological identity of man with God, an absolute monism. 
Tillich would reject the former idea, but would have difficulty 
denying the latter. Indeed, as we shall see below, Tillich 
is an absolute monist because he denies a substantial ontologi-
cal status to man. Man for Tillich is not real as an individual 
metaphysical entity, the creation of God, Man is a phase of 
the objectification of God, the actualization of God. 
The second difficulty with Tillich•s concept of essen-
tial man is closely related to the first; namely, the nature 
of the continuity between essential and existential man. It 
seems that if there is to be any continuity of identity, man 
must in some sense be actual even in his essence. There must 
be a unity of consciousness of some sort which is designated 
as man. And this unity of consciousness must be actual, a 
center of awareness. If this actual unity of consciousness is 
denied to essential man, the only way that the conce~t could 
be meaningful would be in terms of an absoluLe idealism. But 
Tillich does not think that essential man is actual or separate 
as a unity of consciousness. Indeed, man's state of "untested 
unity" and of "dreaming innocence" indicate the nonactuality 
of essential man. Thus agaln, strength is given to the inter-
pretation which views Tillich as an absolute moni~t. For 
Tillich the ultimate ontological reality is One, God, Many 
questions arise about the nature of freedom and separation and 
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dignity in connection with existential man. In spite of these 
questions, however, the difficulties with Tillich's concept of 
essential man indicate that the basic position around which 
Tillich•s thought is oriented is that of an ultimate ontologi-
cal monism, both quantitative and qualitative. 
3. Reason in the man-God relationship. 
i. Reason in creation. 
Just what happens at creation according to Tillich is 
most difficult to understand. The basic problem is whether 
the man who is created is proyerly "man" or "God," whether 
the view of Tillich is an ultimate monism or pluralism. That 
problem will constitute the center of our concern in iv. below. 
For the .!!resent let us consider the role of reason in creation. 
Creation is the proper activity of God; it is God•s na-
ture to create. Creation is identical with God's life. 1 But 
Tillich does not mean by creation an event which took place 
"once upon a time." creation does not describe an event, it 
rather indicates a condition, a relationship between God and 
the world. "It is the correlate to the analysis of' man's f'ini-
tude, it answers the question implied in man's finitude and in 
finitude generally." 2 Man asks a question which, in existence, 
he cannot answer. But the question is answered by man's essen-
tial nature, his unity with God. Creation is the word given 
1. ST, I, 252, 264. 
2. ST, I, 252. 
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to the process which actualizes man in existence. To indicate 
the gap between his essential nature and his existential na-
ture man speaks of "creation." 
There is a question about creation of which Tillich is 
conscious. Is creation the activity of God in "pushing" man 
into existence? Or is creation another word for the fall, in-
dicating the activity of man's freedom in creation? In the 
realm of creaturely freedom creation and the fall coincide. 1 
creation is fulfilled in the self-realization of the creature. 
self-realization is possible through man's assuming the initi-
ative, man•s actualization of freedom which is possible only 
through a break between essence and existence. Creation as a 
description of man's creaturely situation really involves both 
ideas; created goodness as potentiality (dreaming innocence), 
and actualized freedom (the 11 fall 11 which involves man's sepa-
ration from the ultimate ground and "standing upon" himself). 
creation indicates the activity of God, of the divine life. 
The fall indicates the activity of man, the human life. 
In creation the Logos is important in a threefold way: 
as the quality of God which makes creation possible, as the 
agent of creation, and as the form which power assumes in its 
actualization, as the form of creation. 
The Logos, or reason, indicates the nature of God as 
self-manifesting. 2 If God were only "Father," he would be only 
l. ST, I, 256. In using his freedom man "falls." 
2. ST, I, 158. 
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"abyss," he would be "chaos, burning fire," but he wmlld not 
be the creative ground. Without the Logos, God would be ab-
1 
solutely secluded and unklc.own. Logos is integrated within 
the nature of God, as is ''abyss.'' Till1ch's definition of 
God is usually that God is t.he ground and aoyss of being and 
meaning. 2 God is not God without both elements in his nature. 
Thus reason is ttat quality in God w!cich manifests itself, 
objectifies itself, opens itself to cm,lprehension and under-
stanciin_;. Reason j_s that part of God's nature eabracine; mean-
ine;, structure and form by virtue of which God creates, re-
vealing himself. Reason is the logical "character of the di-
vine life" wlc.ich makes creation possible. 3 
Reason also nceans the 11 medium11 of revelation for Til-
lich. God reveals r:i~1self through tLe Word, reason, or the 
lor;os. Reason is the "dynamic spiritual word w'::l.ch mediates 
between the silent mystery of the a~ysa of being and the full-
ness of concrete, individualized, self-rolated bein~s.•• 4 This 
assertion is somewhat inconsistent with tl"e statenec-1ts made 
in the para:;raph above. If reason is the 11 ac_;ant" of creation, 
or in Tillich's terms, if reason in creation is a sort of 
"tec.l"_n.i.cal reason," then a subordination of reason to God, of 
tool to mechanic, of "acent 11 to 11 er1ployer11 is implied. On the 
l. ST, I, 251. 
Logos in God 
2. IOH, 222. 
3. S'l', I, 156. 
4. ST, I, 158. 
Por a fullor discussion of the place of the 
see Chapter III, 3, below. 
48 
other hand, if the logos is integral in the nature of God, of 
the same status as abyss, there is no subordination but co-
ordination. A thorough treatment of the inconsistency will not 
be attempted at this point. The inconsistency is noted here 
only to accentuate the role of reason in creation. At times Til-
lich speaks of reason as if it were the agent of God in creation. 
For our present interest, however, the most important 
role of reason in creation is the extent to which reason is 
present in the created forms. Reason is actualized in indivi-
dual selves and in the world. The world is not a disorderly 
conglomeration, it is a "structured whole," whose structure 
is called objective reason. 1 Reason makes the world a world. 
Without reason there would be no world. There would only be 
2 
chaos. The world, then, as structured by reason may be said 
to "bear" objective reason. "Nothing falls outside the logos 
structure of being. 113 Neither the abysmal dynamism of God4 
nor the creativity of man's freedom5 can bring anything into 
being which contradicts reason. Objective reason is the 
structure within which evc;rytbing must come to be. 
On the other hand reason makes the self a self. The 
structure of centeredness which is the self is subjective 
1. ST, I, 171, 172. 
2. The "chaos" here suggests the "Gi ven 11 of E. s. Brightman. 
see Chapter III below for a fuller discussion. 
3. ST, I, 279. 
4. ST, I, 279. 
5. ST, I, 79. 
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reason. It is the unity of thought and apprehension which is 
also conscious of self and world. Without reason there would 
be no self. On the basis of reason the self knows the world. 
For the reason of the self and of the world correspond. 1 
There is an analogy between subjective and objective reason. 2 
Indeed, there is an analogy between the logos of God and the 
logos of man. 3 It is in this sense that man is the image of 
God. There is not a total discontinuity between God and man, 
in spite of Tillich's language at times. Reason ties creation 
together. Reason is a property of the nature of God which is 
manifest in creation; original, sustaining and directing crea-
tion. Reason is the form under which everything that is has 
come to be. Reason in man also constitutes man as a structural 
center or unity. Reason is an element in God, world and man 
which holds them in unity, though their unity is never complete 
in existence. 
ii. Reason in the structure of man. 
In the discussion of basic definitions above we saw that 
man for Tillich is a composite being, a unity of many campo-
nents. Tillich rejects the interpretation of man wholly in 
terms of his rational self-consciousness. Man is more than 
reason, more than consciousness. He is also soul, the vital 
1. ~T, I, 171. 
2. ST, I, 23. 
3. ST, I, 259. 
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and emotional ground from which personality arises. Man is 
"the dynamic unity of reason and power. 11 1 Tillich seems to 
regard reason as a skeletal structure without power in his 
analysis of God and man. For in each case the dynamic quality 
is another part, the abyss in the case of God, the psychic 
foundation in the case of man. But in God and in man these 
qualities of power and form, of soul and reason, which have 
been treated theoretically as isolated, are in actual, organic, 
creative unity in the concept of spirit. God as Spirit be-
comes meaningful power, powerful meaning. Man as spirit be-
comes powerful reason, rational power. 
There are two main poles in man, the vital and the ra-
tional, in a way similar to the physical and mental poles in 
Whitehead's "actual occasions." These poles are always in 
dynamic unity. A division of the soul which puts reason in 
the position of ruler over other elements is not appropriate 
for Tillich. For reason as consciousness, conscious center, 
is not an adequate basis for the development of personality 
2 
according to Tillich. The vital forces will not be suppressed 
ultimaoely. Reason and the psychic foundation must be in a 
relationship of "fulfillment" to each other. Neither of it-
self rules the personality. They make each other full through 
submission to a higher unity, God, the ground and abyss of 
power and meaning. 
1. Art.(l939), 206. 
2. TPE, 133, 178. 
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It is in the light of this polar nature of man that 
Tillich emphasizes the need for a grace that will penetrate 
deeper than the conscious center of one's life. "Grace must 
include -- a~ it does in the New Testament -- all sides of the 
personal life, its vital foundation, its psychic dynamics, 
its individual uniqueness, and its conscious center. 111 Any 
religion which is thorough must take the whole nature of man 
into account, offering the redemption of man's subconscious 
vitality as well as his conscious rationality. Tillich tries 
to correct the one-sided emphasis of Protestantism on "pure 
consciousness" by witnessing to the new creature, brought 
into being by the presence of the New Being. 
In a theoretical consideration of the structure of man 
reason is seen to be an integral part of man's nature, but 
not the sole or ruling part. Reason and soul are in dynamic 
unity in human personality. Their unity in a living person 
is referred to as spirit. The relationship of one to the 
other is that of fulfillment, not that of subordination or 
submission of one to the other. 
It seems that in his analysis or man Tillich is abstract 
and inconsistent. The analysis is abstract in implying that 
two component parts are "pu-r; together," ~;heir unity constitut-
ing man as spirit. The analysis is inconsistent in speaking 
of the fulfillment of that which is psychic foundation. The 
1. TPE, 133, 134. 
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vital, psychic foundation seems in the analysis not to contain 
logos or reason. How formless power, preconscious vitality 
could be 11 fulfilled" if it had no law or form or reason is 
difficult to understand. It seems artificial and abstract ever 
to think of power as formless or of reason as powerless. This 
is especially true when power cannot express itself except in 
terms of reason. Thus all power which exists is rational power. 
Tillich speaks of the subconscious as "possibility" or 11 poten-
l tiality. 11 In this case all vital potentiaHty may be spoken 
of a~ rational potentia~ity, for neither history nor nature 
can create anything that contradicts reason. 2 There is a logos 
in man's feelings, desires, emotions,urges, call them whatever 
we wish. Reason is not a static skeletal structure within 
which a mass of dynamic matter forms itself. Reason is formed 
power, powerful unity and organization. Reason embraces the 
vital, preconscious foundation of man as well as the directed, 
conscious thought. The charioteer drives the horses as a team. 
Tillich knew this when he wrote: 
An emotional element is present in every ra-
tional act •••• one should not try to construe 
a static system of the rational functions of the 
human mind •••• Music is no less rational than 
mathematics. The emotional element in music 
opens a dimension of reality which is closed to 
mathematics. Communion is no less rational than 
law. The emotional element in communion opens a 
dimension of reality which is closed to law.3 
1. ST, I, 179. 
2. ST, I, .79. 
3. ST, I, 77. 
The same difficulty will appear in the 
concerning the relationship between the abyss 
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doctrine of God 
1 
and the logos. 
Of what value is the concept of abyss or of psychic foundation 
in the understanding of God and man if these concepts mean 
only 11 potentiality, 11 formless power which is not yet actual? 
If what the abyss and psychic foundation indicate may become 
actual only under the constraint of the logos, the value of 
the concepts is questionable. Concerning man particularly, 
if the unconscious has only a potential and not an actual 
status, the concept of the unconscious does not help us under-
stand man in actuality. Tillich's insight into the nature of 
man which appreciates the psychic foundation as well as the 
conscious center is of value. But if these two are separated 
so that the unconscious is thought of as the potential and the 
conscious as the actual, the value of the insight is diminished 
if not destroyed. 
It would seem that the psychic foundation must be actual 
along with man's conscious center, and that reason itself is 
enlivened by springs which it understands, but does not under-
stand fully. To an extent, then, all that constitutes man's 
soul for Tillich, all his vital unconscious nature, is rational 
to a degree and non-rational to a degree. The soul is a pattern 
of power capable of fulfillment, capable of salvation through 
the presence of the New Being. Reason as the conscious center 
1. See Chapter III. 
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of man is not separate from soul, The very nature of man is 
that he is a rational soul, a unity of multiples capable of 
being 11 grasped11 in soul and mind by the saving and healing 
power of the New Being. 
iii. Reason in man's existence. 
we have found reason to be that in God which moved to-
ward self-manifestation, that through which God manifests 
himself and that form which all created beings bear. In man 
this form is not only a unity and centeredness, but it becomes 
self-conscious. Reason is God•s image in man, that capacity 
of man to think God's thoughts after him. In man's essential 
nature he is in a dreaming state of innocence, a state of un-
tested unity with God. But when man enters existence through 
the actualization of his finite freedom, every capacity of man 
becomes distorted to some extent. That fact makes it necessary 
for us to consider man's existential reason separately. 
In existence reason becomes actual and in so doing be-
comes dependent upon the "destructive structures of existence 
and the saving structures-of life. 11 1 Or as Tillich says it in 
another way: "In every rational act three elements inl:)ere: 
the static element of reason, the dynamic element of reason, 
and the existential distortion of both of them. 112 Whatever 
we may say about reason in man's existence, then, we are speak-
1. ST, I, 75. 
2. ST, I, 78. 
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ing of "fallen" reason which is in need of redemption. 11 Actual 
reason needs salvation, as do all the other sides of man's na-
1 
ture and of reality generally." What is the capacity of this 
fallen, existential reason, then? That is our immediate ques-
tion. The function of reason in Tillich•s method, in the con-
struction of a theological system, will be considered in Chap-
ter IV. The question before us now concerns the extent to 
which existential reason is able to understand God. 
In the first place, existential reason is able to com-
prebend the order of reason in the world. This order may be 
spoken of as a universal revelation. Tillich is insistent that 
the final revelation could not occur nor be received except on 
the basis of a universal revelation. 2 No ontology whatsoever 
is possible except on the basis of the "universal, though 
3 fragmentary, process of revelation." Without his rational 
capacity and his ordered world man could not have conversed 
with man. He could not have thought through the meaning of 
his life and of history. He could not have felt the presence 
of the unconditional demand of truth-itself and of the good-it-
self. He could not have asked for final revelation, therefore 
he could not have received the answer of final revelation. God 
confronts man's reason. God does not replace man with another 
being. "He reveals himself to man and saves man. 114 It is this 
1. ST, I, 155. 
2. ST, I, 139~ 
3. Art.(l949) , 2. 
4. ST, I, 139. 
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capacity of reason to seek meaning that Tillich indicates 
when he writes: "There is nothing in heaven and earth, or 
beyond them, to which the philosopher must subject himself 
except the universal logos of being as it gives itself to him 
1 in experience." Distorted as reason is in existence reason 
is nevertheless still able to seek meaning in an orderly 
world, and in continuity with lower realized meanings reason 
can seek the highest meaning. Reason is still the logos of 
God in man and nature, the universal image of God on all of 
his creation. Existential reason is that quality of human 
nature which, in correlation with revelation, makes the God-
man encounter possible. 
In the second place existential reason is the seat of 
severe conflicts which in its own power reason cannot recon-
cile. Reason is that capacity of man to work through the 
human possibilities in quest of the reconciliation of these 
conflicts. Reason means the search for order, unity, coherence. 
Reason is the seat of the conflicts and the drive for order 
which looks beyond the conflicts with sharp sensitivity to a 
healing of reason's disrupted state. The conflicts are three: 
autonomy against heteronomy, relativism against absolutism, 
and formalism against emotionalism. 
Reason in existence has lost its inner unity. The struc-
tural elements move against each other. There is no complete 
1. ST, I, 28. 
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separation, but there is inner strife. Structure and depth 
produce a conflict between autonomy and heteronomy in reason. 
Autonomy means obeying the law of reason, subjective-objective 
reason, the logos structure of mind and reality. "It is obedi-
ence to its own essential structure, the law of reason which 
is the law of nature within mind and reality, and which is 
divine law, rooted in the ground of being itself. 111 There is 
a struggle if reason actualizes itself without regarding its 
depth, or if reason regards its depth as heteronomous, a for-
eign law imposed upon it. The ideal situation is that of the-
anomy, autonomous reason united with its depth. But there is 
no complete theonomy under the conditions of existence. Depth 
and structure give rise to strife within reason in existence. 
But even in the strife of its existence reason is in quest for 
the reunion of these elements within itself. Reason seeks 
theonomy, reason seeks revelation. Neither autonomy nor heter-
onomy can create the union. Depth and structure must be reunited 
if the conflict is to cease. Reason seeks this reunion. 
In essence reason unites a statio and a dynamic element. 
But in existence these elements are torn apart. The static 
element appears as aosolutism, the dynamic element as relativ-
ism. Each strives for exclusive domain in existential reaso~. 
But static and dynamic elements must interpenetrate for mean-
ingful life. The purely static is dead. The purely dynamic 
1. ST, I, 84. 
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is meaningless. Thus reason in existence, though torn intern-
ally by a strife between the static and the dynamic, seeks the 
peace of their reunion, Reason in existence seeks a concrete 
absolute, a living universal. 
In essence reason unites formal and emotional elements. 
But in existence this unity is disrupted, and, as was the case 
with the other elements above, the formal and emotional elements 
are engaged in warfare against each other. Formalism in the 
cognitive realm results in an intellectualism, an exclusively 
controlling knowledge. In the aesthetic, legal and communal 
realms as well, formalism cripples life and shackles reality 
with a rigid skeleton of pure form. Formalism separates the-
ory from practice so as to place them in conflict. On the 
other hand, emotion without form, without rational structure, 
becomes irrationalism. Emotion may assume enough form to ex-
press itself against reason in a blind and fanatical effort 
of a part to become the whole. Or emotion may be formless, 
mere subjective feeling, a vacuum. 1 
1. As an example of empty irrationalism Tillich cites the Ger-
man youth movement. It was "fertile soil for the rational 
irrationalism of the Nazis. 11 (ST, I, 93n). In the light of 
the criticism of Tillich above something more should be 
said here. Tillich betrays his own position when he speaks 
of anything as existing without form. His resorting to con-
fusing terms such as "irrationally promoted reason" and 
"rational irrationalism" is as confusing as Barth's "impos-
sible possibility" which Tillich criticizes. What Tillich 
is intending to say has been said more clearly in the terms 
of Brightman's law of the "best possible"(Brightman, ML, 
156ff), and in terms of the criterion of.coherence. It 
seems that even the simplest emotions are rational in the 
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Reason in existence suffers a split between form and 
emotion. Neither is capable of exclusive emphasis. Harmony 
can come to reason only by the reunion of form and emotion. 
Again, then, though the elements are in intense opposition, 
reason in existence seeks their reunion, reason seeks rave-
lation. In the case of autonomy against heteronomy, relativism 
against absolutism, emotion against form, reason knows that 
there is an answer, but it is an answer not within the grasp 
of reason. Existential reason seeks revelation. 
A third important aspect of reason's activity in exist-
ence is "he reception of revelation. Reason is not only the 
imprint of God•s logos upon his creature and creation. It ~ 
not only man's awareness of distortion and his seeKing for 
unity. Re~son is also the capacity of receiving the revelation 
which brings the unity, the New Being, which makes man a new 
creature. Reason is neither confirmed in its state of conflict 
nor denied in its essential structure by revelation. "But its 
essential structure is re-established under the conditions of 
existence, fragmentarily, yet really and in power. 11 1 Reason 
is saved. Reason received revelation. This is not to deny that 
every element in reality receives revelation and is saved. But 
it is to emphasize that the rational and conscious center of 
sense of 11 having a form." The thing of importance is that 
a life center itself not.around the lowest but around the 
highest, the most inclusive and creative, rationality. 
1. ST, I, 155. 
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personality also receives revelation. Reason constitutes man 
as man and makes him unique in his capacity to receive r.eve-
lation. Man receives revelation in a special way because man 
is conscious and rational. He seeks revelation in a special 
way. And when revelation comes to man reason receives the 
revelation. 
Revelation could not occur if it destroyed the 
organ of its reception. And this organ is reason. 
Man, in contrast to all other created beings, can 1 receive revelation because he is a rational being. 
The theoretical consideration of the role of reason in 
man's existence has brought us to recognize three main func-
tiona. Reason is the image of God, the imprint of the logos 
of God in man which makes possible the God-man correlation. 
Reason is that conscious capacity of man which experiences an 
inner warfare in existence but which seeks the peace of a 
reunion which "ought" to be. Reason is that in man which 
receives revelation, that to which the ground of being mani-
fests itself. 
iv. Man and God. 
We come now to a crucial issue for an understanding of 
Tillich. Is man a part of God in an absolute quantitative 
monism? Or is man akin to God in essence, created with onto-
logical reality, but a separate individual in the sense of an 
absolute qualitative monism but quantitative pluralism? There 
1. Art.(l943), 9. 
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seem to be passages in Tillich indicating both positions. 
There are many passages which indicate that man is a 
part of God. In speaking of God as living Tillich denies 
that there is a definite separation of being from being in 
God. 1 The emphasis on God's participation in every life as 
its ground and aim is monistic. 2 The similarity of Tillich•s 
theology with Hegel's philosophy of spirit and Plotinus 1 
philosophy of the One inclines one to interpret Tillich as an 
absolute monist. God goes out from himself. He rests in 
himself. 3 "The finite is posited as finite within the proc-
ess of the divine life, but it is reunited with the infinite 
within the same process. 114 "God is infinite because he has 
the finite within himself united with his infinity. 11 5 "The 
divine life is creative, actualizing itself in inexhaustible 
6 
abundance." The "actualizing itself" is taken to be a cru-
cial phrase in Tillich 1 s theology. It is precisely this 
"actualizing itself" that happens at creation, the "beginning 
of existence." The divine actualizes itself. 
Speaking of God as related, Tillich says that in God 
relations do not imply the relations of God with something 
else. "They are the inner relations of the divine life. 117 
From the standpoint of God, then, there are no external 
relations. All relations are internal. Man is related to 
1. ST, I, 242. 
2, ST, I, 245. 
3. ST, I, 247. 
4. ST, I, 251. 
5, ST, I, 282. 
6. ST, I, 2b2. 
7. ST, I, 271. 
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God as a part to the whole. But perhaps the most convincing 
statement of monism is in terms of love, that "man 1 s love of 
God is the love with which God loves himself ••.• The 
divine life is the divine self-love. 111 God is the subject 
even where he appears to be the object. Passages such as 
these certainly indicate an absolute monism. 
But Tillich is insistent also on a pluralism, a prin-
ciple of individualization. The many passages quoted above 
concerning finite freedom and history have a bearing on indi-
vidualization. There would be no history unless man were to 
some degree free; that is, to some degree independent from 
God. Creaturely freedom implies that God is partially sepa-
2 
rated from man. The basic characteristic of existence is a 
separation of man from God. "Sin is the disruption of the 
essential unity between God and man by man's actualized free-
dom.113 Man is completely self-centered and completely indi-
vidualized. 4 Man in existence is conscious of an absolute 
demand, an unconditional demand to become what he is not. 5 
Man has in a sense left the divine ground to 11 stand upon" 
his own feet. He is to some extent 11 outside 11 the divine 
life. "To be outside the divine life means to stand in actu-
1. ST, I, 282. Actually Tillich makes the same assertion about 
divine knowledge. 11 If there is a knowledge of God, it is 
God who knows himself through man11 (ST, I, 172). 
2. ST, I, 282 • 
3. STP, III, 4. 
4. ST, I, 175. 
5. TPE, 32n. 
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alized freedom, in an existence which is no longer united with 
1 
essence." In speaking of God as living Tillich intends to 
deny a pure identity of being as being.2 
What sort of resolution of these seeming contradictions 
is possible? Tillich does not deal explicitly with the problem 
as it is now before us. But in terms of his thought as a whole 
it is justifiable to resolve the contradictions on the basis of 
Tillich's distinction between essence and existence. Essential-
ly God is all in all; God is one, and man is not actual as a 
separate being. Man is a part of God. But in existence, in 
the realm of God's creation there is a partial separation of 
man from God through the actualization of man's finite freedom. 
The sustaining structure of existence is still unity with God. 
But the unity is not camp leta in existence. In axis tence, 
then, God and man are separate to an extent, and there is a 
pluralism. The emphasis on the polar structure of 11 indi vidu-
alization and participation" indicates the partial nature of 
the separation. In the light of the essential realm and of 
the ground in existence which ultimately reunites man with 
itself, we conclude that existential man is a 11 part 11 of God's 
self-realization, but man is not a separate metaphysical anti-
ty. Though man and God are separate in existence they are not 
separate in essence. Thus the conclusion must be that Tillich 
is an absolute monist, a metaphysical monist. Three summary 
quotations give weight to the conclusion. 11 The dialectical 
1. ST, I, 255. 
2. ST, I, 242. Tillich wants to distinguish his 11 11 ving God" 
from a 11 pure absolute." 
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method attempts to mirror the movement of reality. It is 
the logical expression of a philosophy of life, for life 
moves through self-affirmation, going out of itself and re-
turning to itself."l Speaking of God, Tillich writes: "We 
assert that he is the eternal process in which separa"Gion is 
posited and is overcome by reunion." 2 
The ground of Being of which every being takes 
its power of being has the character of self-
separating and selfre"Gurning life. Selfseparating 
is the abbreviation for separating itself from 
itself towards the complete individualization of 
the Self having itself. Selfreturning is the 
abbreviation of the return of life to itself in 
the power of reuniting love.3 
For Tillich, then, there is ultimately only one metaphysical 
reality, God. God is truth-itself, being-itself, the good-
itself. This conclusion tends to minimize the seriousness 
of Tillich 1 s remarks about "existential separation" and "finite 
freedom." But Tillich holds to existential separation and 
finite freedom in his trinitarian monotheism. God becomes 
objectified through existence. And God in the consummation, 
in the eschatological concept, is a richer Spirit than is 
God in the essential concept. The life of man is part of trn 
life of God. 
A look at the thought of Plotinus and Hegel would 
throw light on Tilli ch' s thought here. Plot in us' idea that 
man's soul is vart of the world-soul, contemplating the 
1. ST, I, 234. 8 3. Art.(l949) , 15. 
2. ST, I, 24~. 
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eternal hous, and knowing the good through a mystical intui-
tion is comparable to Tillich's idea of man's essential na-
ture. Theoretically the soul may use its freedom to remain 
in union with the world-soul. But according to Plotinus and 
Tillich the soul gazes downward, uses its freedom to choose 
what is, not fully~· and becomes partially separated from 
God. Tillich uses the term, existential nature, to indicate 
this partial separation. Both Plotinus and Tillich are 
monistic as they regard the thought and love of the individual 
soul as the thought and love of God, a sort of 11 bending back" 
or reflection of God•s thought and love. But Plotinus and Til-
lich do not agree as to man's true nature in the state of 
partial separation from God. For Plotinus the real self of 
man consists of thought, of ~ or logos. For Tillich the 
real self of man is a dynamic unity of form and power, of 
logos and vitality. Plotinus 1 view of nous as powerful form 
is more sound than Tillich 1 s somewhat artificial bifurcation 
of the true self. For both thinkers, nous is extremely im-
portant in the returning of the human soul to God, in the 
returning of a part of God back into himself. 
In Tillich the reason of man is important because it 
is in correlation with God, it is the seat of the conflicts 
of existence and the desire for reintegration, and in the 
ultimate reunion, reason receives the revelation. In Tillich•s 
thought man is reunited with God through the initiaLive of God. 
Man does not have the power to effect this reunion. The reunion 
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comes about through God's coming to man, overcoming the sepa-
ration and estrangement, and through the New Being reuniting 
man's vitality and reason with God. In the thought of Plotinus, 
on the other hanu, the initiative fur reunion lies with the 
human soul. ~'he human soul can return to God by turning from 
the sensuous life and 11 ascending" to God through thought. For 
both Plotinus and Tillich the ultimate fulfillment is in the 
ecstatic experience of mystical union of the soul with God. 
Comparison has been made in the context of the chapter 
between Tillich•s idea of the chree stases or natures of man 
and Hegel r s idea of the movement of the Idea, objectifying 
itse~f and returning into itself. The process of selfsepara-
tion and selfreturning of God is similar in Hege~ and Tillich. 
But again, as in the comparison with Plotinus, there is a 
significant difference. In Hegel's whought active reason is 
always the essence of that which is manifesting itself. In 
Tilli ch 1 s thoughc, however, ther·e is always the abyss in Gcxi 
and the vital foundation in man, the abyss and the vital founda-
tion being integral parts of the essence of God and man. Far 
Hegel the movement is centered in reason. For Tillich the 
movement always contains che poles of power and reason. 
The comparison of Tillich 1 s view with Hegel r s and 
Plotinus' thought shows clearly the monist:lc orientation of 
Tillich's system. Tillich's general positionis attractive in 
its unity and orderliness. But there still seems to be more 
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ontological reality to man than Tillich will grant. F'or Spirit 
to be richer after the process of separating and returning, 
for God to be a 11 living God, 11 the separation must be more 
than a phenomenal shadow play, it must in some way be ontolo-
gically real. But Tillich will allow no ontological separa-
tion. 
CHAPTER II 
THE PROBLEi.:l OF RELIGIOUS L!"'JV/I,EDGE 
As the problem of reli[!;ious knowledge is mentioned, 
the question arises: What is tl·e difference between religious 
knowledge and any other 1-:ind of knowledge? In order to open 
the ground for a discussion of 'the problem, Tillich r s use of 
the words "religious" and "knowledge" should be ascertained. 
"Relicion deals w"'.th the relation of man to the eternal."l 
Reli3ion is more t~an a system of special symbols, 
rites, and emotions, directed toward the .highest being; 
religion is ultimate concern; it is the state of 
being grasped by something unconditional, holy, 
absolute.2 
The phrase Tillich uses constantly is that of "ultimate 
concern." An encounter with reality in which an ultimate con-
cern is evoked is called a "religious experJ.ence." "Having 
a religious encounter with reality :means being ultimately 
concerned about reality. 113 Religion, as T:Lllich sees it, 
1. RS, 8. 
2. TPE, 59. Speaking of the definition of the theologian 
Tillich writes: "A person can be a theologian as long as 
he acknowledges the content of the theological circle as 
his ultimate cone ern. Whether tbis is true does not 
depend on his intellectual or moral or emotional state; 
it does not depend on the power of regeneration or the 
grade of sanctification. Rather it depends on his being 
ultimately concerned with the Christian message even if 
he is inclined to attack and to reject it" (S'r, I, 10). 
The theologian is thus distinguished from the philosopher 
of religion. The philosopher of relib~on tries to remain 
general and abstract, while the theologian is by intention 
specific and concrete. 
3. Art.(l947), 17. 
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then, can be no merely theoretical affair. It is an active 
existential relation of finite man to the infinite, a rela-
tion in which man is ultimately concerned. 
The difference for Tillich between being concerned and 
being ultimately concerned is the difference between philos-
ophy and theology. The philosopher places the concern about 
God "alongside" other concerns. The theologian emphasizes the 
"ultimate" quality of the relic.:ious concern, a quality which 
by definition is unique, the most real and vital concern of 
one 1 s life. 1 The encounter with reality may be regarded in 
two ways, then: A. As an event among other events -- in which 
the philosopher of religion is active, and B. As an event in 
which he who considers it is "existentially involved" -- in 
. 2 
which case the theologian is at work. The philosopher of 
religion notices the ultimate concern, but he sees it from 
the outside as an observer. He indicates, explains and eval-
uates the cone ern which others have felt, but the cone ern is 
not his. For the theologian the situation is different. "He 
applies his ultimate concern to everything, as an ultimate 
concern demands -- even to his theoretical interpretation of 
the religious encounter. 113 "The participation in a religious 
4 
reality is the presupposition of all theology." 
1. ST, I, 11, 12. It would seem, however, that if God is Logos 
the ultimate concern of the philosopher and the theologian 
would coincide. Surely it is only the ultimately 11 true 11 
which can elicit a feeling of ultimate "concern." 
2. Art.(l947), 17. 
3. Art.(l947), 17. 
4. Art.(l947), 19. 
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In the situation of ultimate concern "every religious 
relation, attitude, symbol, and action is unconditionally 
serious; decisive in an absolute sense; transcending any pre-
1 
liminary, transitory and dependent value." "Those proposi-
tions are theological which deal with the subject in so far 
as it belongs to the foundation of our being and in so far as 
the meaning of our existence depends on it." 2 For Tillich a 
situation is "religious" for one if he is ultimately concerned, 
if he is grasped by the unconditional, the holy, in such a 
manner that his whole existence is involved, his destiny is 
being determined. 3 
The process of knowledge, of meaningful apprehension, 
is a polarity process involvinc; subject-object and union-
separation. Ordinary knowledge follows the subject-object 
pattern. The subject perceives as object. The perceiving per-
son is the subject. That which he perceives is the object. 
Detachment and separation are characteristic of ordinary 
1. Art.(l947), 18. 
2. Art.(l947), 18 
3. Brightman is expressing a similar thought when he says: 
"Philosophy differs from religion in that religion con-
sists of attitudes of concern, devotion or worship, and 
conduct, whereas philosophy is a rational understanding" 
(Brightman, POR, 22). But Brightman includes devotion and 
worship whereas Tillich defines religion exclusively in 
terms of a somewhat abstract concern. Tillich pleads for 
the wholeness of man against Schleiermacher and Thomas 
(Art.(l946)3, 10]. It seems that the same idea of whole-
ness would have prompted Tillich to include devotion and 
worship along with concern. Tillich is defining religion 
on the phenomenological level where 11 'Religion' spricht 
von menchlichem Tun"Jj\rt. ( 1925), 769]. On such a level 
11 devotion11 and "worship" seem to be as integral in religion 
as is 11 concern." 
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perception. "In order to know one must 'look' at a thing, and 
in order to look at a thing one must be 'at a distance. '"l 
Yet, on the other hand, Tillich writes: "Knowing is a 
union between the knower and the known. The cognitive will is 
the will of' a separated life to unite itself' with other life." 2 
If' there were no element of' union the epistemological predica-
ment would be similar to that of' the agnosticism in Kant.3 
Tillich rejects the "wholly-otherness" of' the God of' Kierke-
gaard and Barth. 4 With equal vigor he rejects the "wholly-
other" relationship between the subject and the object in 
knowledge. "Knowing is a form of' union. In every act of' knowl-
edge the knower and that which is known are united, the gap 
between subject and object is overcome." 5 "The attitude of' 
knowledge must not be strangeness but intimacy, not distance 
from but nearness to life. The community between the knowing 
and the known must be expressed in every scientific work." 6 
It seems that Tillich is insisting on contradictory 
factors within the knowledge experience. But Tillich does 
not maintain that separation or union is complete. In all 
knowledge in existence, except knowledge of' God ("Awareness" 
1. ST, I, 94. 
2. TPE, 68. 
3. No knowl~dge of' the ding an sich is possible. 
all, the possibility of' such noumena is quite 
hensible, and beyond the sphere of' phenomena, 
us a mere void"(Kant, CPR, 187). 
4. Art. ( 1\135 ) 2, 13 7, 138. 
5. ST, I, 94. 
6, IOH, 148. 
"But, after 
incompre-
all is for 
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of God; see the discussion below), both separation and union 
are facts. Tillich speaks of different degrees of separation 
1 
and detachment as being a necessary element in knowledge. 
"Cognitive distance is the presupposition of cognitive union • 
• The unity of distance and union is the ontological prob-
• • 
lem of knowledge. 112 Plato expressed the problem through a 
myth of the original union of the soul with the essences, of 
the separation of the soul from the essences in existence, of 
the recollection of the essences and of the ascent of the 
soul toward the essences through philosophy. 3 
For Tillich, then, the problem of religious knowledge 
is the problem of grasping things and events in such a way 
that they become symbols of the Unconditional. "Religious 
knowledge is knowledge of things and events in their reli-
gious significance, in their relationship to their transcend-
ent ground. Religious knowledge is knowledge of the really 
real. 114 Every thing and event throbs with the ultimate which 
it attempts but fails to express. Things and events become 
transparent to the Unconditional. Religious knowledge is a 
"turning toward reality, a questioning of reality, a pene-
tratlng into existence, a driving to the level where the 
world points beyond itself to its ground and ultimate meaning. 11 5 
1. TPE, 68. 4. TPE, 217. 
2. ST, I, 94. 5. TPE, 217. 
3. Plato, Phaedo, 75-84. 
For the sake of clarity the problem of religious 
knowledge must be broken down into categories. 
1. The justification of the doubter. 
It was under the intellectual leadership of Martin 
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Kaehler that Tillich developed the significant basis of his 
epistemology. Kaehler's central emphasis was upon the "mate-
rial" principle of· the Protestant churches, that of "justifi-
cation through faith." Tillich•s work on the principle led 
him to apply it not only to sinner, but also to doubter. The 
principle refers to the religious-intellectual as well as to 
the religious-ethical life. "Not only he who is in sin but 
also he who is in doubt is justified through faith." 1 
It is not necessary that doubt separate us from God. 2 
Every doubt has a basis in truth and faith; for there is 
faith in the truth, at least, in every serious doubt. If the 
concern we feel over our lack of truth drives us to an ulti-
mate concern, then the divine is present, and the doubteT is 
justified in his thinking. He who denies the truth affirms 
the truth; he who denies God affirms God. 
Die Fraga nach der Wahrheit der Religion ist 
beantwortet durch die metalogische Erfassung des 
wesens der Religion als Richtung auf den un-
bedingten Sinn. Es ist sinnlos, ausserdem zu 
fragen, ob das Unbedingte "ist," ob also der 
1. TPE, xiv. 
2. An argument similar to Descartes' in Meditations III. 
religiose Akt sich auf Wirkliches richtet und 
insofern wahr ist oder nicht.l 
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God as the 11 power of being," as ousia, as Seins-
machtigkeit, is the source of all power. Thus the ability 
to express 11 I doubt," cogito ergo~. or "Holy, Holy, Holy," 
is a aerivative power, energized by the power of the ultimate, 
the Unconditional. The power of thought is derived from the 
Ground of power, yet that Ground is not accessible to thought. 
Tillich at times uses Schelling's term, das·unvordenkliche, 2 
to refer to that quality of ultimate power upon which all 
thinking depends, yet which no amount of thinking can penetrate. 
Within the context of the unity of the ultimate power, 
no atheism is.possible. There is no place beside the divine, 
nor is there any rigid separation between the religious and 
the secular. "The holy embraces both itself and the secular." 3 
The religious quality is the ultimate concern. This concern 
may express itseif, as indeed it usually does express itself, 
in terms of doubt. But doubt is not an independent, creative 
power. Doubt is parasitic, a temporary expression of the 
1. Art.(l925), 798. 
2. Das Unvordenkliche is translated by J.L. Adams in TPE, 76, 
'ii"S""11 that before which thinking cannot penetrate." A more 
accurate translation, both from the standpoint of grammar 
and of the transfer of ideas across the language barrier, 
is that of Tillich himself in Art.(l944)2, 52, "that 
which all thinking must presuppose." "That which cannot 
be presented in thought'' seems also to express the idea. 
Das Vordenkliche seems clearer than das Unvordenkliche. 
3 • T'PE, XV • --
power of being in the human dilemma. God within the all-
embracing fDamework of righteousness justifies the sinner. 
God within the all-embracing framework of truth justifies 
the doubter. 
Not only our action, but also our thought is 
under the divine 11 no. 11 No one, not even one 
who believes, and not even a church can boast 
of the truth, just as no one can boast of love. 
Orthodoxy is intellectual pharisaism. The jus-
tification of the one who doubts corresponds to 
the justification of the one who sins. Revela-
tion is just as paradoxical as forgiveness of 
sins, and can become !n object of possession as 
little as the latter. 
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Unity with God which justifies the doubter is not the 
work of right thinking nor is it the sacrifice of the in-
tellect. Nor, indeed, is this unity achieved by a submission 
to alien authorities such as the doctrines of the church and 
the Bible. "Neither works of piety nor works of morality nor 
works of the intellect establish unity with God. 11 2 All of 
these works follow from the unity~ but they do not make the 
unity. Unity is the background of the experience of dis-
parat eness; luve is the background of the experience of the 
justification of the sinner; truth is the background of the 
experience of the justification of the doubter. 3 
l. IOH, 34, 35. 
2. TPE, xv. 
3. The use of the phrase, 11 unity with God," and the prob-
lem which the phrase suggests will be considered under 
the heading "ecstasy and knowledge" below. 
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2. Belief-ful realism. 
There is a tension in all human existence. Man is con-
scious of an ultimate and he is conscious of a world of things 
and people. Man adopts an attitude of faith toward the trans-
cendent, an attitude of realism toward the immanent. 11 Faith 
transcends every conceivable reality; reali.sm questions every 
transcending of the real, calling it utopian or romantic. 111 
Realism and faith criticize each other, yet they seem to stand 
in a complementary relation to each other. "Hence we are led 
to the surprising result that faith and realism, just because 
of the tension that prevails between them belong together. 112 
An absolute tension is always present in faith, and any attitude 
which weakens or cancels this tension is incompatible with faith. 
"Idealism relativizes, self-limiting realism denies, but self-
transcending realism accepts the tension. 11 3 The thought of 
this last sentence will now be developed more fully. 
i. Evasion of tension through idealism. 
The mind seeks to evade the tension which besets it. 
An escape is possible in two ways: through idealism, the way 
of a self-transcendence which is not realistic, or through 
realism, the way which is not self-transcendent at all. 
l. TPE, 67. Here Tillich seems to equate the real with the 
phenomenal. Hence realism is phenomenalism or positivism 
for Tillich. 
2. RV, 67. 
3. TPE, 68. Tillich 1 s generalization here causes one to ask 
whose idealism and whose realism he means. 
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Idealism tries to transcend reality. It tries to 
dissolve the tension by ascending to a higher level. Ideal-
ism tries to unite 11 an autonomous interpretation of reality 
with a religious transcending of reality. 111 But idealism 
fails to understand the gap between the infinite and the 
finite, a gap which no ethical self-elevation can bridge. 
"The limitation and tragedy of idealism lie in the fact that 
it idealizes the real instead of transcending it in the 
power of the transcendent, i.e., in faith. 112 To the extent 
that idealism idealizes the real, i.e., does not take phe-
nomenal existence seriously, it is a false evasion of the 
tension in human experience. 
ii. Evasion of tension through realism. 
The second way of evasion of the tension is through 
realism, or self-limiting realism. This realism forbids all 
trespassing over the boundary of phenomenal experience. 
There is no tension because there is no transcendent, ultimate 
1. TPE, 68. Here again Tillich limits the real to the phenom-
enal. The arbitrary limitation is especially confusing in 
that under the broader definition of reality the general 
purpose of any metaphysical interpretation would be not 
to transcend reality, but to penetrate to the real. Bright-
man's definition of reality has a particular reference to 
idealism: 11 As viewed by Hegel and many other idealists, 
reality is the total object to which thought refers; in 
this sense, reality is what we think about when we think 
most adequately (coherently)" Art.(l945), 636 • Tillich's 
sympathy with the existentialists against the idealists 
is clear at this point. 
2. TPE~ 68. Again the real means the ph.enomenal, for the 
transcendent is opposed to the real. 
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pole in experience. The extent to which the concept of ex-
perience is limited depends upon the branch of realism. 
Teclmical realism, mystical realism and historical realism 
should be mentioned. 
Technical realism subjects things to the control of 
rational man. Reason becomes the means of controlling the 
world. Such things as values do not matter. The ousia of 
things is their calculable element, energy, or power. What 
is not determined by natural law or maneuvered by technical 
science is not an object of knowledge for technical reason. 
"Later Neo-Kantianism and, more especially, positivism are 
the philosophical expressions of this radical reduction of 
the power of things to their theoretical calculability and 
their practical utility.nl 
Mystical realism, on the other hand, goes beyond phys-
ical and mathematical knowledge to seek the eternal essences 
2 
and their unity and ground. There are degrees of being and 
the mind "ascends" to the highest one, the supreme power of 
being. Matter exercises a retarding drag as the mind seeks 
to make this ascent. The ultimate power of being lies beyond 
being. Therefore, the mind must transcerD the entire visible 
1. TPE, 70. 
2. Tillich is not consistent in his pattern of presentation 
at this point. It would seem more logical to include this 
form of Platonic idealism under the heading of idealism. 
For evasion of tension in this case is through ascent, 
the transcendence of what Tilli ch has calls d the real 
(the phenomenal). 
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cosmos. This concept is the basis of Neo-Platonic asceticism 
and of "mystical realism.;; 
Different though the technical and the mystical may be, 
they have one common characteristic. They do not look at 
"concrete existence, its •here and now, 1 in order to discover 
the power of things. They abstract from it -- "echnological 
realism for the sake of means and ends, mystical reaLism for 
the sake of essence and intuition. 111 But it is possible to 
seek for the power of reality within the concreteness of its 
existence. This is precisely what the third type of realism, 
"historical realism, 11 tries to do. 
The really real is asked for in time and space, 
in our historical existence, in that sphere from 
which all Greeks had taken flight. It was now 
no longer necessary to flee, since the world is 
divinely created and no demonic ambiguity can 
be found in the material world as such.2 
The really real appears in the structures created by the 
historical process. 3 
Historical realism begins to operate where the other 
realisms fail. History cannot be understooa in terms of math-
ematical calculation and control, in terms of technical real-
ism. Neither can history be grasped in a mystical contempla-
tion of its essence. "It is open to interpretation only 
1. TPE, 71. 
2. TPE, 71, 78. 
3. Hegel's idea of the Absolute's realizing itself in the 
historic process is interesting in comparison. "History 
in general is therefore the development of Spirit in 
Time" (Hegel, POH, 72) • 
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through active participation. We can grasp the power of his-
torical being only if we are grasped by it in our own histori-
cal existence." 1 The decisive character of historical realism 
is its consciousness of the present situation, of the "here 
and now." It sees the power of being not in manipulable mem s 
or practical ends or transcendent essences, but in the depth 
of our historical .situation. "It is contemporaneous, and in 
this it differs from the technological, as well as from the 
mystical, idea of reali ty. 112 
Technical (or technological) realism blots out the 
significance of the present by relating every moment to a 
future fulfillment. Mystical realism is indifferent to the 
contemporaneous excevt to flee from it in a union of mind 
with the eternal essences. But the Protestant understanding 
of history has overcome this indifference toward our 
historical existence. For history is the history of salva-
tion. The prophetic-Christian interpretation of history is 
the background of historical realism. In emphasizing the 
contemporaneous, historical realism does not surrender itself 
to the passing and fleeting. It rather seeks to emphasize 
the power of the present as the merging of the actual past 
with the already actual future. The power of the here and 
now is "its unique, unrepeat able, and fateful character. 113 
1. TPE, 72. The word, 11 grasped," here anC' th" word, 11 union, n 
above suggest that Tillich might mean a sort of mystic 
experience. 
2. TPE, 72. 
3. TPE, 73. 
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Hisoorical realism is a possible way through which the tension 
might be avoided or dissolved. But the question is not 
settled. Historical realism should be related to the process 
of knowing in order to determine the possible value it may 
have .in an epistemology. 
3. Historical realism and knowledge. 
Historical realism sets up as a condition of true 
knowledge the participation in tba whole of human existence. 
This applies to the personal and the social reaiity of man 
in history. One cannot know the realiy real in history unless 
he knows the really real in his own personality. Knowing one's 
self at this level is transforming one's self. Deoached and 
theoretical observation is not pos~ible. "And !mowing our 
historical situation on this level transforms our historical 
situation. He who knows in terms of historical reHlism 
is he who is creative in himself and in history. 111 Tillich 
illustrates the )oist ori CHl imperative in knowledge by the 
title of a sermon: 2 11 Dolng the Truth." 
Historical realism takes time seriously. A static or 
block type of thinking is rejected. The possibility or 
thinking in a timeless logos is an immense abstraction which 
fails to take seriously the face and decision of' immediate 
1. TPE, 73. 
2. SOF', 1.14-117. 
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1 
existence. The error of absolute philosophies of hisoory 
consisos in the tendency to negate history in the light of 
the absolute fulfillment. The fundamental Protestant atti-
tude is to make decisions in concrete historical reality. 
No absolute position of 11 right 11 or 11 truth11 is possible. The 
sphere of decision cannot be escaped. To refuse to decide 
or to act is in itself' a decision or an act. 11 Fate and 
freedom reach into the act of knowledge and make it an 
historical deed: the Kairos determines the Logos ."2 
The subject is not a mirror of the object in knowledge. 
This fact stands under the Socratic maxim that 11 knowledge is 
virtue, 11 3 that knowing the good necessarily involves doing 
the good. But the objection· is raised that actually man does 
not perform the good he knows. Tillich is aware of the problem. 
It is, of course, as easy as it is cheap to state 
that one may know the good without doing it, with-
out being able to do it. One should not confront 
Socrates with Paul in order to show how much more 
realistic Paul was. It is at least probable that 
Socrates knew what every schoolboy knows -- that 
some people act against their better knowledge. 
But he also knew something of which even philos-
ophers and theologians are ignorant -- that ture 
knowledge includes union and, therefore, openness 
to receive that with which one unites. This is 
the knowledge of which Paul also speaks, the 
gnosis which in· New Testament Greek means cogni-
tive, sexual, and mystical union at the same time. 
In this respect there is no contrast between 
1. IOH, 129. 
2. IOH, 135. Tillich means that time forces one to decide 
about the true. 
3. Plato, Char., 174C; Laches, 199D; Prot., 352D, 358D. 
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Socrates and Paul. He who knows God or the Christ 
in the sense of being grasped by him and being 
united with him does the good. He who knows the 
essential structure of things in the sense of 
having received their meaning and power acts 
according to them; 
1 
he does the good, even if he 
has to die for it. 
For the static conception of being, the world of ideas 
is closed within itself. It is a hierarchy, a completed 
structure, in which there is no "seriousness of separation" 
which Hegel speaks about. The battle against each other is 
the fate of existence, not of ideas. The 11 war 11 or ambiguity 
of all things for Heraclitus is true for existence, but not 
for essence. Kant 1 s unity of the manifold, the synthesis of 
the syntheses, as the goal of infinite process, can be intui-
tively grasped. Hegel is correct in rejecting that static 
conception of being. 
He knows the 11 yes 11 and 11 no 11 in the idea itself; 
he knows the contradiction.that rushes from idea 
to idea. No one has seen the ambiguity of essence 
as he has. The employment of ambiguity as a prin-
ciole of historical dialectics is an intellectual 
achievement of decisive importance.2 
But Hegel corrects the shortcoming only to fall victim, 
finally, to the same error, according to Tillich. The ambigui-
ty which Hegel so clearly saw in the historic movement he 
failed to see from the point of view of the total process, the 
contradiction in history being swallowed up in the synthesis. 
Thus Tillich argues against Hegel: 
1. ST, I, 95, 96. 
a metaphysics 1 
2. IOH, 167. 
Tillich's epistemological union here suggests 
union as well. 
The necessity of the synthesis makes the anti-
thesis an element of the whole, and does not 
permit the advent of a serious con t radiation 
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of the whole. His tory is taken in to the synthesis 
of syntheses, but it il not a challenge to every 
conceivable synthesis. 
According to Tillich, Hagel made the first important 
2 
attempt to grasp the idea dynamically. For Tillich this in-
sight is Hegel's greatest contribution to the history of 
thought. The idea enters history and experiences a fate. 
But Tillich finds Hegel to be disloyal, finally, to his 
unique insight. 
He knows the meaning of historic fate; and yet 
his solution is inadequate. In the last moment 
essence triumphs over existence, completion over 
infinity, and the static over the dynamic. The 
philosopher places himself at the point in history 
where history has spoken its decisive word, where 
the whole road can ba surveyed, where the circle 
has closed. With this, however, the idea is robbed 
of its fateful character. It became richer through 
its entrance into history; but it is not inex-
haustible; its inner infinity does not hang as a 
threat over every existence, even the most filled. 
Therefore the Logos rules over the Kairos.3 
In these criticisms of Hagel Tillich makes his position 
clear. Tillich believes that Hagel is right in understanding 
and employing ambiguity as a principle of historical dialac-
tics, in understanding the dynamic nature of the idea. 
1. IOH, 168. 
2. IOH, 166. 
3. IOH, 166. The question whether or not the idea must ba 
inexhaustible in order to hold a fate over the historic 
manifestation of the idea may be raised. If the infinite 
contains more in value, beauty, meaning and power, even 
in an analogous way, the fnfinite would appear inex-
haustible to the finite. The facts that being is process 
and spirit is active for Hegel also must ba considered. 
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But Tillich criticizes Hegel for sacrificing this revolu-
tionary insight regarding the process when looked at from 
the whole, In the view of the whole process, the Logos 
triumphs over the Kairos, essence over existence, synthesis 
over the warfare of thesis and antithesis. 
Though it is somewhat anticipatory of the chapter on 
God, some aspects of Tillich•s view should be presented along 
with his criticism of Hegel. For as Tillich finds Hegel co 
be disloyal, at last, to his insight into the dynamism of 
the idea, Tillich gives evidence that he,too, is disloyal 
to his concept of the dynamic idea and the ambiguity of all 
experience when he discusses faith and final revelation. A 
few quotations will uive substance to the criticism and provide 
the basis for a further question. Tillich writes concerning 
faith: "But if the. foundations of this place and all places 
begin to crumble, cynicism itself crumbles with them. And 
only two alternatives remain -- despair, which is the certainty 
of eternal destruction, or faith, which is the certainty of 
eternal salvation. 111 If faith gives certainty of eternal sar 
vation the final synthesis is assured, the ambiguity is re-
moved, the fateful historic decision under the 11 no 11 of the 
inexhaustible infinite loses its threatening power. 
Tillich 1 s references regarding final revelation are 
more explicit. 
1, SOF', 10. 
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christianity, without being final itself witnesses 
to the final revelation. Christianity as Christi-
anity is neither final nor universal. But that to 
which it witnesses is final and universal.l 
11 The final revelation, the revelation in Jesus as the Christ, 
is universally valid, because it included the criterion of 
every revelation, and is the finis or telos of all of them. 112 
Final revelation "liberates reason from the conflict between 
absolutism and relativism by appearing in the form of a con-
3 
crete absolute." 
As we shall see in the discussion on revelation, Til-
lich does not absolutize the form or medium of any experience 
of Jesus or any man. No expression of the experience of final 
4 
revelation is absolute. The manifestation of the New Being 
brings one into a level of existence that is "unique and beyond 
all these conflicting elements and methods of Existential rea-
5 
son." "Where the new reality appears one feels united with 
God, the ground and meaning of one 1 s existence." 6 Tillich 
introduces under the term "final revelation" what he adminishes 
Hegel for thinking under the term 11 synthesis. 117 
1. ST, I, 134. The polarities of existence are in God also, 
but without tension(ST, I, 243). 
2. ST, I, 137. 
3. ST, I, 150. 
4. ST, I, 151. 
5. ST, I, 151. 
6. Art.(l950), 515. 
7. The experience of Hegel and Tillich in this respect gives 
rise to the question whether or not any metaphysical monism 
(qualitative) can be conceived meaningfully which, when 
looked at from the whole, does not reveal a synthesis, a 
finality. 
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The discussion about an absolute viewpoint in history 
contributes to the consideration of the act of decision in 
knowledge. Tillich follows Hegel in attributing a dynamic 
and creative quality to the idea. He follows Schelling and 
Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard in recognizing the 11 decision char-
acter 11 of true knowledge. Nietzsche's position is remarkably 
equivocal but at the same time of a decision character. 
He fights for pure science, into whose waters, 
even if they are dirty, the truth seeker likes 
to dive, as long as they are not shallow. He 
offers energetic resistance to all interferences 
from the spheres of wish and feeling, even when 
religious. And yet he thinks consistently in 
terms of the Kairos. He knows that he is living 
in the hour of fate, the great moment, the be-
ginning of the superman; he knows that one cannot 
think everything at all times and most surely 
not at all places of society. He knows that 
spirit is blood, and that only what is written 
in blood is worth reading and learnine;. With 
this the decision-ch!racter of truth is broue;ht 
to clear expression. 
Hegel, Schelling and Nietzsche have contributed to what 
Tillich regards as the true interpretation of historic exist-
ence. But Tillich finds none of the three to understand 
clearly and fully the historical character of knowledge. The 
fateful character of their own decision is obscure because 
they place themselves in the absolute era, the beginning of 
the end. 11 They themselves are exempt from the danger of 
decision: a defiance of human limitations which led to catas-
2 
trophe first of all with respect to Hege 1' s system. 11 
1. IOH, 140. 
2. IOH, 141. 
The idea is dynamic and real knowledge involves 
decision, 11 doing the truth." Yet every decision is under 
the fate of existence. No human decision about God is un-
equivocally right. A decision in the direction of the un-
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conditioned (Richtung auf das Unbedingte) is not a simple 
right decision. Nor is it a single decision. For it to be 
a single decision would be to deify the activity of the con-
ditioned being. The form which a single decision takes is a 
symbol of the basic, living intention and attitude of the 
person. This basic decision is never apparent as such, but 
it is the innermost meaning of every single decision. The 
basic, living decision in the direction of the Unconditioned 
does not take its place beside single decisions. Rather does 
the decision regarding the Unconditioned find expression 
within single decisions. Every single decision as a symbol 
is under the 11 yes 11 and the 11 no 11 verdict of the Unconditioned. 
Thus no single concrete decision is unequivocal. 
The conflict, indeea, is not eliminated, and 
therefore every decision is equivocal. The 
abstract assertion that in a cleft world there 
cannot be a final decision for God means 
practically that every human decision with 
res.pect to God is equivocal. Indeed, this 
ambiguity is the actual mark of concrete 
existence. 
Tillich 1 s doctrine of the nature of man throws light 
upon the ambiguous dilemma of historical existence. Man's 
1. IOH, 137. 
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existential nature is that he is estranged from God and from 
his most real self. His destiny is to exercise his essential 
nature, which is freedom and reason. Freedom confirms itself 
or destroys itseif. Freedom may act against reason and deny 
1 
itself its own essential nature. Freedom acting against it-
self turns away from its essential being and surrenders it-
self to servitude. Thus Tillich speaks of man's essential 
na"ure -- freedom, reason; and of man's existential nature 
servioude through his act against his essential nature. 2 Am-
biguity, estrangement and Angst characterize man's existential 
state. ''So far as man exisoentially is in servitude the unity 
3 
is lost and man is subject to the law of tragedy." In an 
interpretation of Tilli ch' s view, Professor Georgia Harkness 
writes: "Man's life is characterized universally oy f'initeness, 
by contingency and anxiety, by guilt and despair." 4 
In the knowledge experience, then, man's existential 
nature of estrangement is important for Tillich. No decision 
is absolute theoretically. Karl Groos has expressed the 
knowledge dilemma in saying that a "theoretical absolute" is 
impossible, but a "theoretical relative" becomes for one a 
5 
"practical absolute." Tillich would agree with Groos in his 
central argument, adding that every "practical absolute" is 
1. Art.(l939), 203, 204. 
2. Art.(l939), 212. see the discussion of the "three stages" 
apove, pp. 2lff. 
3. Art.(l939), 210. 
4. Harkness, Art.(l938), 511. 
5. Groos, Art.(l931), 468-473. 
90 
ambiguous from the viewpoint of the whole. No "practical 
absolute, 11 even, is under a complete 11 yes 11 of the Uncondi-
tioned. Tillich is conscious of criticizing the assured 
absolute standpoint of extreme orthodoxy. 
There are religious attitudes which tend to assume 
an absolute position of the knowing subject. There 
is a religious attitude from which the absolute 
position of the subject is attacked. This attitude 
is the consciousness of standing in separation 
from the Unconditioned, and in the sphere of 
cleavage and decision, without being able to evade 
this situation even in knowledge.l 
For Tillich decision is integrally involved in the 
knowledge process, and every decision in the knowledge of 
God is ambiguous. A further word about the precise nature of 
the decision may be said. The prerequisites of knowledge are 
personality as subject; the concrete world which stands oppo-
site the ego and in which the ego expresses itself; and a 
third element which is neither formal nor material, but through 
which knowledge becomes a spiritual matter. "The third element 
is the meaningful interpretation of reality •••• All knowledge 
contains fundamental interpretations rooted neither in formal 
evidence, nor in material probability, but in original views, 
in basic decisions. 112 The meaningful interpretation of 
reality is a decision regarding meaning in history. "The 
decision, whether history has a meaningful direction, is to 
be made in history itself'. History has meaning only insofar as 
1. IOH, 135, 136. 
2. IOH, 143. 
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the threat of meaninglessness is overcome in concrete decision. 111 
The decision spoken of in all the cases above is neither 
a moral nor an intellectual decision. 
It lies in the deeper stratum upon which both 
of these rest and which we designate but in-
distinctly when we term it religious, for it 
is also not a question of decision in the 
sense of a specifically religious attitude. 
What is meant is the attitude toward the Un-
conditioned, an attitude which is freedom and 
fate at the same time, and out of which action 
as well as knowledge flows.2 
The important decision-character of knowledge for Tillich is 
not a manifest decision of will or intellect. It is the inner 
disposition of the unified self exercising its freedom and 
reason toward the Unconditional within the framework of fate, 
the framework determined by other conditioned beings and by 
the activity of the Unconditional. 
Creativity in history has not been felt by the school 
of theorists who practiced scholarly asceticism. The ascetic 
scholar is transformed into an apparatus for the registration 
of facts, with no passionate concern. This attitude corresponds 
to the eternal element in all knowledge, and for that reason is 
valid. But this is only one element. The other element is the 
change, the movement, an emphasis on the here and now. The 
older generation of scholars produced an estrangement from life 
1. IOH, 255, 256. 
2. IOH, 145, 146. Tillich wants to include man's vital 
foundation as well as his conscious center in this basic 
decision. 
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in the academic world by emphasizing the ascetic element in 
historical method. The younger generation of scl·olars is 
emphasizing the active element in knowledge, the necessity for 
participation in all parts of life. "The ideal of knowledge 
in historical realism is the union of scientific objectivity 
with passionate self-interpretation and self-transformation. 111 
Emphasis on the here and now in knowing demands a pane-
tration into the depths of personal being. But beyond this, 
the emphasis also demands a penetration into the depths of' 
our social being. Mystical realism does not admit that i'act. 
Mysticism uses knowledge as a means of escaping the demands 
of historic existence. The technical realists are different 
from the mystical realists at this point. The technical real-
ists recognize the connection between technical science and 
the social order. 11 The proletarians look at knowledge as a 
means of power in the class struggle. 112 The bourgeoisie uses 
knowledge not for the creation of true ideas, but for the 
forming of ideologies which idealize and justify the power 
of the ruling class. 
It is pathetic and provoking to see the naivete 
with which many highly educated people absolutize 
their own favored position in society, without 
realizing the general structure which gives them 
this position.3 
It is the duty of honesty to know the power of the social 
1. TPE, 74. 
2. TPE, 74. 
3. TPE, 75. 
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structure to which one belongs. Knowledge here again means 
transformation. One must be in contact with the concrete 
tensions of the present to know the power of reality in the 
depth of his historical existence. "The ideal of knowledge 
in historical realism is the union of scientific objectivity 
with a passionate understanding and transformation of the 
historical situation."l 
Historical realism rejects all efforts to escape the 
present, whether that escape be romantic in turning toward 
the past, or utopian in turning toward the future. The really 
real of the past can be reached only through an active parti-
cipation in the present. The future can be molded only in con-
crete decisions and actions in the present historical situation. 
The emphasis on contemporaneity does not deny the vali-
dity of ethical norms. Nor is there a surrender to relativism. 
Historical realism has principles and criteria. Without them 
no understanding of the depth of being would be possible. 
Without principles of the ideal, the real cannot 
be interpreted in its depth. But historical 
realism prevents the principles from becoming 
abstract. It expresses them in the light of the 
present and as answers to ~he questions implied 
in a historical situation. 
Historical realism, with respect to knowledse, does 
not deny norms and principles. But it insists that even these 
1. TPE, 75. Tillich• s emphasis on the existentlal dimension 
in knowledge suggests that he thinks of reason as a formal 
structure rather than a dynamic spirit. 
2. TPE, 76. 
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norms cannot be understood unless they are discovered in or 
related to the active participation in the present histori-
cal situation. 
i. Ontological and phenomenal knowledge. 
Tillich is not satisfied with the problem of knowledge 
as it is dealt with on the level of the phenomenaL. Religion 
cannot live unless its base is in the ontological realm. God 
as the "best explanation of' man's general experiences," the 
"most reasonable hypothesis" is conceived abstractly and 
objectively. The living God is experienced in a realm be-
yond and before the phenomenal. Thus Tillich distinguishes 
sharply between ontological knowledge and cosmological 
knowledge. Cosmological knowledge is in the realm of the 
sciences, facts, surveys. Ontological knowledge does not deny 
or add anything to the amount of cosmological knowledge. Rather 
it supplies an awareness, a unique reception of a meaning, 
1 
which transforms, heals, and saves. 
All life is dependent upon the source of' life. All 
phenomenal structures depend for their existence upon the 
ontological. Man doss not create the Unconditional by any 
sort of compilation or combination of the conditioned. All 
phenomenal knowledge leans, as it were, on the ontological 
awareness of unity with the Unconditional. In all scientific 
approaches the "a priori" which directs the introduction and 
l. ST, I, 39. 
the deduction is a type of mystical experience. 
Whether it is 11 Being-Itself11 {Scholastics) or 
the 11 univer,al substance 11 (Spinoza), whether 
it is "beyond subjeci.ivity and objectivity" 
(.James) or the "identity of spirit and nature" 
(Schelling), whe~her it is "universe" (Schlei-
ermacher) or "cosmic whole" ( Eocking), whether 
it is 11 value creating process" (Whitehead) or 
"progressive integration" (Wieman), whether 
it is "absolute spirit"(Hegel) or "cosmic 
person" (Brightman) -- each of these concepts 
is based on an immediate experience of some-
thing ultimate in value and being of which 
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one can become intuitively aware •••. The 
naturalists al'e rooted in a "mystical a priori, 11 
an awareness of something which transcends the 
cleavage between subject and object. And if in 
the course of a "scientific" p:rrocedure this a 
priori is discovered, its discovery is possible 
only because it was present from the very beginn1ng. 1 
No amount of phenomenal observation and causal argumEnt 
will create the reisn of the Unconditioned within the condi-
tioned unless the Unconditioned already reigns through creative 
action. Man does not create himself, the world about him, or 
the way in wliich that world is apprehended. A complicated 
"given" confronts him long before he is aware of being an 
individual. Tillich is insisting on the ontological unity 
of self and world, of subject and object; indeed, of all 
that in phenomenal existence is zerissen. Phenomenal knowl-
edge does not establish this ontological unity; rather is 
phenomenal knowledge itself established by the unity. 
l. ST, I, 9. Tillich 1 s insistence that all ontological knowl-
edge is mystical union is not sound unless Tillich believes 
that there is only one ontological subject. 
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Tillich divides the field of theology into two par~s: 
the kerygmatic theology and the apologetic theoloc;y. The 
kerygmatic theology emphasizes the "mes:;age," upon the 
initiative of the UnconditionaL The apologetic theology 
emphasizes the "situation" and seeks to understand the mes-
sage always in term" of the situation. 1 A further correla-
tion may be made between kerygmatic theology and the onto-
logical, between apologetic theology and the phenomenal or 
the cosmological. 
What happens to the person who experiences union with 
the ontological and who receives the message is not that new 
facts are imparted to him which he places alongside other 
facts of the phenomenal realm. He has become aware of power 
and meaning which give being and meaning to all his phenomenal 
knowledge. Ontological knowledge is on a different level from 
phenomenal knowledge. These knowledges do not, nor can they, 
compete with each other. Tillich is quite definite on this 
point. "Knowledge of revelation cannot interfere with ordinary 
knowledge. Likewise ordinary knowledge cannot interfere with 
knowledge of revelation. 112 Revelation is ontological knowledge. 
"Revelation is the manifestation of the mystery of being for 
the cognitive function of human rea~on. 113 Knowledge of revela-
tion cannot be introduced as an addition to the ordinary context 
of knowledge, 11 Knuwleuge of revelation does not incroas e our 
1. ST, I, 3, 4, 5. 
2. ST, I, 130. 
3 • ST, I, 12~ • 
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knowledge about the structures of nature, history and man. 111 
"Knowledge of revelation is knowledge aboc:t tJn.e revelation of 
the mystery of being to us, but not about th.e nature of beings 
and their relation to one amther. 112 Indeed, as we shall see 
in the next section below, Tillich prefers to use the term, 
"awareness," rather than the term, "knowledge. 113 Eis purpose 
is to show the monism, the unity of ontoloc;ical knowledge as 
over against the dualism, the subject-object structure of 
phenomenal or cosmological knowledge. 
Two questions must be raised abcut Tillich•s conception 
of religious knowledge at this point. Though the questions 
persist through the discussion yet remBining it is expedient 
to raise them now. 
1. TilHch is strongly critical of anyt>ing of a 
heteronomous character. His criticism of supra-naturalism 
in general and of Karl Barth in particular is based on his 
rejection of heteronomy. A completely foreign substance or 
authority suddenly thrown at man could have no meaning to man. 
Revelation would not be even a divine possibility 
if it could not be reo ei ved by means of forms of 
culture as human phenomena. It would be a de-
structive foreign substance in culture, a disruptive 
"non-human" entity within the human sphere, and 
1. ST, I, 129. 
2. ST, I, 129. 
3. Art.(l946), 10. See the discussion under "The prius of 
separation of subject and object" below. 
could have had no power to shape and direct 
human history.l 
Tillich' s sharp critic ism of' Barth is apparent again. 
The "Grand Inquisitor" is about to enter the 
Confessional Church, and strictly speaking, with 
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a strong but tightf'itting armor of Barthian Supra-
naturalism. This very narrow attitude of the 
Barthians saved t!l.e German Protestant Church; but 
it crl3ated at the same time a new hetaronomy, an 
anti-autonomous and anti-humanistic feeling, which 
I must reg~rd as an abnegation of the Protestant 
principle, 
But Tillich himself writes that knowledge of revelation 
cannot interfere with ordinary knowled!je, and that likewise, 
ordinary knowledge cannot interfere with knowlede;e of revela-
tion.3 It sounds very ml'Ch as if TilHch falls into the 
"wholly-other" ( das ganz Andere) predicament of' Barth 1 s 
heteronomous position. Tillich may well distinguish the 
"awareness of the Unconditioned" from "knowledge of' the phe-
nomenal." But to go beyond that distinction and to assert 
that they are on a different level and have nothing to do with 
each other is simply to shift the dichotomy. Barth maintains 
a wholly-other exclusiveness separating man and God. Tillich 
comes close to maintaining the same exclusiveness between tvo 
areas of man's experience. 4 The modern mystic, Hufus M. Jones, 
conceives it as part of his mission in life to develop a posi-
1. Art,(l935)2, 140. 
2. IOH, 26. 
3. ST, I, 130. 
4. This is especially apparent in Tillich's extrsme statement: 
"There is no common basis between theology and philosophy" 
(ST, I, 26). 
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tive type of mysticism which relates the mystical experience 
1 to all other experiE!nce. The personalism of Jones is rejected 
by Tillich, but Jones 1 s idea of the importance of the ontologi-
cal awareness to phenomenal knowledge is consistent with Til-
lich's usual emphasis. Surely the experience of union with 
the Ground of Meaning and Power is not indifferent to phenomenal 
experience. Tillich's emphasis when he discusses the role of 
theology2 and the distinction between ecstatic and technical 
reason3 is that this ontological knowledge creates a "New 
Being, 11 a new person, who reinterprets all of his historical 
existence in the light of the Ground of Meaning. In such a 
case knowledge of revelation does not "interfere" with ordinary 
knowledge in the sense of nullifying it. But knowledge of 
revelation does 11 interfere" with ordinary knowledge in the 
sense of fulfilling it, of giving it meaning. 
2. A second question should be mentioned. Tillich 
rejects the exclusive claims of kerygmatic theology and of 
apologetic theology. But he recognizes an essential tyuth in 
the claims of each. He attempts to bring the true elements of 
l. Ferm, CAT, I, l\11-:dll. Jones rejects the idea of an abstract 
infinite. He tries to pass over to an interpretation of 
God which brings 11 the two worlds" together into a 11 single 
unity and which finds Him actually revealed in the moral 
demonstrations of history, in the highest reaches of 
humanity, above all in the divine-human Person, in the 
validity of truth and beauty and love and goodness as we 
know them" (Ferm, CAT, I, 211). 
2. ST, I, 3ff. 
3. ST, I, 53, 115, 116. 
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kerygma tic theology and apologetic theology together through 
the "method of correlation." Tillich describes his intention. 
The following system is an attempt to use the 
"method of correlation" as a way of uniting 
message and situation. It tries to cori'elate the 
questions implied in the situation with the 
answers implied in the message. It does not 
derive the answers from the questions as a 
self-defying apologetic theology does. Nor 
does it elaborate answers without relating 
them to the questions as a self-defying keryg-
matic theology does. It correlates questions and 
answers, situation and message, human existence 
and divine manifestation.l 
It has been suggested that for Tillich the terms 
ontological, message and kerygmatic are correlative expres-
sions indicating the Unconditioned as Ground and Abyss of 
Meaning and Power. It has also been sugsested that the 
terms phenomenal, situation and apologetic are correlative 
expressions indicating the realm of the finite, the realm 
of the conditioned. The method of' correlation is a dialec-
tical attempt to understand the mutual interdependence of 
questj_on and answer, message and situation, kerygmatics and 
apologetics. The question which should be asked concerns 
whether or not Tillich wishes to correlate the Unconditioned 
and the conditioned in a similar fashion. Is it possible far 
there to be a dialectic a 1 interpretation unless there are 
polar elements, each in a sense conditioned by the other? If 
God is Unconditional there seems to be a divine determinism, 
1. ST, I, 8. 
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and no escape from it. Yet Tillich holds to a real freedom 
for man, which freedom is part of man's dignity, separating 
1 
man from other beings. But in conversation Professor Tillich 
insisted that man does not condition God, nor is there any 
2 
cooperation by man with God. Further consideration of Tillich's 
conception of religious knowledge may shed light on this problem. 
ii. The prius of separation of subject and object. 
'l'illich is reluctant to speak of God. His term to indi-
cate that which is the content of faith is das Unbedingte, the 
Unconditioned or the Unconditional. 3 Tillich fears that any 
symbol we use for God will enter into a subject-object rela-
tionship, that God would then be thought of as a being beside 
others. The holiness and majesty of the ultimate nature of 
God must be preserved. The "unconditional," then, 11 is a 
philosophical symbol for the ultimate concern of man. It is 
the prius of everything tha~; has being or meaning, 114 
"Absolute," if taken literally, means: without 
relation; if taken traditionally, it connotes 
the idealistic, self-developing principle. 
Both meanings are avoided in the concept "un-
conditional, 11 which implies the uncondit1.onal 
demand upon those who are aware of something 
unconditional, and which cannot be interpreted 
as the principle of a ratLmal deduction. But 
1. Art.(l939), 202. 
2. At Union Theological Seminary, May, 1950. 
3. J, I,. Adams in his essay on Tillich at the end of Tillich, 
TPE, says that das Unbedingte should be translated 11 the 
uncondi tional11 and never 11 the uncondi ti oned11 ij.dams, Art. 
(1948), 300]. dut Tillich himself speaks of God as b!Jing 
"the unconditioned" [Art.(l946), ll]. 
4. Adams, Art.(l948),.299. 
102 
even here wrong connotations must be prevented; 
Neither tt The Uncorrl it ion ed11 nor 11 some thine; uncondi-
tional, 11 is meant as a being, not even the highest 
being, not even God. God is unconditioned, that 
makes him God: but the 11 uncondit:lona111, is not 
God. The word 11 God11 is filled with the concrete 
symbols in which mankind has expressed its ulti-
mate concem, its being grasped by something un-
conditional. And this 11 sometbing11 is just not a 
thinr; but the power of being in which every being 
participates.l 
God is not an object which we as subjects perceive or 
think about. That is what Tillich wants to make clear. To 
speak of the Unconditioned or of 11 s ornetb~EJ£ uncondi tional 11 
would imply a subject-object :;elatinnship between God and 
us. Such a view would be blasphemous for Tillich. If the 
experience of God 
is bro,Jght down to the level of a conversation 
between two beings it is blasphemous and ridicu-
lous. If, however, it is understood as the 11 ele-
vation of the heart," namely, the center of the 
personality, to God, it is a revelatory event.2 
Believing that God 11 is no object for us as subjects, 11 3 Til-
lich moves behind the separation to the prius of the separation 
into subject and object, to that which precedes this division. 
As God is an object neither of thought nor of perception but 
the prius of this separation tlle personalistic idea of the 
person as "self-determinative unity of consc1ousness 114 is 
rejected. Bowne ins:i.st ad rit;htly that the finite person is a 
1. Art.(l946)3, 11. Tillich's :Tnconditional certainly sugcests 
the idea, "without extc,rnal relatims. 11 
2. ST, I, 127~ 
3. Art. (1946) , 11. These are ontological rather than epistemo-
logical statements. 
4. Brightman, l'OR, 350ff; DeWolf, OST, 24; Knudson, POP, 82, 
87, Bowne, MET, 118. 
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substantial creation of God, a unity of consciousness which 
through God's creative power was made a "subject," in inter-
1 
action with God. 
But Tillich does not think of God as a person. Thinking 
of God as a person would allow the danger of the demonic, the 
deificacion of the finite. As a person, God would become an 
object to other persons. As Tillich does not define God in 
terms of personality, he does not define man in terms of a unity 
of consciousness or will or self-determinacion. For Tillich man 
is not a "substantial creation" in Bowne's sense. Man is ac 
every moment dependent upon the creacive power.of the Uncondi-
tional. "It is impossible to be aware of the Unconditional as 
if it did not exclude by its very presence any observer who was 
not conditioned by it in his whole being. 112 Thus, in moving 
behind (logically) the separation of subject and object, Tillich 
believes God to be noi. a thing, but "the power of being in which 
every being participates," as we saw above. "This power of be-
ing is the prius of everything thac has being •••• It precedes 
every separation and makes every int;eraction possible, because 
it is the point of identity without which neither separation 
nor interaction can be thought. 113 
The prius of se~aration, then, is power, power of being. 
Tillich follows existential philosophy at this puint. For he 
1. Bowne, MET~ 99ff. 
2. Art.(l946), lU. 
3. Art.(l~46)3, 11. It is clear here that Tillich is speaKing 
more ontologically chan epistemologically. The implication 
again is that there is only one substantial subject, God. 
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interprets existential philosophy as an attempt to find a 
level which precedes the contrast between subject and object. 
11 It aims to cut under the 'subject-object distinction' and 
to reach that stratum of Being which Jaspers, for instance, 
calls the 'Ursprung' or 'Source. 1111 In order to reach this 
stratum existential philosophers believe that one must leave 
the sphere of objective things and pass through the corre-
sponding 11 subj ecti ve 11 inner experience in order to arrive at 
"the immediate creative experience or 'Source. 1112 
Historically speaking, the existential philo-
sophy attempts to return to a pre-Cartesian 
attitude, to an attitude in which the sharp 
gulf between the subjective and objective 
1 realms 1 has not yet been created, and the 
essence of objectivity could be found in the 
depth of subjectivity -- in which God could 
be best approached through the soul.3 
On the basis of his thought of God as power of being, 
Tillich speaks of the union between the knower and the known, 
11 the point of identi ty. 11 "Knowing is a union between the 
knower and the known. 114 There is one point in religious 
knowing where subject and object are identical. Tillich 
does not state that the subject becomes the object, or that 
the object becomes the subject, or, indeed, that both become 
something else. But his intention is clear; the conditioned 
turns toward the Unconditional and loses its self-consciousness 
in awareness of the "power of being." The Unconditional 
2 1. Art.(l944) 2 , 56. 2. Art.(l944) , 56 
3. Art.(l944) 2 , 67. 
4. TPE, 68. 
11 is the object ot total surrender derna.YJ.din;_; also the sur-
render of our subjectivity while we look at it."l 
Tr.e point of identity of subject and object 
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is the awareness of the ultimate itself, the esse 
iosum, which transcends the difference between--
subject and object and lies, as. the presupposition 
of all doubts, bevond doubt; it is the veritas 
ipsa, as Augus tin.e has called it. -
To doubt, to feel, to think, to know; indeed, to exist affirms 
God. For God as "power of Being" is the power by which one 
doubts, feels thinks, knows, exists. "Being i.tself, as 
• 
present in the ontolot;ical awareness, is power of Bein;:; but 
not the most powerful beinz •••• lt is t:0e power in every-
thing that has power, be it a universal or an individual, a 
tbing or an experience. 11 3 On this basis TilEch consi.ders 
the attempt to prove the existence of God aoort:ive. The 
cosmolo0ical is not a proof of God's existence, but a finite 
witness to the dependence of the conditioned upon the uncondi-
tioned. This is the ontological atmosphere in. which Tillich 
believes any philoso:Jhy of religion must breathe. Tillich 
finds indications of that ontological atmosphere L'l the formu-
1. ST, I, 12. This certainly suggests Oriental 1fedantism. It 
appears as if Tillich in trying to avoid the possible demonic 
conception of personality in God actually leads us to a sub-
personal conception of God as power. If this is true the 
religious experience is not the elevation of the center of 
personality, but tr.e descent of t'-' .. e center of personality 
to the level of power. 'l'his radjcal epistemolozical monism 
in reducing the subject-object to a unity in 11 powBr of 
beir:g" leaves personality unexplained. 
2. Art.(l947)~ 23. 
3. Art. (1946).:>, 11. 
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lation of the idea of God "in such a way that the question of 
God's existence becomes a dead issue 11 l(Wieman), in Lyman's 
speaking of 11 the innermost center of man which is in kinship 
with the deepest Reality in the Universe" in Baillie's speaking 
of the possibility of genuine atheism. More cle~rly ontological 
are the philosophies like that of Rocking, 
who emphasizes the immediate experience of 
"Wholeness" as the prius of all objective 
knowledge with respect to being and value, 
or of Whitehead who calls the primordial 
nature of God the principle of concretion, 
or of Hartshorne, who tries to reestablish 
the ontological argument and to combine it 
with the "contingent" in God.2 
The point where subject and object are identical is 
the awareness of the ultimate itself. This point is not to 
be called God, as no point is to be called God; but it is 
necessary to call it "that in us which makes it impossible 
for us to escape God. 113 As was seen aoove Tillich defines the 
Uncondi tiona! as 11 power of Being. 11 Thus so far as one has 
power he cannot escape God. This element of ultimacy in us is 
the basis of religious experience. This awareness of the ulti-
mate is a monistic experience. Knowledge of God comes not 
through the channels of ordinary knowledge but through an 
exisre ntial participation of one 1 s whole being in God. This 
awareness becomes the fact of one's existence. But when this 
awareness is referred to and is related to other experience, 
1. Art.(l946) 3 , 9. 
2. Art.(l946) 3 , 9, 
3. Art.(l947), 23. 
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as it is expressed, embodied in symbols and acts, the sub-
ject-object relationship is restored. All of our refere,1ce 
to God is dualistic. "Everything whj_ch becomes real to us 
enters the subject-object correlation." 1 But God is the 
presupposition, the -1JOWer, through which we exist and through 
which tl1ings become real to us. 
There are two inseparable elements, then, in religious 
experience. "(1) The 'po',nt 1 of immediate awareness of the 
unconditional which is empty but unconditionally certain; and 
(2) the 'breadth' of a concrete concern w?1ich is full of con-
tent but has the conditional certainty of venturing faith." 2 
TilHch calls tilis polar structure of religious experience the 
''ontological principle.'' 
The ontological prinCi]Jle may be stated thus: "L'an is 
immediately aware of somet!Jing unconditional which is the 
prius of the separation and interaction of subject and object, 
theoretically as well as practically. 113 
Tillich 1 s basic idea in this entire problem of knowledge 
is confusing. It seems that he is trying to protect the 
"initiative," the ''creative power," which is God's alone. 
But in so doing he raises as many questions as he answers. 
!,Inn cannot exist i.n the realm of subject-object interaction 
and contemporaneously in the realm of the prius, logically 
l. Art.(l946) 3 , 11. Tillich still uses "real" as the phe-
nomenal. 
2. Art.(l947)3 20. 3. Art.(l946) , 10. 
108 
prior to the separation. 1 It is true that in his description 
of this event Tillich rejects the terms 11 knowledge 11 ani "ex-
perience. 11 but the term "awareness" implies a center of con-
sciousness which is aware as well as an object of wJcich it is 
aware. In speaking of God as "power of Being" Tillich is not 
fair to himself, for he faUs to mention God as the Ground of 
~':eaning and Value •2 Whereas the latter categories demand per-
sonality, or at least conscious self'-detenninism, Tillich 
desires tre surrender of these qualities by the finite person 
ani the decline of' the person into tl:e "impersonal" power of 
Being,3 The epistemolosical problem is solved but on a sub-
personal plane of' power, where, as a matter of fact, the 
problem could not have arisen. 
Yet Tillich writes tl'Bt personality is a mytholo;::;ical 
symbol denoting the unconditional, the ground and ab;;'ss of 
all beings. 
This kind of symbolism is indispensable and 
must be maintained against pantheistic, mysti~al, 
and naturalistic criticlsr', lest reU.gion and 
with it our attitude toward naturs, man, and 
society fall back to the level of D urimitive-
demonic pre-personalism.4 
l. Tilli ch knew this when he said: 11 Revels t ion is revelation 
to me in my concrete situation, in my historical reality" 
( TP1~, 81) • 
2. Tillich speaks often of God as the Ground of Meaning; 
TP3, 76, 88, 119, 217, 163, 187. See also Adams, Art. 
(1948), 293, .300, 309. See below, page l7lff. 
3. See the cmclusion to the discussion of the nature of God, 
page 217n below. 
4. TPE, 119. 
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It is this sort of basic contradiction which causes vagueness 
as one seeks to understand Tillich. 
It seems that Tillich in speaking of God as prius is 
trying to witness to the fact that God is the infinite 
creator who has made the world and has made man. But Tillich 
has not taken seriously enough the scriptural witness to 
God 1 s creation of man, God's imparting to man a center of 
consciousness with freedom and resl-'onsibility, a will with 
co-creative powers.l It is not robbing Goa if one is aware 
that there is contact between God and man, a contact based on 
God's sovereign power and the powers he has bestowed on the 
creature man. In creating persons God imparted power to the 
center of finite consciousness. Man knows that the power has 
originated with God. He also knows that his exercise of finite 
freedom in the use of this power cundi tions God, Such thinking 
is consistent with one side of Tillich. But it is sharply in-
consistent with Tillich's dominant insistence on the uncondi-
tionality of God. 
Tillich avoids the terms "intuition," "experience," and 
"knowledge," preferring instead the phrase, "awareness of the 
unconditioned." Awareness of the unconditional is not intuition, 
for the unconditional does not appear as a "Gestalt," a being, a 
form to be intuited. The unconditional is an element, a power a 
demand. "The Unconditional is a quality, not a being.n 2 
1. Genesis 1:27-31; 2:7, 8; Psalm 8; Mark 12:30; Matthew 23:37. 
2. TPE, n.32. 
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"Experience" is avoided as a word to describe the 
phenomenon because experience usually describes the "observed 
presence of one reality to another roality. 111 "Knowledge" 
implies an isolated, theoretical act, assuming the separation 
of subject and object, Awareness of the Unconditioned means 
the opposite of separation in this sense. ontological aware-
ness is immediate. It is present 11 in terms of an uncondi-
tional certainty. 112 This awareness is not a function of a 
special organ or capacity of a religious man. It is not a 
matter of a cognitive function alone. Raoher it is the whole 
man who is aware of the Unconditioned. 
It is important to indica"te asain that the Unconditional 
is not God. Mankind ha" expressed its uloimaLe concern in 
varying ways, these ways being thought of s;nnbolically as God. 
What has grasped man in these concerns is not a t>,in6 but a 
power, the power of being in which eVGl'Y being participates. 
In the light of this power of being the disoinction between 
subject·and object is no longer applicable. This power of 
being is the prius of everything that has being. It preceaes 
every separation of subject and object. The prius cannot 
become an object to which man is theoretically related. God 
is not an object for us as subjects. God a.lways precedes 
3 1. Art.(l946) , 10. This is a much narrower definition than 
Brightm .. n 1 s. For Brightman experience means "our entire 
conscious life" (Brightman, POR, 1). In his later writings 
Tillich speaks of exJJeriential verification over against 
experimental verific .. tion in such a manner as to broaden 
his own id2a of experience(ST, I, 102), 
2. Art.(l946) , 10. 
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this division. Yet we speak of God, we act upon him. God 
has become real to us, and what is real to us enters the 
subject-object correlation. TilLich's analysis of religious 
experience has led us to see two inseparable elements in 
religious experience: the point of immediate awareness which 
is empty of content but unconditionally certain, and the 
breadth which has content but only conditioned certainty. 
The question to be rasied here is whether God is prius 
(power) or person (purpose and meaning). It is granted that 
all knowledge of God is in a sense symbolical. But even so 
the content determines the sJ~bol chosen, and it should be 
the purpose of the theologian to choose the highest and most 
correct symbol possible. ~'he choice is between prius and 
person as the most adequate symbol. If prius is chosen, as 
Tillich chooses in the major part of his writing, knowledge 
of God is awareness of power, of New Being, of the Uncondi-
timal. In such a case knowledge of God has little of a 
"knowledge" nature to relate to man's finite existence. For 
as Tillich has written in another place, "If it is unex-
pressible it is not knowledge." 1 
iii. Ecstasy and religious knowledge. 
Tillich indicates the awareness of the Unconditioned, 
the experience of being grasped by tJ:."e really real, by the 
word ''ecstasy.'' Religion seeks to get beyond the conditioned 
1. ST, I, 100, 
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order of given reality to approach the Unconditional. Reason 
seeks its meaning beyond itself. The means through which 
transcendence of self is possible is,rapture or ecstasy. 
Crisis and grace are also terms Tillich uses to indicate this 
phenomenon. A thing or a person is grasped by the really 
real, it becomes transparent for the ground of its power, the 
ultimately real. It becomes sacramental, for "any object or 
event is sacramental in which the transcendent is perceived 
to be present. 111 Tillich compares the experience of rapture 
with the experience of a thunderstorm at night, when a bolt 
of lightning reveals things in blinding clarity for a moment 
only to leave them in complete darkness the next moment. It 
has been indicated that Tillich is not consistent about the 
precise relationship of the ecstatic experience to ordinary 
experience. At times Tillich speaks as though the ecstatic 
experience had no relation to ordinary experience. 
Knowledge of revelation is knowledge about the 
revelation of the mystery of being to us, but 
not about the nature of beings and their rela-
tion to each other •••. Knowledge of revelation 
cannot interfere with ordinary knowledge. • • . 
Revealed truth lies in a dimension where it can 
neither be confirmed nor be negated by hl.storiog-
raphy. • • • Knowledge of revelation • . • does 
not imply factual assertions, and it is therefore 
not axpos~d to critical analysis by historical 
research. 
1. TPE, 108. Hera Tillich falls prey to his own criticism. 
To perceive is to objectify. The transcendent is never 
present in a perceptual way for Tillich. Yet Tillich's 
''awareness" objectifies its object, in spite of his 
intention to the contrary. 
2. ST, I, 129, 130. 
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On the other hand within the illuminating experience 
of the "bolt of lightning" everything is seen in a more com-
plete way than when seen only in darkness. "When reality is 
seen in this way it has become something new. Its ground has 
become visible in an 'ecstatic 1 experience called 'faith.' 111 
If everything becomes new through this awareness, if one's 
whole personality is grasped by the ultimate power so that 
he is broken, judged, and healed, it seems that the center 
of consciousness reinterprets all of the phenomenal world. At 
least, the phenomenal world is seen in a new light, something 
more is known even about phenomenal existence. Be that as it 
may, however, the experience of union must be analyzed further. 
Tlc.roughout this chapter there has been an emphasis on 
the 11 point" of union between subject and object. All phe-
nomenal knowledge is seen to rest on ontological foundations. 
Tillich agrees with the existentialist philosophers in their 
rejection of reality as an object of thought from which we 
are theoretically separated; and he affirms with them that 
Rea.Li ty or Being is immediately experienced. 2 Man's immedi-
ate experience reveals more complet8ly the nature and traits 
of reality than man's cognitive experience. !\Tan's immediate 
awareness of the unconditional has been called "ecstasy." 
"Whenever we transcend the limits of our own being, moving 
1. TPE, 78. Tillich here regards faith as a monistic experi-
ence. 2 2. Art. (1944) , 44, 45. 
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toward union with another one, something like ecstasy 
('standing outside one's self') occurs. Ecstasy is the act 
of breaking through the fixed form of our own being." 1 
Ecstasy, "standing outside oneself,'' points 
to a state of mind which is extraordlnary 
in the sense that the mind transcends its 
ordinary situation. Ecstasy is not a nega-
tion of reason; it is the state of mind in 
which reason is beyond itself, tha~ is, be-
yond its subject-object structure. 
Tillich regards the basic condition of finite ration-
ality as being the subject-object structure of knowledge. He 
thus lays the basis for defining ecstasy as the transcending 
of that basic condition. The "detachment" within the subject-
object structure is emphasized through the term, "controlling 
knowledge." The existential involve:11ent within the context 
of ecstasy is emphasized through the term, "receiving knowl-
edge." 
Tillich speaks of the mind's being "grasped" by the 
mystery, the ground of being and meaning. This is ecstasy, 
and there is no revelation without ecstasy. 3 Yet "revelation 
claims to create complete union with that which appears in 
revelation." 4 The "standing outside oneself," then, is a 
state of mind in which one is grasped into complete union 
with God. Again the question arises about the possibility 
of such a union. Tillich wants to preserve the giving and 
1. TPE, 79. 
2. ST, I, 111, 112. 
3 • ST, I, 112 . 
4. ST, I, 100. 
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the receiving side in revelation. Indeed, he says that revela-
tion is net real without the receiving side, and it is not 
real without the giving side.l Revelation is a sort of di-
vine double-talk in Tilllch' s concept unless the state _Qf 
mind of the receiving person is preserved. Complete union 
demands the loss of the finite unl.ty of consciousness in the 
infl.nl.te ground of power and meaning. On such a basl.s it is 
difficult to understand how the idea of a New Being could 
survive. Perhaps it would be accurate to speak of another 
being. But the term, New Being, implies some stream of con-
tinuity with the old being, for whom everything becomes new. 
If the stream of continuity is merely on tree level of substance 
or of power the question aoout freedom and responsibility in 
the decision for meaning cannot arise. For these questions 
can be raised only on the level of' consciousness, and to 
some extent, at least, on the level of self-determination. 
If the stream of' continuity is in the unity of personality, 
it seems more consistent to speak of' the immediate awareness 
of God than to speak of the "complete union" of the finite 
with the infinite. This basic question about Tillich's 
thought is more searching as the contradiction is more ap-
parent. 
In ecstasy and revelation there is an element of mys-
tery. 11 It is the character uf the Unconditional that it can-
1. ST, I, 111. See ~lso Ar~.(l938), 251, ~52. 
not be grasped; its power includes its unapproachable mys-
1 
tery." Yet Tillich regards revelation as 
the manifestation of the mystery of being for 
the cognitive function of human reason. It 
mediates knowledge, a knowledge, however, which 
can be received only in a re~elatory situation, 
through ecstasy and miracle. 
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The knowledge which revelation mediates (as was seen 
above) does not fall into the same category with ordinary 
knowledge. Even so, for Tillich, it is not as if God were 
revealing himself progressively to man in such a way that 
the mystery gradually disappears. Mystery is an integral 
part of the nature of God as Sinngrund und Sinnabgrund. The 
"depth" and the 11 aoyss" in God create ohe mystery. Whatever 
is essentially mysterious cannot lose its mysteriousness 
even when it is revealed. Otherwise the mystery would not be 
essential but accidental. On the ievel of logic it seems 
contradictory to assert that God has revealed himself while 
asserting at the same time that God is an infinite mystery 
to those to whom he has revealed himself. But this contra-
diction is not rigid. 
Revelation of that which is essentially mys-
terious means the manifestation of something 
within the context of ordinary experience 
which transcends the ordinary context of ex-
perience. Something more is known of the mys-
tery after it has become manifest in revela-
tion •••. But revelation does not dissolve 
the mystery inLo knowledge.3 
1. TPE, 76. 
2 • ST, I, 12 9 . 
3. ST, I, 109. 
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Nor does revelation aod to the totality or our subject-
object, ordinary knowledge. The mystery and meaning or being 
become manifest in a new dimension or knowledge, "the di-
mansion or understanding in relation to our ultimate con-
cern.111 The element or mystery will always be present in 
the ecstatic experience. But a new understanding or meaning, 
purpose and value is imparted as the ground or being mani-
rests itself. 
(1) True and false ecstasy. 
In speaking or ecstasy Tillich realizes that the ex-
perience may be elicited by finite stimulation as well as by 
the manifestation or the Unconditional. It is proper, there-
fore, that many should be suspicious or the experience. Many 
are afraid or a confusion between genuine ecstasy and arti-
ficial self-intoxication, "for not every kind or enthusiasm 
is a participation in the unconditioned power, not every-
thing that calls itself ecstasy is an experience or being 
grasped by the really real. 112 It is easy to confuse over-
excitement with the presence or the divine spirit. Tillich 
must make clear, then, the criterion or true ecstasy. For 
this crucial idea in his thought is ambiguous in a potential-
ly dangerous way unless by same criterion true ecstasy can 
be differentiated from false ecstasy. 
l. ST, I, 115. 
2. TPE, 80. 
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Tillich mentions several contributory evidences along 
with the major principle for distinguishing true ecstasy. 
False ecstasy is on the subjective, psychological level of 
over-excitement, often artifically produced. In true ecstasy 
something happens objectively as well as subjectively. The 
objectively real manifests itself within the whole of our 
psychological conditions, but true ecstasy cannot be derived 
from those psychological conditions. 1 It is imposslble to 
produce true ecstasy artificially, man cannot manipulate the 
ultimate ground of being. Any attempt to force the uncondi-
tioned power creates a false ecstasy. The initiative is with 
the unconditional. It grasps u.s when it will. 2 
A second contributory evidence is that false ecstasy 
drives us away from the reality and the demands of the pres-
ent. True ecstasy transforms us, not in any general way 
(Offenbarung uberhaupt), but in our particular, concrete, 
historical. existence. "Revelation is revelation to me in 
my concrete situation, in my historical reality. 113 
Another contributory criterion is that false ecstasy 
destroys our being. It sets one part uf our being at war with 
another part. 11 0ne section of our being overwhel.ms the whole 
of our personal.ity, emptying it and leaving it in a state of 
1. ST, I, 11.:.. 
2. TPE, 80. 
3. TPE, 81. A comparison with Kierkegaard 1 s position is 
interesting. SK writes: "only the truth which edi!'ies 
is truth for you" (E/0, II, ~94). 
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disintecration." 1 False ecstasy is the deification of a 
"part" of our being; true ecstasy is ticcl affirmatio'1 of' 
wholeness th.rough self-transcendence. This leads us to the 
major criterion by which true ecstasy is identified. 
'rhoc:ch the evidences mentioned are helpful in distin-
guisLtnc true ecstasy from false ecstasy, the central prin-
ci!lle w!Ji.ch is the actual 8riterion is a principle of reason. 
This rational criterion is important for a full understanding 
of' Tillich' s position. Tillich says trat ecstasy does not 
destc>oy the rational structure an::i pr:L"lciples of' the r:lind; 
rather it aff'irms them. 
The ecstDtic state in which revelation occurs 
does not destroy the rational structure of the 
mind. . . Wl;ile demonic possession destro~;rs 
the rational structure of' the m.ind, dj vine 
ecstasy preserves and elevates it, altJcouch 
transcending it. Demonic possession destroys 
the ethical and logical pr)_nci.plos of reason; 
divine ecstasy af:!"ir:ns then.2 
Tillich goes furtl:J.er to say that an assumed revelation which 
is contrary to the :;ninciple of justice of t>1e practical 
reason is ant"i-divine, and it is therefore judt;ed to be a 
lie. If Tillich includes other princioles of practical reason 
in this criterion of ecstasy, he has a criterion quite akin 
to rational coherence. Practical reason jude;es revelation and 
l. TPE, 80. 
2. ST, I, 113, 114. 
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1 
ecstasy. The demonic blinds practical reason, it does not 
reveal. In demonic possession the mind is not really "beside 
itself." It is rather in the power of elements within itself 
which aspire to be the whole being, elements which override 
reason, grasp the center of the rational self, and destroy it. 
False ecstasy weakens or destroys the wholeness of the rational 
mind. True ecstasy affirms the wholeness of the rational mind. 2 
In the discussion above of the "awareness" of the un-
conditional it was seen that Tillich thought that the sub-
jective person must be sacrificed to unity with the uncon-
ditional power. But when he discusses the standard for dis-
tinguishing true ecstasy from false ecstasy, Tillich regards 
the wholeness of the rational mind as the basic criterion. 
He does not say that reason produces the ecstasy. He does 
say that reason judges the ecstasy and the revelation by its 
own principles. 
(2) Mysticism 
Tillich 1 s use of terms like "ecstasy," 11 union, 11 
11 mysterium tremendum11 suggest a close correlation between his 
thought and that of the Mystics and Rudolph otto. Indeed, 
1. If practical reason judges the ecstasy to determine its 
truth or falsehood, there must be come "content," some 
meaningful relation between ecstasy and ordinary knowl-
edge. Unless man becomes God, there must also be a con-
tinuity of will and consciousness in man which holds to-
gether the "understanding" gained through ecstasy and 
the concrete cone erns of ordinary exi stance. 
2. ST, I, 114. 
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Mystik bedeutet Vereinigung mit dem unbedingten 
Sinngehalt als Grund und Abgrund aller Bedingten. 
In diesen Sinne ist M y s t i k a 1 1 e r 
R e 1 i g i o n w e s e n t 1 i c h. Den die 
Richtung auf den unbedingten Sinngrund ist ein 
Wesenselement der Religion. 
But Tillich is critical of the Mystics. It wi 11 indicate 
Tillich's position if his criticism of mysticism is investi-
gated. 
Tillich believes that mysticism is an element of any 
truly religious message. Mysticism is wholesome in its 
attack on demonization, the deification of finite words, sym-
bols, events or persons. "It is the permanent function of 
mysticism to point to the abysmal character of the ground of 
being and to reject the demonic identification of anything 
finite with that which transcends everything finite. 112 
But Tillich classifies mysticism with the thought of 
Hegel in that both stand in an "absolute," synthesis posi-
tion which denies the boundary situation of concrete his-
torical existence. Mystics do not take seriously enough the 
guilty separation from the inner infinity of being. They 
fail to understand that God is unconditionally far while they 
emphasize that he is unconditionally near. 
Mysticism is not aware of the unapproachable 
nature of the divine ground of reality. It 
tries to reach the unconditioned in conditioned 
steps, in degrees of elevation to the highest • 
• • • Mystical self-transcendence does not 
1. Art.(l925), 811. 
2. ST, I, 140. 
realize the infinite gap between the finite 
and the infinite,l 
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Mysticism recognizes that faith is an essential element, that 
union with God is a gift to be received and not something to 
be achieved by man. But mysticism tries to transcend faith 
in the experience of mystical union. "It disregards the 
2 
historical situation and its power and depth." "Mys ti ci sm 
liberates one from the concrete-sacramental sphere and its 
demonic distortions, but it pays the price of removing the 
concrete character of revelation and of making it irrele-
vant for the actual human situation. 113 In elevating man 
above actual concerns, mysticism implies an ultimate negation 
of his existence in time and space. In Tillich's view, then, 
mysticism is ascetic toward the Kairos. Any concept which 
denies the realm of the conditioned, the realm of historical 
existence, is invalid for Tillich. 4 History became the cen-
tral problem of his philosophy and theology when he returned 
5 home after the first world war. Tillich terms his philosoph-
ical and theological method that of "correlation," of true 
dialectic. Two poles are essential in a correlation and in a 
dialectic. To transcend the historical situation completely 
is to negate the reality of one pole of the dialectic. For 
that reason Tillich rejects the solution recommended by the 
1. TPE, ·77. 4. 'rPE, 32. 
2. TPE, 77. 5. TPE, xvii. 
3. ST, I, 140. 
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mystics. For that reason Tillich believes in a self-tran-
scending historical realism 
which expressas the ultimate in and through a 
concrete historical situation and denies any 
approximation to it, knowing it is always at 
the same time unconditionally near and uncon-
ditionally far.il. 
speaking of the gospel as being a message that comes from 
beyond man, Tillich says that the gospel nevertheless comes 
to man. 
It is a message to me; I must receive it; it must 
concern me in my-very existence and in my world, I 
must understand it, my existence must be trans-
formed by it. Therefore it is immanent, it belongs 
to my world .2 
For Tillich mysticism is valuable in its constant 
attack upon the deification of the finite. But mysticism 
errs in thinking it can approach God by degrees and finally 
take flight into a mystical union with God which tends to 
negate ail historical existence. 
(3) The religious symbol. 
Another facet of Tillich's thought about religious 
knowledge is informative for the discussion. That is Tillich's 
theory of the religious symbol, or myth. Tillich regards 
every theological expression as being a symbolic utterance. 
For since the unconditional is "forever hidden, transcendent 
1. TPE, 77. But is not every symbolic historical attempt to 
reflect the impact of awareness of the unconditional in a 
sense an approximation of God? If Tillich insists on an 
infinite gap between the conditional and the unconditional 
it seems to be folly to speak of "awareness" or "union." 
2. Art.(l938), 251, 252. 
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and unknowable, it follows that all religious ideas are 
symbolical. 111 The spirit of the Protestant protest is that 
no finite form, word, person, or deed shall be identified 
with God, There is an infinite gap between man and God. 2 
Thus man cannot express God in any finite event or thing. 
God bursts all finite forms with transforming power. Thus 
every word about God is true and it is false, it contains a 
11 yes 11 and a 11 no." It is true in that all finite power is 
dependent on the ground of power and it is true to the extent 
that it witnesses to the reality of the transcendent. It is 
false in that it is not God and in the fact that there is no 
one-to-one analogical relationship between it and God. 
God is not an object, not even the highest object. 
He is not ~ being, not even the highest being. Tillich regards 
it as the whole work of theology 11 that it is the permanent 
guardian of the unconditional against the aspiration of its 
own religious and secular appearances. 113 11 Unconditioned 
transcendence as such is not perceptible. If it is to be 
perceived --and it must be so in religion it can be done 
only in mythical cone eptions • 114 The really real cannot be 
approached directly as an object over against man as subject. 
The really real grasps man into union with itself. No finite 
form available to man can express adequately the really real. 
l. RS, x. 
2. ST, I, 6b. 
3. Art.(l946)3 13. 
"4, Art. (1940) 2 ; 22. 
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Since for Tillich the really real transcends everything in 
the empirical order it is unconditionally beyond the con-
ceptual sphere. Thus every word or form man uses to indi-
cats this awareness of the really real is in the nature of a 
symbol or myth. 11 0ffenbarung ist die Porro, in welchem das 
religiose Object dem religiosen Glauben theoreLisch gegeben 
ist. Mythos ist die Ausdrucksform fur den Offenbarungs-
inhal t. 111 
Tillich disting~ishes between a sign and a symbol. 2 
A characteristic of the symbol is its innate power. A sym-
bol possesses a necessary character. It cannot be exchanged. 
On the other hand a sign is impotent in itself and can be 
exchanged at will. The religious symbol is under a constraint 
from the God-man relationship, ever to remind us that the 
religious act has to do with the unconditioned transcendent. 
The religious symbol is not the creation of a subjective 
desire or work. If the symbol loses its untological grounding, 
it declines and becomes a mere 11 thing, 11 a sign im;otent in 
itself. ·"Genuine symbols are not interchangeable at all, and 
real symbols provide no objective knowlede;e, but yet a true 
awareness. 113 The criterion of a symbol is that through it 
the unconditioned is clearly grasped in its unconditionedness. 
A comparison of the symbol with the reality to which it refers 
l. Art.(l9G5) 820. 
2. Art.(l940)~, 14ff. 
3. Art.(l940)2, 28. 
is impossible because this reality is absolutely beyond 
1 human comprehension. 
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The insistence by Tillich that symbols cannot be ex-
changed, that they are grounded and have innate power, sug-
gests that there is a via analogia between God, symbol and 
man. Tillich speaks about ~he possibility. 
The knowledge of revelation, directly or in-
directly, is knowledge of God, and therefore 
it is analogous or symbolic •••• If the 
knowledge of revelation is called "analogous," 
this certainly refers to the classical doc-
trine of the analogia antis between the finite 
and the infinite. Without such an analogy 
nothing could be said about God. But the 
analogia antis is in no way able to cre~te 
a natural theology. It is not a method of 
discovering truth about God; it is the form 
in wr~ch every knowledge of revelation must 
be expressed. In this sense analogia entis, 
like "religious symbol," points to the ne-
cessity of using material taken from finite 
reality in order to give content to the cog-
nitive function in revelation.2 
Even though Tillich is saying essentially that the 
analogia entis is a power of expression rather than knowledge, 
the statements, "without such an analogy nothing could be said 
about God," and 11 it is not a method of discovering truth about 
God," are difficult to reconcile with each other. The former 
statement is consistent with Tillich's thought of the distin-
guishing characteristic of the symbol. The ontological ground 
of the symbol distinguishes the symbol from a sign which has 
a cosmological connection only. That is why Tillich can say 
1. Art.(l940) 2 , 28. 
2 • ST, I, 131. 
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that religious and theological words lose their meming if they 
are used as terms to designate finite objects under the control 
of the categories which constitute i;he world of objects. 1 One 
should expect Tillich to develop this thought to show that t!hte 
analogia entis is the only way of discovering truth aoout God. 
But suddenly the latter statement ap;ears, and a large part 
of Tillich' s thought is cons is tent with it. F'or example, 
Tillich speaks of an infinite gap between God and man, of 
the unconditioned and the conditioned, of the unconditioned 
transcendent, of that which is "unconditionally beyond the 
conceptual sphere," of a reality which is "absolutely beyond 
human comprehension." It is because of statements such as 
these that Tillich is interpreted by some to be an irration-
alist or a skeptic. D. C. Macintosh classifies him with the 
reactionary irrationalists on the basis of thls irrationalis-
tic tendency.2 
As was seen above in the discussion of the criterion 
of ecstasy, this irrationalism is not the whole of Tillich's 
thought. Yet the irrationa~ism is an important pare of his 
thought which any falr appraisal must take into account. As 
the discussion proceeds it becomes more apparent that basi-
cally contradictory ideas are included by Tillich in one 
dialectical system of thought. Macintosh has felt this, 
saying that Tillich has apparently round a way of being at 
l. TPE, 79. 
2. Macintosh, PRK, 303, 
one and the same time a rationalistic critic and an ir-
rationalistic believer. 
He sdems to have found a modus vivendi 
for his "belief-ful realism" in the ac-
ceptance of many of the ideas of tra-
ditional Christianity which conflict with 
his h1personalistic absolutism, as being 
necessary myths, even while he recognize~ 
the danger to religion of such a course. 
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w. !';. Urban has expressed the same dilemma in his 
effort to understand Tillich. 2 Urban L1entirms two of Til-
lich 1 s statements -- "all knowledge of God has a s;ym~olic 
character;" "symbols provide no objective knowledc;e but yet 
a true awareness" -- confessing that he cannot "make much" 
out of such contradictions. \'roan's :position is that "unless 
there is •analogy of being' between the •Creator' and the 
'created,' between being in itself and being for us, it is 
perfectly futile to talk of either religious symbolism or 
religious knowledge.••3 
Urban's criticism is sound. It may be carried even 
further. T~1e inconsistency concerning knowledse of God is 
rooted in a more basic idea in Tillich' s thousht, that of 
the infinite gap between God and man. If the gap is infi-
nite there is no connection between the ontoloc;ical and the 
cosmological. All talk of "symbol" is meaningless. Por some-
thing about the symbol must be true or tlcere is no ;:mrDose in 
l. Macintosh, PRK, 349. 
2. Urban, Art.(l940), 34-36. 
3. Urban, Art.(l940), 35. His position is more elaborately 
presented j_n Urban, LH, particularly Ghapter XII. 
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speaking of a symbol. ~~d if something about it is true, 
the symbol gives some sort of knowledge of God. Something 
in the relationship of the ontological with the cosmological 
must provide a basis for the operation of God in history, for 
the operation of the ontological in the cosmological. Other-
wise even the "awareness" of the unconditioned which is so 
important for Tillich declines into a sort of suojective mus-
ing or self-deception. It seems more true to say that the 
analogia ~ntis is the best way of discovering truth about God 
than to say it is simply a form in which every knowledge of 
revelation must be expressed. Tillich seems to believe that 
when he says: "For as the philosopher Schelling says: 'Only 
a person can heal a person.• This is the reason that the sym-
bol of a Personal God is indispensable for living religion." 1 
4. A criterion of truth. 
The criterion of truth by which one judges all experi-
ence is usually a reliable indication as t0 one's attitude 
toward reason. Tillich is well aware t[lat tJJe "false" ex1"sts, 
and he considers it to be a major portion of the task of the 
Protestant Church to speak prophetically against demonic 
distortions. 
It has been indicated above that Tillich maintains 
(with some inconsistency) "that knowled0e of revelation is 
"Wholly-other" than ordinary knowledge of a subject-object 
1. Art.(l940), 10. But can a symbol heal a person? That is 
the question. 
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structure. F'aith implies a kind of cognition that is quali-
tativoly different from ordinary cognition. True knowledge 
is knowledge of, or uni. on with, the True, the Really Heal. 
11 A judgment is true because it grasps and expresses true be-
ing; and the really real becomes truth if it is grasped and 
expressed in a true judgment. 111 But this truth is not of a 
demonstrable sort, nor can it be evidenced by the amassing of 
psychological, sociological or historical data. ''Theologians 
need not be afraid of any historical conjecture, for revealed 
truth lies in a dimension where it can neither be confirmed 
nor negated by historiography. 112 The truth of knowledge of 
revelation is not dependent on criteria which lie within the 
dimension of ordinary knowledge. The truth of revelation 
depends upon criteria which are themselves revelatory. 
"Knowledge of revelation, like ordinary knowledge, must be 
judged by its own implicit criteria. 113 Ultimate truth is 
self-confirming, self-evident. Tillich says that awareness 
of the Unconditioned does not have the cr~racter of faith but 
of self-evidence. His rejection of faith is based on the 
contingent element in faith. But k·10wledge of the truth, of 
the Unconditioned, is certain; it is self-evident. 4 
Not only does this awareness of the Unconditioned au-
thenticate itself. Awareness of the final revelati.on be-
comes the criterion by which all knowledge is judged. Speak-
1. ST, I, 102. 
2. ST, I, 130. 
3. ST, I, 131~ 
4. Art.(l946) , 12, 13. 
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ing of final reve'lation, Tillich says ti1at it "means the de-
cisive, fulfilling, unsurpassable revelation, that wluch is 
the criterion of all the others. 111 Jesus becomes the Christ 
and as such He becomes the final revelation. 
The final revelation, the revelation of 
Jesus as the Christ, is universally valid, 
because it included the criterion of every 
revelation, and is the finis or telos 
(intrinsic aim) of all of them. The final 
revelation is the criterion of every reve-
lation which precedes or follows. It is the 
criterion of every religion and of every cul-
ture ••.• It is valid for the social exist-
ence of every human group and for the per-
sonal existence of every human individual. 2 
Tillich believes that the cognitive objects of philos-
ophy are the principles and norms whlch constitute the 
structure of subjective and objective reason. He oelieves 
that rationalism and pragmatism discuss the problem of the 
verification of these principles in an abstract way, by-
passing the element of cognitive union and receiving knowl-
3 
edge. Rationalism develops norms a priori, in terms of 
l. ST, I, 133. 
2. ST, I, 137. The inconsistency between this statJment and 
those above maintaining a rigid separation between knowledge 
of revelation and ordinary knowledge is clear. Tillich 
wants to preserve the boundary situation where he can hold 
to historic existence and to the Unconditioned. It seems 
that he should have maintained a more organic rslationshi~ 
between the conditioned and the Unconditioned. 
3. ST, I, 40. Tillich contrasts receiving knowledge with cm-
trolHng knowledgG; receiving knowledge being that of 
union and participation, of ecstatic reason; controlling 
knowledge being that of detachment and separation, of 
technical reason. 
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their self-evidence, their character of un:Lversali ty and 
necessity. The rational structure of mind and real:Lty is 
deduced. Pragmatism works in the opposite direction. It 
regards the so-called principles of reason as being the re-
sults of accumulated and tested experience, open to future 
changes and subject to endless tests. If these principles 
explain a given form or expression, they are thereby verified. 
Tillich criticizes rationalism and pragmatism because they do 
not see the element of participation in knowledge. Against 
both of them Tillich asserts that the verification of the 
principles of ontological reason has neither the character 
of rational self-evidence nor of a pragmatic test. 
The way in which philosophical systems r~ve 
been accepted, experienced, and verified 
points to a method of verification beyond 
rationalism and pragmatism. These systems 
have forced themselves upon the mind of 
many human beings in terms of receptive 
knowledge and cognitive union.l 
Controlling knowledge, rational criticism, and pragmatic 
tests have refuted these systems which are verified through 
cognitive union. But the systems contL1ue to live. "Their 
veriflcation is their efficacy in the life process of man-
kind. They prove to be inexhaustible in meaning and creative 
in power. 112 
Tillich 1 s criterion of truth might be called 11 ontolog-
ical." The awareness of the Unconditioned is subject to no 
1. ST, I, 105. 
2. ST, I, 105. 
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criterion, it is self-authenticating. But it becomes the 
criterion of all truth. Cognitive union is efficacious in 
the life process. Tillich knows that there are objections 
to his ontological idea of truth. The scientist claims that 
what cannot be verified by experiment is emotional self-ex-
pression. Tillich replies that the scientist is right to the 
extent that every assumption must be tested. But the scientist 
is wrong in limiting verification to experimentation. Tillich 
speaks of "experiential verification." 
Verification can occur within the lifo-process 
itself. Verification of this type (experiential 
in contradistinction to experimental) has the 
advantage that it need not halt and disrupt the 
totality of a life-process in order to distil 
calculable elements out of it (which experimental 
verifi_cation must do). • • The life-process 
itself makes the test.l 
On the basis of the emphasis on the life process, the whole 
of life, one may say that Tillich's criterion of truth is 
"experiential efficacy in life." The truth is imparted in 
the awareness of the Unconditioned. It is found to be the 
truth in experience, in the dynamic life process. 2 
In spite of all that Tillich says about the self-
authentication of the awareness of the Unconditioned, he says 
other things wbi ch qualify that opinion. It was seen above 
that true ecstasy cannot violate the ethical principles of 
1. ST, I, 108, 103. 
2. once again the connection between the life process 
(largely of ordinary knowledge) and the self-evidence of 
the TJnconditional as criterion is not clear. 
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the practical reason, that true ecstasy does not violate the 
wholeness of the rational mind. Tillich also says that the 
1 
holy is at the same time the right and the just. A qualifi-
cation must therefore be placed on Tillich's idea of self-
evidence. That which is self-evident and which destroys 
reason is false, is demonic. That which is self-evident and 
confirms (fulfills) reason is true, is divine. Thus the dis-
tinguishing activity of the criterion is not on the basis 
of the self-evidence but on the basis of the fact that aware-
ness of the Unconditioned heals and confirms reason. The 
anti-rational cannot be true. 
Tillich regards Jesus as the final revelation. His 
reasons for such a regard are rational. 2 The clue to an un-
derstanding of Tillich's idea of religious knowledge, and 
perhaps of his entire pl,ilosophy, is in the word, "meaning." 
Tillich believes that the task of Protestant theology is to 
ask: "What is the ultimate meaning in all historical activi ty?" 3 
He regards it as one of the few signs of hope in a post-war 
reconstruction period that the churches r..ave "preserved the 
message of the ultimate lll9aning of lif'e." 4 Tillich' s entire 
interpretation of history is ba<Jed on his idea of the center, 
die lvlitte der Gesohichte. This center is the center because 
5 
of the meaning it gives to the entire process. The reoog-
1. IOH, 228, 4. TPE, 267. 
2. ST, I, 136. 5. ron, 249-251, 259. 
3. TPE, 217. 
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nition of Christ as the final revelation rests on the fact 
that Christ gives "meaning to all possible and actual his-
tory.111 "Meaning" is a crucial word in Tillich 1 s thought. If 
one unites the idea of the wholeness of the life process with 
that of meaning in Tillich, he might accurately term Tillichls 
criterion of truth as "coherence of meaning." The main dis-
tinction Tillich would draw between his thought ani rational 
coherence is the fact of' existential involvement in his co-
herence of meaning. He believes that racionalism remains sep-
arated from life, aloof from the dynamic decisions of exist-
ence. The possibility of recognizing the real truth for Til-
lich depends upon decision and fate. 2 The wbole person is 
involved in knowledge oi the truth; one 1 s en tire destiny is 
felt to depend upon the Unconditional. "Truth is realized in 
a decision regarding the Unconditioned. n3 
5. Reason and religious knowledge. 
It is not the purpose of this section to present a 
thorough analysis of Tillich 1 s thought about reason in God 
and man. Yet it would be valuable to indicate here the general 
outline of Tillich 1 s attitude toward reason. 
4 ManIs essential nature is that of freedom. This free-
dom is witbin the context of reason, the Loses-structure of 
1. ST, I, 136. 
2. IOH, 150. Tillichl s impoverished conception of reason is 
again apparent. 
3. IOH, 141. 
4. Art.(l939), 202. 
, __ 
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man's essential nature. At this stage man differs from God 
in the "temporal imperative" which coerces !".an to use his 
freedom in life. "I'an has finite infinity. He has the eternal 
Logos in temporal and indiv:ldual limitations. 111 At this stage 
man is a "dynamic unity of reason and power, of mental univ-
sality and vital individuality. 112 Since man is individual 
and since he must act he must actualize his freedom. 'l'here 
is a theoretical possibility that man will act according to 
reason. But the existential fact is that EBn does not act 
according to reason, but agp inst reason. Tillich terms this 
second aspect of man's nature his existential nature, intend-
ing thereby to indicate the ambiguous situation man creates 
for himself. Man possesses reason, yet acts against it. There 
is, then, an inner cleavage in man. "'e has misused his freedom 
and in so doing he has partially separated himself from that 
essential unity to which he belonc;s. Ee experiences loneliness, 
melancholy, and An,~ in his existential predi_cament. 11 Ee is 
infinitely separated from the unity to wf>1_ch he be longs. 113 
But man is still man. He still possesses his logos nature, 
his reason, though it 5_s separated from its ground in God 
and at times is divided ai_\ainst itself in TI'Bn. "I·.C:an can 
never lose his infinity and spirituality. He can never become 
a 'stone and stump'; and therefore he can never cease to be 
v 
1. Art.(l939), 210 
2. Art.(l939), 206. 
3. Art.(l939), 211. 
1 
the 1 image of God. 111 
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Tillich, in analysing modern history, states with ap-
proval the attitude of the revolutionary period toward reason. 
Reason in the revolutionary period did not mean the process 
of reasoning, but the power of truth and justice embodied in 
2 
man as man. Reason was the principle of humanity, somewhat 
akin to the divine Logos of the Stoics. Every man is a r·a-
tional being. Again in the same connection Tillich lists ~s 
one of the guideposts to the Christian answer to the world 
situation the fact that the answer must acknowledge and ac-
cept the positive c ont ribut ions of the modern period. 
Here the principle point is the elevation 
of reason as the principle uf truth above 
all forms of authoritarianism and obscur-
antism •••. Christian faith which pro-
claims Christ as 11 Logos 11 cannot reject reason 
as the principle of truth and justice.3 
Yet Tilli ch is insistent tha1.. man is not God. Under 
the conditions of existence reason is partially separated 
from its ground of unity. But, on the uth~r hand, man is still 
man; he still possesses reason and this reason plays a signifi-
cant role in the knowledge of God. F'or the sake of ch•rity, 
and not to indica"e an actual separation, th~ role of reason in 
religious knowledge may be divided into four functions. 
Reason asks a qu~stion. God is the law ror the :>tructure 
and ground of reasou. In actual existence human rea~:~on is 
1. Art.(l939)~ ~1~, 2~3. 
2. Art.(l945)v, ~. 3. 
3. Aru.(l945)3, 44. 
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never unified with its gruund. But neither is it ~ver sepa-
rated !"rum its ground. Reason is always struggling, probing, 
quesuing, seeking unity within itself and unity with its 
ground. In its struggle to realize the Logos that is implicit 
within itself, human reason asks a question. The question 
arises out of reason, not against reason. 1 
A symptom of both the essential unity and the 
existential separation of' I1.nite man rrom his 
infinity is his ability to ask about the in-
finite to which he belongs: the fact that he 
must ask about2it, indicates tbat he is sepa-rated from it. 
In asking the question, human reason creates a situa-
tion in which revelation can be meaningful. Truth and meaning 
would be of no value to the finite spirit which is indifferent 
and insensitive toward them. Dodd says that the true meaning 
of any positive statement depends on the question to which it 
is the answer. 3 God is the answer to the question of human 
reason. But question and answer stand in a correlative relation-
ship. 11 The answers implied in the event of revelation are 
meaningful only in so far as they are in correlation with 
questions concerning the whole of our existence, with existen-
4 tial questions·" Indeed, Tilli ch says that rmn himself is 
the question, before any specific question has become articu-
late. Man is a question in that he seeks unity and meaning 
1. ST, I, 85. 
2. ST, I, 61. 
3. Dodd, TBD, 30. 
4. ST, I, 61. 
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and truth. Revelation is the answer to man's question in 
that it manifests the Ground of unity, meaning and truth. 1 
It would appear from what has just been said that man•s 
reason is the capacity imparted to him which makes him akin 
to God. It may be said further that if the way man uses his 
freedom in some way conditions God it is no longer accurate 
or consistent for Tillich to speak of God as the Uncondi-
tioned. 'l'hat is, if the question determines the value of the 
answer to any extent; if there is a correlation between the 
question and the answer, the answer is in some way dependent 
upon the question. But Tillich does not allow this idea. 
The idea that man cooperates with God, or conditions God 
(except in his manifestation) is rejected by Tillich. His 
answer is clear: "Symbolically speaking, God answers man's 
:,: 
questions, arrl under the impact of God's answers he asks them." 
Tillich is right in stressing the idea of a "historical rave-
lation 11 against the old idea of a man-alone, reason-alone 
foundation and a superstructure of revelation. For Tillich 
the very stuff of history is possible because of the polar 
tension between the finite and the infinite. There is no 
such thing as man-alone in history. There is no history 
without revelation. "Man in his tory never is without reve-
lation and he never is withoc:_t question for revelation. 3 
1. Art.(l943), 9. 
2. ST, I, 61. 
3. Art.(l935), 169. 
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Let it be granted wit!l. Tillich that :own's question 
can be asked only under the impact of God 1 s answers. There 
still has to be the finite pole if ttere is to be a question-
answer, dialectical relationship. Ot.!-:el··wisG the w"ole matter 
is an instance of dj.viDe sradow-boxinc;. 'fhe :~.ore basic 
thought of Tillich affirms that man is essentially of a Logos 
structure, and th:t no sort of existentisl involvement can 
rob man of his rational nuture. Possessi.ng reason, man asks 
a question, he seeks truth and !"eaninc;. Reason has the 
capacity to ask a question, to seek value, meani~ and truth, 
and in so doin6 to fulfill itself. 
A second capacity of reason w::,ich 'Ls operative in the 
attaining of relic;ious lmowledge is that of criticism. It 
was seen thnt for Tillich true revelation c~:mnot violate 
reason, that "demonic possession destroys tl'e ethical and 
lo;:;ical principles of reason; divine ecstasy affirms them." 
Reason as a criterion of revelation is a cathartic power. 
Christianity has benefitted by using reason in this sense as 
an instrur.1ent of self-regeneration. 
The acceptance and e1:1[Jloyment of reason as 
the princinle of' truth has cl.:l ssolved certain 
orthodox 11 stnmblb;;-blo0lcs 11 wbich had not 
been touched by the Ref'ormati on but rather 
had been more firmly anchored by the scho-
lastic doglll9tism iYito which Reformation 
thought herdened.2 
Reason in this cathart1.c capacity bBs ena-bled Christianity 
l. ST, I, 114. 
2. Art.(l945)3, 40. 
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to sluff off the hard crust of dead creed, giv:ing light 
and life to fresh questions and fresh answers. Historical 
criticism of the Bible, liberating Christian truth from 
legendary and superstitious elements in the historic tradi-
tion, is a significant example. Tillich believes that reason 
has completed the religious emancioation of the layman which 
the Reformation began. Reason has broken all heteronomous 
rule, whether that be of state or minister or priest. 
The enlightenment was in certain respects a 
Protestant lay movement. As such it pro-
duced new ideas of personality and commun-
ity. In many parts of the world it destroyed 
the patriarchal form of community with all 
its implications for sex-relations, family, 
and worksLop. Reason has accomplis'led much 
the same emancipation for Christian person-
ality. It has opened it to receive the 
riches of humanism. It bas released the sup-
pressed levels of personal life. It has 
freed the i~dividual from cruel religious 
absolutism. 
Reason does not produce revelation, nor is it self-suf-
• 
ficient, spinning its answers out of itself. But in judg-
ing revelation and in rejecting the false in favor of the 
true, the meaningless in favor of the meaningful, reason 
performs a function essential in the attaining of reli-
gious knowledge. 
A third function reason performs is that of receiv-
ing and conceiving revelation. In rejecting Barth's wholly-
otherness Tillich strongly emphasizes that God's spirit 
1. Art.(l945)3, 41. 
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bears witness to our spirits. "The Holy Spirit bears wit-
ness to our spirit -- a witness that we are able to under-
stand •••• 111 Reason receives revelation. Having received 
revelation, reason must relate revelation to the whole of 
man's existence, expressing the msanin~ of revelation in the 
concepts at hand. 2 Reason can never conceive accurately and 
fully what it receives. This is an ambiguity of existence 
which is inevitable outside the complete harmony of formal 
and ecstatic reason; that is, outside the Kingdom of God. 
Tillich speaks of revelation (or the theological norm) 
as being "received by ecstatic reason and conceived through 
technical reason." 3 There is a close relation between the 
receiving and the relating functions of reason. It is the 
same reason in each case, and there is no actual separation 
of function. For there is an act of shaping in every act 
of reasonable reception and an act of grasping in every 
reasonable reaction. 4 This manner of speaking suggests that 
the knowledge of revelation does have some connection with 
the normal range of subject-object knowledge. Though Tillich 
maintains the contrary, he is inconsistent in maintaining it. 
Tillich says that knowledge of revelation is on another level 
and can never be in opposition to normal subject-object 
knowledge. It is understandable that this knowledge of reve-
1. Art.(l935) 2 , 141. 
2. ST, I, 53. 
3. ST, I, 54. 
4. ST, I, 76. 
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lation is unique and on a level deeper tr~n ordinary knowl-
edge, even though it is the same reason of man which knows 
in both cases. It is not understandable that Tillich should 
maintain a rigid separation, saying that one in no w;;.y inter-
feres with the other. ~ 
Speaking of the meaning of human existence, Tillich 
mentions two lines by wbich this meanine; can be symbolized: 
the vertical and the horizontal. The vertical line indicates 
the eternal meaning as such, the horizontal line points to 
the temporal realization of the eternal meaning. 
Every religion necessarily has both directions. 
• • • If religion is to speak a transcending, 
judging and trans forming word to the people of 
our time, it must do so in both directions, the 
vertical as well as the horizuntal, and this in 
mutual interdependence.l 
The functions of reason to receive and to ccnceive 
l'evelation, then, are functions of a unified reason, yet 
functions in mutual interdependence. Reason is that capacity 
in man which makes him a possible recipient of revelation. 
This fact, together with the constant insistence by Tillicb 
that God is the Ground of meaning, and that meaning is the 
fundamental category of existence, suggests a strong doctrine 
of analogi a entis. Wb~t Tillich explicitly denies he impli-
ci tly affirms. 
A fourth major function of reason according to Tillich 
is that of being filled by revelation. Reason asks a question. 
l. TP:\ 186. 
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When reason's question is answered reason is reintegrated 
and fulfilled. Those who demand the sacrifice of the intel-
lect are far from Tillich. 
It is not only bad theology but also a kind 
of ascetic arrogance when some theologians --
since Tertullian -- indulge in nonsenslcal 
combinatlons of words, demanding of all true 
Christians that in an act of intellectual 
self-destruction they accept nonsense as 
11 divine sense. 11 1 
Revelation is not only consistent with rea.,on, it fulfills 
reason. Reason is reunited with that from which it has been 
split. "Reason does not resist revelation. It asks for 
revelation. For revelation moans the reintegration of reason."2 
"The unconditicnal is not arbitrary; it never demands the 
sacrifice of the intellect; it is not alien to man; it ful-
fills his inmost nature. n3 "God does not annihilate the ex-
pressions of his own Logos. "4 Indeed, i.n answering the 
question of reason, God through revelation brings reason to 
its coherent fulfillment. In revelation reason experiences 
the ultimate answer to its quest for meaning, justice, 
truthfulness and sonship. 5 
Human reason plays a dignified and important role in 
the attaining of religious knowledge. Reason asks a question, 
it rejects all false answers in favor oi' the true answer, it 
receives and relates the answer, experiencing the ultimate 
l. ST, I, 15ln. 4. ST, I, 57. 
2. ST, I, 94. 5. Arc.(l938), 136. 
3. Adams, Art.(l948), 293. 
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in meaning and truth and thus ·oeing 11 made full" by revela-
tion. But reason does not create the revelation. It is on 
account of this fact that Tillich says that reason is not a 
source for theology. God as "content of faith" is the source 
of theology. Reason 
does not produce its contents. Ecstatic reason 
is reason grasped by an ultimate concern. 
Reason is overpowered, invaded, shaken by the 
ultimate concern. Reason does not produce an 
ultimaoe concern. Reason does not produce an 
object of ultimate concern by logical pro-
cedures, as a mistaken theology tried to do 
in its "arguments for the existence of God." 
Tbe contents of faith grasp reason.l 
According to Tillich the creative initiative is always 
with God. But trus creative initiative is meaningless until 
it is received, appropriated, and to some extent understood 
by human reason. Human reason is in a polar relationship with 
revelation, a relationship which constitutes history and 
wruch enables man to find his pl~ce in history.2 
6. Is religious knowledge possible? 
In an attempt to bring this aspect of the discussion 
to a conclusion it might be well to repeat Tillich's defini-
tion of religious know ledge. 11 Religious knowledge is lmowl-
edge of things and events in their religious sic;n:Lficance, 
1. ST, I, 53. 
2. Tillich's discussion of reason assumes a real existential 
correlation between man and God. But in the discussion of 
ecstasy and mystical union above we saw ~illich to be 
speaking more of an ontology than of' "n epistemology. 
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in their relationship to their transcendent ground. Reli-
gious knowledge is knowledge of the really real. 111 In a 
general way all knowledge is religious; for all knowledge 
involves a reference to the ultimate and transcendent ground 
of oeing. Certainly all metavhysical knowledge is religious 
knowledge. For God is being. "The deus est ~ is the basis 
of all philosophy of religion." 2 That is why Tillich could 
say in an earlier work: 
The presupposition of all our thoughts was that 
truth is realized in a decision regarding the 
Unconditioned: stated in religious terms, that 
all knowledge of the truth in a certain stratum 
is knowledge of God.3 
For Tillich religious knowledge!.!'!. possible; indeed, in its 
highest theonomous light, the entire world of persons and ob-
jects becomes sacramental as a symbol which relates us to the 
ultimate ground of being. Sacred and secular are not ultimate 
categories. The world of persons and objects is one world, a 
dynamic structure of power and meaning po:lnting beyond itsel!' 
to the ultimate. 4 
The quesoion, "Is :;nowledge of God possible"?, re-
quires a more complicated answer. Tillich answers "yes" 
and 11 no. 11 Knowledge of God is not possible J.n the sense 
that God is a being alongside other belngs as object~ to the 
finite perceiving subject, a being wrose exi.s tence is debated 
1. TPE, 217. 
2. Art.(l~46) 3 , 10. 
3. IOE, 141. 
4. The implicaoion agaj_n is of an absolute monism. 
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by finite minds. Man does not grasp God, but is grasved by 
God. God remains unconditionally far from man, and una)Jproach-
ably holy. Man, by intellectual search, cannot find God. God 
can never be reached if he is thought to be the object of some 
question. "The religious Ultimate is presupposed in every 
philosophical question ••.• God is the presup,;osition of the 
question of God. 111 If one assumes that krwwledge implj_es a 
separation, a subjcco-object structure, Tillich regards 
knowledge of' God as being impossible. 
But this :cs not; the whole story. Knowledge of God in 
the sense of 11 awareness o:f the Unconditioned" is pos siole. 
This awareness is not the isolated function of the intellect. 
Man is aware of the Unconaitioned. In tnis ont;oluglcal aware-
ness there is an essential unity of the conditioned and the 
Unconditioned. Man's es~ence is to be in unity with God. It 
is by V.Lrtue of this unity thaL man lives and has his oeing. 
But man's exist;once is to .Live in time, where all things real 
enter the subject-object relaLionship. In this zerris:;ende 
realm all man's knowledge of Gou is symbolic. 
It ha" been inaica-r;ed that at tbis point Tilllch's 
thought falls into a basic contradiction. The idea of the 
symbol is crucial for Tillich. He makes a rather sharp dis-
tinction between a symbol and a sign, only to deny the 
uniqueness of the symbol (i.e., its ontological grounding) 
3 1. Art.(l946) , 4. The 11 that art thou" of the Chandogya 
Upanishad comes to mind as a similar monism. 
148 
by speakinc; of God as absolutely Unconditioned. 'le says that 
a personal symbol is more adequate for God t:oan a sub-personal 
symbol, 1 but he denies an analosy of being. Ee says that rea-
son seeks, receives and appropriates revelatj_o:-:t, is made full 
by revelation, but that this experience of reason is unrelated 
to the context of ordina:ry knowledge. Fe says that lmowledc;e 
of God is impossible but he maintains that all knowledge of 
the truth at fi certain stratum is knowledge of God. In the 
light of these contradictions it is diff~cult to state Til-
lich's opinion about the knowledse of God. The most consistent 
assertion Tillich makes is that every kcwwledge is to an ex-
tent knowledge of God and to an extent not knowledge of God. 
It is impossible to draw a precise analogy at any point be-
tween the conditioned and the Unconditioned. Every knowledge 
experience is knowledge of God potentially as a witness to 
its ultimate ground and as a possible stimulus for pure ecstasy. 
No experience is knowledge of God in the sans e that 11 this is 
God, II that God is objectified in anything finite. 
Throughout this chapter it has been difficult to inter-
pret Tillich because he shifts reference without warning from 
the epistemolosical to the ontological. In this sHuation it 
is clear why passages should seem inconsistent to the reader 
who tried to maintain a consistent orientation. But the seEm-
ing inconsistent ~tatements of Tilli~h are not so necessaril;r. 
1. Art.(l940), 10. 
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The monism of the ecstatic experience in which subjectivity 
is sacrificed is not inconsistent with the idea of the subject-
o·oject structure of kcwwledge and the "torn" state of reason 
if the being of God experiences three stages comparable to tmse 
l 
of man. This interpretation will be given explicit expression 
in Chapters III and pr below, with the otherwise ambiguous po-
sition of Tillich regarding religious knowledge contributing 
to this interpretation. The epistemological monism is grounded 
in an ontological monism. 2 There is only one substantial sub-
ject, God. God moves out from himself in the form of man, 
being therefore partially separated from himself. The state 
of God's separation from himself is the stat·3 of historical 
correlation. Reason in God and man is the analogy of being 
through which there is a correlation. That is WDY reason is 
important in man 1 s existence to seek, evaluate, receive and 
relate revelation. Revelation is the periodic and fleeting 
reunion of man with God. This reunion is called ecstasy and 
cannot be complete in existence. But it is an indication of 
what shall be eschatologically. The life of rc:an wi1ich is part 
of the life of God will be reunited with God himself and God 
again will be all in all. 
Regarded from the standpoint of God in his essential 
or eschatological nature, then, God is everything. From this 
1. see above, Chapter I, page 2lff. 
2. See Chapter IV below for a discussion of Tillich's idea 
that the method of knowing is ontologically determined. 
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perspective Tillich is an epistemological and an ontological 
monist. But from the viewpoint of man in existence there is 
a partial separation between man and God. 'l'hus, Tillich can 
speak of the subject-object structure of knowledge, of the 
epistemological objectifying of God, while insisting tb_at 
ontologically man is not a being outside or alongside God. 
As to man 1 s existence, then, Tillich holds to an epistemologi-
cal dualism as a temporal condition of knowing, yet he believes 
that even in existence man can occasionally enter the ecstasy 
of union with God epistemologically and mtologically. 
CHAPTER III 
GOD AND HEASON 
For Tillich there is no question about the existence 
of God. Though he speaks of God in such diverse ways as 
"the answer to the question implied in being, 111 "the name 
of this infinite and inexhaustible depth and ground of all 
being, 112 as "the name of the ground of history, 113 "the basis 
and abyss of all meaning which surpasses all that is conceiv-
able, 11 4 "the power of being in which every being participates, 115 
"the power in everything that has power, 116 "the name for that 
which concerns man ultimately, 117 as "being itself," 8 and as 
11 Lord11 and "Father, 119 he is jealous to safeguard the non-exis-
tential status of God. The essential form of blasphe"ly and 
perversion is the bringing of God into the context of exjsten-
tial knowledge as an object for men as subjects to perce1ve 
and consider. The diverse statements find their unity in the 
idea that "God does not exist. 1110 Therefore the usual dis-
cussion of the existence of God, as if God were something or 
someone completely misses the essential nature of God. Argu-
1. ST, I, 163. 
2. SOF, 57. 
3. SOl:<', 59. 
4. IOH, 222. Nikhilauanda writes that Brahman also is un-
known and unknowable [Art. ( 1948), 9]. 
5. Art.(l946)3, 11. 
6. Art.(l946)3, 11. This is certainly a pantheistic statement. 
7. ST, I, 211. 
8. ST, I, 205. 
9. S1', I, 286. 
10. ST, I, 2u5. The clear implication here is an absolute 
monism. 
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ments for the existence of God are wrongly labeled. The 
finite cannot work toward the infinite as conclusion on the 
basis of the finite that is "given." The implication in such 
a procedure is that God is not present until he is found by 
thought to ue present. The further implicati_on is that God 
is objectified as true being, good being, the most powerful 
being. 
Tillich will not accept tl-,ese implications. He does 
not think of God as .§_ being, not even a most powerful being. 
Nor does he think of God as the most perfect object. What the 
theologians and philosophers should have said rather than argu-
ments for the existence of God was somethi_ng aoout the onto-
logical implications of finitude. The analysis of finitude 
shows that i'initude witnesses to somet:C:Cine; beyond the finite. 
The power or the being to which finitude witnesses is as much 
.present in the first question as in the last conclusion, as 
much present in the suoj ect as in the object. This power or 
being stancis under the separation of' subject and objer;t, as 
the prius of tt~ separation. 1 The outcome of Tillich's analy-
sis of the ontological, cosmological and teleological argu-
ments for the existence of God is to show tb_at the question 
of God is implied in the finHe structure of being. 2 The 
whole of condi_tioned existence leans toward a norm of uncon-
di tionedness; the teleological argument incUcating the search 
1. Art.(l946) 3 , 3ff. Tillich is speaking ontologically here. 
2. ST, I, 210. 
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for the ground of meaning, the cosmological argunent indicat-
ing the search for the ground of beigg. 
T!1e two main poles of Tillich' s thought aoout God are 
ground and abyss, Sinngrund und Sinnabgrund. 1 As this inves-
tigation centers around the place of reason in the thought 
of God and man, God as Sinngrund will receive first attention. 
But God as Sinnabgrund is in integral unity with God as Sinn-
grund. Thus, in the ensuing discussion the abyss of God's 
nature can never be neglected. 
In general the ground of meaning is that in God which 
supports the rational, logos type of manifestation. This mani-
festation is positive in content and form. In so far as God is 
Sinngrund man can approach God through his own rational nature, 
through an analogy of meanings and meaning-structures. On the 
other hand, the abyss of meaning is that in God which creates 
mystery, the inexhaustible depth of God which man cannot fathom. 
This a·oyss indicates the negative, the absence of content and 
form, which power in God's nature is a threat to form and 
content. In so far as God is 
holy, infinitely distant from 
Sinnabgrund he is unapproacbably 
2 
man. Therefore every staLe-
ment about God is an analogue or a symbolic or mythological 
3 
utterance upon which a "yes" and a "no" must be pronounced. 
1. IOF, 222. 
2. ST, I, 287. 
3. "There is no way of speaking about God except in mytho-
logical terms"(ST, I, 223). Since God is "forever hidden, 
transcendent, and unknowable, it follows t.bat all religious 
ideas are symbolical" ( RS, x). 
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The analogy is true and it is false. The part which is true 
is not a definite part, for example two-thirds. In every 
analogue the false and the true are intermixed. Thus, at the 
outset of the discussion about God a basic difficulty is ap-
parent. God is concrete, yet ultimate. 1 Tillich tries to hold 
together the rational and the beyond-rational elements in 
God's nature. The implications or this _dialectic in God for 
the approach to God, the attributes of God, the trinity, and 
for the personality of God should be explored. 
1. The finite witness to the infinite. 
A persistent idea in Tillich 1 s writing about God is 
• <; that God is not an object for us as suoJec.ts. God is not 
any particular meaning to be placed beside other meanings, 
not even the highest meaning. 3 God is not any particular 
value beside other values, not even the highest value.4 God 
is not any particular being beside other beings, not even 
the highest being. 5 The complete lack of particularity in 
God led Dr. !-Iarkness LO write: "The one element in our knowl-
edge of God which is litera.L fact, and not symbol, is God's 
character as the Unconditioned. 11 6 As Tillich has written at 
length about the unconditioned, though without consistent 
l. ST, I, 286. 
2. SOF, 45. Cf. Chapter II above. Tillich is speaking with 
implications beyond epistemology. 
3. IOH, 288; TPE, 163. 
4. IOH, 2G3. 
5. TPE, 163; Art.(l946)3, 11. 
6. Harkness, Art.(l938), 518. 
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clarity, the idea may orofitably be considered. 
Man's finite existence is marked by tense and transient 
insecurity, for he lives in a world whose foundations are 
shaken. Man looks beyond his world of conditioned concerns 
to an ultimate which Tillich calls the "unconditioned.'' Man 
in his conditioned existence is confronted by an unconditional 
demand. At times Tillich speaks of the unconditional a~ a 
quality of the encounter; at other uimes he speaks of the un-
conditional as if it wer" being-itseJ.f; inaeed, .. s ir it were 
God. 
In a footnote to a lecture on 11 Kairos 11 Tillich speaks 
of the unconditional as a quality. 
The term "unconditional" ••. points to that e.Le-
ment in every religious.experience which makes 
it religious. In every symbol of the divine an 
unconditional. claim is expressed, most power-
fully in the command: "Thou shalt love the Lord 
thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy 
soul, and with all tny mind." No partial, rt:-
stricted, conditioned love of God ltl .. dmit ted. 
The term "unconditioned" or the adjective made 
into the "ubst<mtive, "the unconditional," is 
an abstraction from such sayings which abound in 
the Bible and in great reiigious liter .. ture. rhe 
unconditional is a quality, not a being. It char-
act6rizes that which is uur ultimate and, conse-
quently unconditional concern, whether we call 
it 11 God(, or "Being as such" ur tne '' Govd as such" 
or the "True as such," or whether we give it any 
other name •••• Unconditional is a quality which 
we experience in encountering reality, for instance, 
in the unconditional character of the voice of the 
conscience, the logical as well as the moral.l 
1. TPE, 3~n. 
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Tillich i~ clear in asserting that the unconuitiunal 
is not a being but a quality. Yet •he issue is cluuded in the 
next sentence when he says that the unconditional character-
izes that which is our ultimate concern, whether we call that 
God or Being as such. There is an ambiguity even within this 
concise attempt to state that the unconditional is not a being. 
The question arises, is the unconditional as a quality a qual-
ity of being itself, that is, a quality of the ontologically 
real? Or is the unconditional a subjective quality of man's 
experience of the ground and abyss of being? The concluding 
statement in the quotation immediately above does not illumine 
the issue. one can understand Tillich 1 s fear that the finite 
may be deified if God were thought of as ~being. But Tillich's 
assertion that the unconditional is a quality which we experi-
ence in encountering reality is ambiguous. In that case one 
would experience reality and a quality, as if the experience 
of them were somehow different. It seems to be quite consistent 
with Tillich's intention to say that unconditionality is a 
quality of being itself; not of a being, but of being itself, 
which quality man experiences in the encounter with being· 
itself. 
If this is a correct interpretation of Tillich, many 
other references to the unconditional fall into a pattern. 
For usually Tillich refers to the unconditional as if it were 
being itself, or a quality of being itself. 
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The unconditional meaning . • • toward which every 
act of meaning is directed in implicit faith, and 
which supports the whole, which protects it from 
a plunge into a nothingness void of meaning, it-
self has two aspects: it bears the meaning of 
each single meaning as well as the meaning of 1 the whole. That is, it is the basis of meaning. 
This statement is quite understandable if that to which 
it refers is thought of as being itself, which being has the 
quality of meaning. Again in the Interpretation of History 
Tillich says that we can speak of the unconditional simul-
taneously as basis of meaning and abyss of meaning. 2 If the 
unconditional is thought of as a quality, then that quality 
would be the basis of meaning and the abyss of meaning. One 
would seek in such a case to get beyond quality to that in 
which the quality inhered, or that of which the quality was 
a manifestation. 
In an essay on the "Kairos 0 Tillich writes: ''The rela-
tion of the conditioned to the unconditioned ••. is either 
an .openness of the conditioned to the dynamic presence of the 
unconditional or a seclusion of the conditional within it-
self.n3 The conditir>ned here means tr1e finite life. The 
reference to the unconditioned seems to be to the infinite 
life or being-itself. The statGment has real meaning if Til-
lich is speaking of the quality of the infinite life and the 
1. IOR, 222. Our question concerns whether tbat which is the 
basis of meaning itself is meaningful. 
2. IOH, 222. 
3. TPE, 43. 
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quality of the finite life. Again Tillichwrites: "But the 
really real is not reached until the unconditional ground of 
everything real, or the unconditioned pcwer in every power of 
1 beillG, is reached • 11 Here again, unconditional refers to the 
ground of being or being-itself. Other passages2 could be add-
ed to these to indicate that in spite of Tillich 1 s assertion 
that the unconditional is a quality and not a being, he never-
theless frequently refers to the unconditional as if it were 
being-itself, the ground and abyss of all beings, the infinite. 
The conclusion is that in these references a contradiction is 
not necessarily implied. The insistence that the unconditional 
is a quality is not abortive if that quality is seen to be a 
quaiity of being itself. J. L· Adams 3 also interprets Tillich•s 
idea of the unconditional as a quality of bej_ng-itself. Of 
Tillich 1 s unconditional he writes: 
Hence, as the depth or the infinlty of things, 
it is both the ground and abyss of being. It 
is that quality in being and truth, in good-
ness and beauty, tloat elicits man's ultimate 
concern; thus it is the absolute quality of 
all being and meaning and value, the power 
and vitality of the real as it fulfills it-
self in meaningful creativity.4 
Having sought to establish Tillich 1 s thought of the un-
conditional as a quality of being-itself, we must now return 
--------
1. TPE, 76. 
2. TPE, 119, 163, 209. 
3. Tillich 1 s appraisal of Adar.1 1 s interpretation of his thought 
(in a class remark) is reported by his students: "That man 
knows more about my thought than I do myself." 
4. Adams, Art.(l948), 300, 301. 
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to a consideration of the other 11 side 11 of being itself. No 
quality can unequivocally characterize God. As the ground of 
meaning God is logos, of a definite nature and quality. But 
as the abyss of meaning God is inexhaustible depth, with no 
positive statement a,Jout his nature possible. The only state-
ment about God's nature that is legitimate is a negatlve state-
ment, that God is not-conditioned, that he is unconditional. 
"Neither •The :inconditioned' nor •somethine; unconditional,' 
is meant as a being, not even the highest being, not even God. 
God is unconditioned, that makes him God; but the •uncondi-
tional' is not God. 11 1 Tillich fears that God wi 11 be drawn 
into the context of beings whose existence may be discussed 
if the depth of God is neglected. The objectification, or the 
11 thingification11 (to use J. L. Adams' term) of God is demonry. 
The essence of the idea of the demonic is that something finite 
claims to be infinite. To bring the infinite into the finite 
structure of things and objects is to revarse the direction of' 
the movement, but it is nonetheless engaging in demonry. 
In making God an obJect beside other objects, 
the existence and nature of which are matters 
of argument, theoloc;y suptJorts the escape to 
atheism. rt encourages tlcose who are interested 
in denying the threatening Witness of their 
existence. The first step to atheism is always 
a tbeolosy which drags God down to the level of 
doubtful things.2 
1. Art.(l946) 3 , 11 
2. SOF, 45. Yet Tillich admits that anything we think about 
is an "object." Surely we can think about God epistemologi-
cally without necessarily implying an ontological dualism. 
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This particular type of demonry has cJ-,aracterized some of the 
best thought, even that of Augustine and Kant. Both recognized 
the unconditional element in every encounter with reality. 
They were correct in their starting pol_nts. But they erred in 
their conclusions, moving from the unconditional element in 
the encounter with reality to the establishment of an uncon-
ditioned being within reality. God is not~ being for Tillich. 
As the concept of das Unbedingte is important in Til-
lich's thought of God it is well to consider the concept 
somewhat further. Tillich's denials that das Unbedingte is 
God should be considered, followed by an examination of the 
relationship of das unbedingte to the concept of ultimace concern. 
As we saw above in a discussion of religious knowledge, 
all knowledge of God is symbolical. There shall be occasion 
then to refer to the terms 11 God 11 and "Lord" and ''Father" as 
symbolic ~ndications of the awareness of tre unconditional. 
Tillich' s insistence on the unconditional as a quality stems 
partly from his interesc in preserving the symbolic nature of 
a 11 references to God. God as ground and abyss cannot be an 
object of thought or language. 
Glaube ist Richtung auf das Unbedingte als 
solchen Gegenstand sein, sondern nur das Sym-
bol, in dem das Unbedingte anschaut und gewollt 
wird. Glaube ist Richtung auf' das Unbedi~gte 
durch Symbols aus den Bedingten hindurch. 
Aber das Unbedingte ist kein gegenstandlicher 
Objekt. Es kann duro& Objekts nur symbolisiert, 
nicht erf'assc werden. 
1. Art.(l92D), 802. 
2. Art.(l925), 804. 
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Being-itself' is ultimate. All beings participate in 
the inexhaustible power of being-itself. No being is separate 
from being itself. Being-itself is not an object for discus-
sion or knowledge. One becomes aware of beinr; itself through 
intuition. Being its elf energizes every form, every logos; 
but being itself overflows every structure. That is, no struc-
ture can contain the fullness of being itself. But for pur-
poses of discussion and exchange of ideas tl'e grotmd of beirg 
and meaning must be referred to. The church has customarily 
used the terra, "God," for the ground of being and meaning. 
TilJich prefers the term, das Unbedingte, in order to emphasize 
the quality of the encounter and to minimize the possibility 
of thinking of the ground of being in terms of a definite 
beine;. Thus the term, das Unbedingte, becomes for Tillich a 
philosophical symbol for the ultimate concern of man. 
There is a close relationship, then, betw~en the uncon-
ditional and man's ultimate concern. In man 1 s fiYJ.'.te existence 
of transient concerns he is confronted with an ultimate concern. 
This ultimate concern becomes very important for Tillich. It 
is the indication of the ground of being and meaning in the 
life of man. It is also the basis for dist1.nguishing religion 
(or the theological circle) from all other attitudes. As such 
the ultimate concern beccmes a sort of moral witness to the 
ultimate. One is reminded of Lotze's remark: "The true 
beginni.ng of metaphysics lies in etr1ics. I admit that the 
ex}::ression is not exact; but I still feel certain of being on 
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the rign.t track, when I seek in that whi. ch should be the 
ground of that which is. 11 1 Helmut Kuhn has written recently 
to the same point. ''Being and goodness (value) belong to-
gether: by discovering that which is, man becomes apprised 
of what he should do. 112 The siml .. larity between these ex-
pressions and Tillich 1 s view will be clearer as we look more 
closely at Tillich 1 s "ultimate concern." 
The theologian is distinguished from the philosopher 
by this conunitment of ultimate concern. "A person can be a 
theologian as long as he acknowledges the content of the 
theological circle as his ultimate concern. 11 3 This crlterion 
of a theologian does not judge upon his emotional or intellec-
tual state. 4 Whether one is a theologian or not, in Tillich's 
sense, depenqs only upon his being ultimately concerned with 
the Christian message. ~.'ore significant tban the criterion 
of the theologian; however, is the place of ultimate concern 
as a witness to the presence of the ground of being • 
. Explaining the "unconditional" Tillich speaks of an 
"unconditional demand upon those who are aware of something 
unconditional, which cannot be interpreted as the principle 
of a rational deduction. 115 In spite of the tautology here, 
l. Lotze, M.2T, II, 319. 
2. Kuhn, Art.(l951), 162. 
3. S'l', I, 10. "Content of the theological circle" means the 
creed to which he is committed and its claim to uniqueness 
and universal validity. 
4. ST, I, 10. Just hov1 one could be ultimately concerned with-
out the involvement of his emotions and his intellect is not 
clear. The emphasis is on the whole man, not a facultv. 3 " 5. Art. ( 1946) , ll. 
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the demand-nature of' the unconditional is clear. In the quo-
tation above it was seen that in every symbol of' the divine 
an unconditional claim is expressed, 1 especially in the 
Biblical command that thou shalt love the I,ord thy God with 
all thy heart and with all t!-;y soul, and with all thy mind. 
In his most recent work Tillich has felt it necessary to 
explain again what he means by "ultimate concern." 
Ultimnte concern is the abstract translation of' 
the great commandment: "The Lor·d, our God, the 
Lord is one; and you shall love t!Je Lord your Uod 
with all your heart, and with all your soul and 
with all your mind, and with all your stre:-J.gth." 
The relisious concern is ultimate; it excludes 
all other concerns from ultimate significance; it 
makes them preliminary. The ultimate concern is 
unconditional, independent of any conditions of' 
character, desire, or circumstance. The uncondi-
tional cuncern is total: no part of ourselves 
or of our world is excluded from it; there is no 
11 place 11 to flee from it. The total concern is 
infinite: no moment of relaxation and rest is 
possible in the face of' a religious concern which 
is ultimate, unconditional, total, and infinite.2 
In a religious experience cne is aware of the ultimate. 
And the ultimate gives itself only to the attitude of ultimate 
concern. 'l'hat is, one cannot be aware of' God and be indifferent 
about God. !!an's total finite existence is under this demand 
of the ultimate, whlch demand enters man's consciousness as 
the experience of ultimate concern. 'l'o a high degree,· then, 
Lotze's "ought" as an indication of the "is" finds a correlary 
in Tillich 1 s idea of' the "really real's" confronting man in 
1. TPE, 32n. 
2. ST, I, 11, 12. 
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his finlte existence as an unconditional demand to which man 
responds in the attitude of ultimate concern. Lest tnere be 
ambiguity, however, it should be indicated that trJis knowledge 
or awareness of the infinite ground of being is not by the 
cognitive function alone, but by man as a whole. "Man, not 
his cognitive function alone, is aware of the Unconditioned. 111 
Throughout man 1 s finite existence there is dependence 
upon an ontological realm wLich confronts •ctan with an ethical 
ultima"Ce. But Tillich' s ultimate demand cannut be suspended 
in air. l!:ither it is subjective in the sense trat it implies 
nothing about the nature of being-ioself, in' he sense that 
it is simply a qnal "Lty of man's experience; or lt '-s objective 
in that as a quality of man 1 s experience it also implies some-
thing about being-itself. Tillich will not allow that t~is is 
an exclusively subjective experience. On t.he other hand he 
tries to say that ultimate concern is a quality ~f man's 
awareness of the really real. He is not willing, it seems, to 
say that unconditionedness is a quality of being itself. The 
question arises, there!·ore: What is it that confronts man? 
l"l"hat is the ultimate concern about? What concerns us uncondi-
tionally? i!'Ol' Tillich the answer can never be any special 
ouject, not even Goa. We have seen above that there is an eth-
ical demand in the confrontation, i.e., "Thou shalt love." 
Beyond thao demand Tillich acknowledges some further content 
lob 
to the concern. 11 0ur ultimate concern is tbat which deter-
mines our be1ng or not-being. • Notllins can be of ultimate 
concern for us w.hich does not bave t>e uower of threatening 
and saving our beine;. 111 11 JVian is ultimately concerned aoout 
his beinc; and meanin;z;. 112 Man is ultimately cone erned about 
that which determines his destiny. 
We are brought to a crucial question that will recur 
frequently through the investigation. Does that which deter-
mines our being have beine;? Does that which determines our 
meaning have meanin8? It would seem t1oat the ultimate concern 
is possible only if there is some content of meaning in the 
ultimate of which man is 8.ware. Content of meaning would in-
valve personality in some sense, and that suggestion antici-
pates the di_scussion oelow on thJ personality of God. But a 
possible danger in Tillich' s thought must be indicated. When 
Tillich omits meaning and speaks of that which determines our 
bei 'lg he treads close to the statement that the ulti.mate is 
power and not purpose. If purpose is not integral in the nature 
of God, an ultimate of power is the alternative; an ultimate 
which cannot account for the di_rection which the power takes; 
an ulti'Ylate on a sub-personal level whicJ- ~annot acco'clnt for 
l. ST, J:, 14. Although the lane;uac:e is not clear, Till~cb does 
not mean that the l;_ltimate cone ern determines our being or 
not being. He means that "that w~ich determines our being 
or not-beinG'' is a matter of ulti_mate concern for us. Being 
in this passage does not mean temporal and spat~al existence. 
Tempora.L and spatial existence is constantly tlTeatened with 
destructive powers w.hj_ch do not concern us ultirnately. 11 But 
the term 'bej_nt;' meanp, t.he whole of human real~ty, the .struc-
ture, the meaning, and the aim of exist ence 11 ( ST, I, 14). 
2. ST, I, 14. 
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personality; an ultimate on the sub-rational level which 
cannot account for reason. The criticism at this stage is 
not conclusive, but Tillich 1 s tendency to use symbolic 
language about God in every case but 11 tbe power of being" 
causes one to look with suspicion at his concept of God. 
Perhaps Tillich is trying to say somethinr; about God 
without saying anytl>inr; about God. 'l'hour;h tbi s at times would 
appear to be the case, it is more likely that Tillich is say-
ing that nothing positive can be said about God. Yet Tillich 
says positively that God is the ground of being and meaning. 
If there is enough rational continuity between God and man for 
man to make this assertion, man inevitaoly asks: What is the 
nature of' the ground? What is God's nature? This question 
concerns us as we look at the attributes of God for Tillich. 
The witness to God in existence is in man's emotional, 
moral and rational nature. Man is aware of a demand. This is 
the starting point of all theology; indeed, of all religion 
in man. In a real sense, then, one might refer to Tillich• s 
method as being empirical, though 'rillich would not accept 
l the reference. Experience is not tb.e source of the ultimate 
concern for Tillich. But expsrience is the vehicle of that 
which is confronted j_n a situation of "ultimate concern." 
Man's approach to God, for Tillich, is in a broad sense moral 
and rational. Man expCJriences the order and unity of the 
world in such a way that an absolute demand upon man is also 
experienced. Throush this demand man is aware of God. "Aware-
l. Art.(l947), 22, 23. 
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ness of the infinite is included in man's awareness of fini-
tude.111 Within the experience of finite beings there is an 
ultimate demand which is the mark of the infinite in the 
finUe, a witness within the finite to the presence of the 
infinite. For 'I'illich this witness is not a ladder enabling 
one to go from less valid witness to more valid witness to 
God. It is rather a basic fact whioh one must understand if 
he is to .breathe the atmosphere of theology. The finite is 
dependent and contingent. Its builder and maker is God. The 
finite is grounded not in itself but in God as beine; itself. 
Religiously speaking all finite life confirms this dependence 
in the words of the Psalmist: "Know that the Lord is God! 
He made us, and his we are. 112 
2. The attributes of God. 
Though the blasphemy of discussing the nature of God 
is closely akin to that of discussing the existence of God, 
Till:Lch is less }',esitant to engage in the former. One question 
is as important as the other, it seems. To speak about the 
existence or the non-existence of God is meaningless unless 
the nature of that God is understood. Likewise, to theorize 
about the nature of ''possible Gods 11 without reference to their 
ontological status is idle speculation. 
We have segn above that all langua(';e about God is of 
1. ST, I, 206. 
2. Psalms 100:3. Smith and Goodspeed translation. 
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the nature of symbols. Every symbol contains a real analogy 
to tD~t which it signifies; yet the analogy is never precise 
in a one-to-one sense. Tillich 1 s own lansuase about God must 
also fall under this general condition. Beyond his definition 
of God in terms of a "ground" of being and meaning, Tillich 1 s 
thought about God falls into three categories: God as power 
of being (~ ~~), God as good-itself (bonum ipsum), and 
God as truth-itself (ver~ ipsum). The contention is not that 
God is a being whose nature is truth and goodness. God is noi; 
a being, not even the highest being. 11 If God is a being, he 
is subject to the categories of finitude, especially to space 
1 
and substance." To determine how God is ground and abyss, 
being-itself, good-itself, truth-itself, and not a being with 
these attributes is our irnrnediate concern. 
i. God as ground and abyss of power and meaning. 
'l'illich•s basic definition of God is that God is ground 
and abyss of power and meaning. 2 In distinguishing religion 
from culture he says: 
There is only this difference, that in religion 
the substance that is the unconditioned source 
and abyss of meaning is designated, and the 
cultural forms serve as symbols for it; whereas 
in culture the form, wbich is the conditioned 
meaning is designated, and the substance, which 
is the unconditioned meaning becomes perceptible 
only indirectly throughout the autonomous form.3 
1. ST, I, 235. 
2. ST, I, 21, 250. 
3. IOH, 50. 
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For our present purpose the important part of this quotation 
is the reference to the source of religion as the uncondi-
tional source and abyss of meaning. 
Reference has been made above to Tillich's expressions 
about God in the Interpretation of Rist~ Parts of the quo-
tation must be repeated. 
The unconditional meaning ••• is the basis of 
meaning. Yet it is never to be grasped as such in 
any one act of meaning. It is transcendent in re-
gard to every individual meaning. We can therefore 
speak of the unconditioned simultaneotcslv as basis 
of meaning and abyss of meaning (Sinll£ru~d und --
abgrund). We call this object of the silent belief 
in the ultimate meaningfulness, this basis and 
abyss of all meaning which surpasses all that is 
conceivable, God. • . • Unconditional meaning has 
the quality of inexhaustibility •••• The cone ept 
"meanind'is supposed to express all aspects of the 
human mind and therefore is just as valid in ap-
plication to the practical as to the theoretical. 
The basis of meaning is just as much the basis of 
personality and con~unity as of being and signifi-
cance; and it is simultaneously the abyss of all • 
• • • The unconditioned appears as that which does 
not admit any conditioned fulfillment of its command-
ments, as tba t which is able to destroy every per-
sonality and community which tries to escape the 
unconditioned demand. We miss the quality of the 
unconditioned meaning, of being basis and abyss, 
j_f we interpret it either from an intellectual 
point of view or from a moral point of view alone. 
Only in the duality of both does the unconditioned 
meaning manifest itself.l 
The lenc;thy quotation is rich in ideas and clear in 
presenting God as the ground of meaning and being. Before 
seeking to interpret the passage, however, let us include 
comments in other writ inss. Tillich speaks of the ultimate 
l. lOR, 222, 22~, 224. 
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power of being, the ground of reality, appearing in a con-
crete situation, revealing the infinite depth and the eternal 
significance of the present. 1 Significance in this context 
is the same as "meaning." He speaks of the unarproachably 
holy as the ground of our being. 2 Every finite reality is 
rooted in the creative ground, in Being itself. 3 Theology 
asks for the meaning of being, seeking the ultimate ground 
and power and norm and aim of being. 4 Indeed, quite consist-
ently with the discussion above of the moral approach to God, 
in asking for the powers and structures constitut-
ing the beinG of self and the world, their im;er-
relation and their manifoldness, theology asks for 
the appearance of the ground, poweg, norm, and aim 
of being in these realms of being. 
In a recent article Tillich also refers to God as the ground 
and meaning of one's existence. 6 
The two persistent ideas here are that God is basis 
(ground) of being and meaning, and that God js the depth 
(abyss) of being and meaning. Remaining true to his felt 
position "on the boundary," 7 Tillich here wishes to estaolish 
two polar concepts ontologically.B The tensions in e11.istence 
between form and the formless, good and evil, the ~acred and 
1. TPE, 78. 
2. TP'~, 84. This passage indicates tbe priority of the abyss. 
3. TPE, 63. 
4. TPE, 88. 
5. TPE, 88. 
6. Art.(l950), 515. 
7. See IOH, Chapter I. 
8. "The dj_vine life is the dynamic unity of depth and form" 
(ST, I, 156). 
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the secular, find their basis in the nature of God. Corre-
lation for Tillich becomes more ohan a philosophical-theo-
logical me·Ghod. Correlation becomes, contrary to his ex-
pressed intention, a positive aescription of the nature of 
God 1 in his relationship with existential man. 
(1) God a~ ground. 
In emphasizing God as the ground of all being and 
meaning, Tillich wishes to establish the dependence or ail 
"beings" upon the source of being, all meanings upon tne source 
of meaning. If this idea is accepted man will lose the arro-
gance he a~sumes au times, when he t'cink~ of himself as 11 inde-
pendent." This will also minimize the possibility of man's 
looking at his rational creations, his values and ideas, as 
exclusively 11 his 11 creations. But the major idea which Tillich 
strives to express in t..'le concept of "Ground" is a basis of 
continuity between God and the world of man and nature. This 
is the creativlty of God. 1 Tillich rejects all hetervnomous 
ldeas; that is, all ideas 01 a completely forelgn substance 
being thrown into history. He also rejecos a revelation that 
will desoroy reason. 2 It is the heteronomous nature of Baroh's 
revelauion which Tillich criticizes. 3 
From the idea of the ground there !'lows the idea of the 
significance of reason, and perhaps of tLe rationality of God. 
1. ST, I, 238. 
2. ST, I, lb8. Also: ''Demonic possession destroys the rational 
structure of the mind, divine ecst&sy preserves ana elevates 
it'.'(ST, I, 114): . 2 3. Aro.(l~3b), lo5, IOH, 2b, Art.(l935) , 140. 
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"That which is the mystery of being and meaning is, at the 
same time, the ground of its racional structure and the power 
of our participation in it. 111 The mystery of being referred 
co here is connected with the idea of' abyss discussed below. 
What. is ~ignificant in the immediate context is that the ulti-
mace a:; the ground of the rational :;tructure of being is em-
phasized. 
The idea is clearer in another stacement. Til~ich 
speaks of the traditional development of the doctrine of reve-
lation as the "Word of God." This development is fitting 11 if 
word is in terpretea as the: logos element in the ground 'of 
being, which is the interpret.at.ion which the cla:;sical logos 
doctrine gave it. 112 The firsc meaning of the ''Word of God" 
which Tillich lists is the 11 Word 11 as the principle of self-
manifestacion in the ground of being-itsel!·.3 
The ground is not only an abyss ln which every form 
disappears; it also lS the source from which every 
form emerges. The ground of being has the charaete1• 
of self-manifestation; it has logos character. This 
is not svmething add~d to the divine: life; it is 
the divine life itself. In spite of its abysmal 
character the ground of being is "logical"; it in-
cludes its own logos.4 
we shall 1•eturn below to consider the ground as evidencing 
the creative, act:i.vt~, self-manifesting aspect of God. The is:;ue 
before us at present is the rationality of Goa anu or creacion. 
God has created man wich a world that ls a meaningful 
1. ST, I, 15 3 . 
2. S'l', I, 157. Tillich 1 s conception of rea~:<on as 11 form11 is clear. 
3. ST, I, 157. 
4. ST, I, lb7, 158. The abyss is the prillBry character of God. 
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unity. "As the Greek kosmos and the Latin universum indicate, 
•world' is a structure or a unity of manifold11ess."1 Tillich 
speaks of' this "world .. s a structured wnole" in terms of "objec-
tive re .. son.";:: The self, then, is a "structure or centeredness" 
wnich Tillich aesignaLes "subjective reason."3 The purpose of 
these assertions is to prepare for the statement that reason in 
these cases corresponds. Reason, or logos, here is extremely 
important. Reason makes the self a self and the world a world. 
Without reason being would not be being but only the possibility 
of being. 4 God as the ground of be1ng opposes the drag of non-
being by creating being; that is, by rationalizing nonbeing, 
by imparting logos to "potentiality of' being." 
1. ST, I, 170. 
2 • ST, I, 171. 
3. ST, I, 171. 
4. In discussing that which every form forms Tillich seeks 
something that is not in that it dces not yet have form, 
yet a dynamic something that is in that it is not nothing. 
This potentiality of being is called me on. The Greeks saw 
nonbeing in a dialectical relationship-with being. That 
which is "nothing" the Greeks called ouk on; it has no 
relation to being at all. 11 Me on is !!'nothing' which has 
a dialectical relation to beinglr[S'l', I, 188). It does not yet 
have being but in union with form it is capable of having 
being. In a sense this me on as dialectically related to 
~ ipsum stands in correlation with the abyss as dialec-
tically related to the ground in tre nature of God. Til-
lich uses me on to indicate a something which is united 
with form to bring the creature into existence. "Being a 
creature includes both the heritage uf nonbeing (anxiety) 
and the heritage of being (courage) 1~ST, I, 2!::J3). Being 
precedes nonbeing in ontological validity, but everything 
which participates in being is mixed with nonbeing(ST, I, 
189). There is a real problem here. Tillich is close to 
a metaphysical dualism. We shall return to the subject in 
the concluding section of this chapter. 
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In the two paragraphs immediately above the basic ques-
tion about God as the ground of being and meaning is suggested. 
The assertion is made by Tillich aL one pointl that the ground 
of being has a logos character, which character j_s not "something 
added'' but is of the nature of the divine life itself. The 
ground of being is logical in that it includes its own logos. 
If this idea is seen in isolation, it may be regarded as a 
clear contrast to what Tillich usually says about God. Tillich's 
basic and usual assertion is that God is the ground of being aHd 
meaning. But here he says that the ground has a logos character, 
that the ground is therefore logical and rational. These seem 
to be positive statements about the nature of God. In this case 
the ground itself takes on character and meaning, and it super-
sedes the amorphous "being itself" which is the ground of every-
thing that is, without itself being anything. If this statement 
of Tillich's may be taken seriously the nature of God as ground 
seems to mean the rat"0nality of God. God is no longer that 
from which reason proceeds but which itself is not rational. 
Seen from this perspective alone, God is rational. 
But one must balance this readinG of Tillich' s statements 
with another reading. In the quotation above God was spoken of 
as the source from which every form emerges and also as the 
abyss in which every form disappears. 2 It is correct to say 
that the ground of being is logical in the sense of including 
1. ST, I, 157 . 
2. ST, I, 157. 
Quoted in second paragraph above. 
Quoted above. 
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its own logos. The logos character is the divine life. But 
it is not correct to say that the logo~ character is all the 
divine life. If one says that God is lo::;ical he must also 
say that God is abysmal. 
God is the ground, then, not only of reason but of the 
me on as well. Nonbeing becomes being in union with form. Non-
being here is a sort of formless power, a dynamic potentiality. 
And form is a pattern or norm which appears itself to be static 
but which nevertheless gives order to the power of nonbeing. 1 
God is the ground of the me on as well as of reason, for God 
is the ground of everything that is. If the me on were outside 
--
of God then Tillich would be teaching a metaphysical dualism. 
Though a dualism comes closer to an adequate explanation of 
experience than do supranaturalism and humanism, Tillich re-
jects a dualism, both as a method and as a meta"hysical postu-
late, in favor of a correlation, a dialectical monism.2 
Tillich maintains that God is the ground of every being 
and meaning. But one cannot appropriately say that for Tillich 
God is a particular being or meaning. Tillich is an agnostic 
3 
about God's nature. One can know that God is, but one cannot 
know what God is. The only statement possible about God is 
the negative statement that God is the unconditioned ground 
of being and meaning.4 
l. Cf. the psychic foundation and reason in man, Chapter I above. 
2. See Chapter IV, 4, below. 
3. Kant 1 s epistemological position is comparable; CPR, 187. 
4. Except Tillich's statement, 11 God is spirit 11 (ST, I, 249). 
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Tillich, nevertheless, speaks of truth-itself, of good-
itself, and of being-itself, equating these principles with 
God. God as verum ipsum and bonum ipsuo fall under the dis-
cussion of God as ground, which discussion will culminate in 
a consideration of God as living. God as esse ipsum will be 
discussed under the general category of God as abyss. 
( i) Verum ipsum. 
The basic statement about God in this connection is 
that God is being-itself. "Deus est esse. 111 Postponing a dis-
cussion of being-itself for the moment, let us consider the 
allied ideas of verum ipsum and bonum ipsum. For Tillich, if 
God is called ipsum esse he must also oe called ipsum veru~. 2 
The lead of Augustine is followed at this point. A sort of 
ontological argument for veritas is similar to an ontological 
argument for God. Veritas is presupposed in every philosophi-
cal argument. 11 You cannot deny truth as such because you could 
do it only in the name of truth, thus establishing truth. And 
if you establish truth you affirm God. 11 3 Tillich quotes Augus-
tine: "When I have found the truth, there I have found my God, 
the truth itself."4 
God as uncondi tiona 1 demand appears in the 11 theoretical 
(receiving) functions of reason as verum ipsum, the truth it-
1. TPE, 63. 
2. TPE, 64. 
3. Art. (1946)3, 4. 
4. Art • ( 19 46) 3, 4. Augustine, "on the Profit of Believing, 11 
par. 33. 
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self as the norm of all approximations to truth. 111 Being-it-
self manifests itself as truth-itself. No complete relativism 
in regard to truth can be maintained. The skeptic can deny 
the possibility of a true judgment only. on the basi_s of a 
truth. 11 'Jeritas ipsa is acknowledged and sought for by no 
one more passionately than by the skeptic. 1' 2 
To this point Tilli ch follows AU[; us tine. llu t when 
Augustine makes verum ipsum the God of the church Tillich 
can follow him no more. 3 Truth-itself as an abstract demand 
is a quality man experiences in an encounter with God. But 
verum ipsum is not the quality of a being within reality. The 
unconditional confronts man's intellectuai nature as the truth 
itself. 
Here again a problem arises in the interpretation of 
Tillich. Wba t is the relationship of these abstract demands 
to the nature of God? Eas Tillich satd anything about God when 
he says tha;; God is truth-itself? He is moving beyond the 
minimum assertion that "God is" to say tbat "God is truth." 
He feeis impelled to go beyond the minimum assertion to affirm 
content in God, what God is. Tillich could hide in the ambigu-
ous formula which he often uses, that God is truth in that be 
is the ground of all truth. But here Tillich appears to be 
making a sincere effort to give content to the concept of God. 
l. ST, I, 206. 
2. ST, I, 207. 
3. ST, I, 207. Augustine makes God a being as God of the 
church. Tillich cannot regard Goa as a being, not even 
the highest being. 
Veritas ipsa is an assertion about the rational nature of 
man. This demand for truth is not man's creation. It is 
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the presence of God in the consciousness o-f man. Truth-itself, 
therefore, aJ.so implies a qua.li ty in God's nature. At least 
in his rela-r;ionsbip to man's ;_ntellect God appears as truth-
itself, an absolute demand for truth, nbsolute truth. That 
God should be thought of as "falsehood itself'' is inconceivable 
for Tillich. It is concluded, therefore, that in the concert 
of God as verum ipsum Tillich is saying sometbing positive 
about the nature of God as well as sometbins aoout the ra-
tionality of man. 
(ii) Bonum ipsum. 
The assertion that God is bonum ipsum is of the same 
pattern as the statement that God is verum ipsum. Tillich 
again follows Augustine. Nothing less than the ultimate 
power of being can be the ultimate power of good .1 The un-
conditional as the unchangeable is the prius of all goodness, 
just as it is the prius of all truth. Here again 'fil.iich is 
trying to give positive content to the idea of God without at 
the same time characterizing God as the highest being. Perhaps 
his task is impossible! The position he holds is certainly 
confusing, whether it be a success!"ul ac-~ounting of all the 
data or not. One reads about God as verum ipsum and bonum 
ipsum with a question in mind as to the concreteness of these 
1. Art.(l946)3, 5. 
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ideas. One wishes to get behind these abstractions to an on-
tological substance in which these propertjes inhere. To say 
that God is ground of truth and goodness without the further 
attribution of these qualities to the nature of God as ground 
suggests the thought that God is also the ground of falsehood 
and evil. This is especially true when everything that is is 
by virtue of its participation in the power of being, being-
itself. 
The fact that Tillich is trying to say somett:ing posi-
tive about the nature of God is clear in this passage: 
The very fact that the one God is called "good" 
gives him a divine character superior to that 
of the evil god., for God as the expression of 
man's ultimate concern ii supreme noo only in 
power but also in value. 
In another context Tillich speaks of true being as the ulti-
mate good. 2 These passages indicate that Tillich would not 
refer to God as falsehood itself or as evil itself. He knows 
that ontologioally, or in terms of creation, the world is 
good. 3 Thus when Tillich says tbat God is the power of being 
in whicb everything that is participates he implies that God 
is of such an impersonal nature or at such a removed distance 
that he appears LObe neutral to all finite concerns. Yet 
Tillich wants to hold to the essential goodness of God, re-
fusing at the same time to allow God to be "dragged" into a 
1. ST, I, 22b. 'l'he attribution of truth and goouness to God 
certainly suggests that God is a personal being. 
2. TPE, 27. 
3. TPE, 2?. 
subject-object relationship of a being beside others. The 
basic idea in Tillich's thought about God and man is that 
180 
man in his existence is confronted with an unconditional de-
mand. To the shaping function of reason tilis unconditional 
element appears as bonum _!psum, 11 the good its elf as the norm 
of all approximations to goodness. 111 
If the attributes of truth and goodness mean anything 
they must have content and they must be qualities of some 
rational. subs-cance or essence. In the discussion of God as 
ground we saw that Tillich has difficulty stating what he 
really be~ieves about the nature of God. Das Unbedingte he 
will not surrender, yot he wants to give it content, knowing 
tbat ho thereby conditions the unconditional. The abstractions, 
bonum ipsum and verum ipsum, evidently alluw rum to hold both 
positions. But the abstr>Jctions arc not qualitative enough to 
cover his ar,tbiguous position here. The integrity of God in 
Tillich' s t.hought is tbe question. Tillich tries to hold to 
God's integrity on both scores, on his wholly-other uncondi-
tionality, the prius of being in which everytbing partici-
pates, anu on his character as logos, verum, bonum. It seems 
clear that God is not God if he is evoryt,,ing to all men. 
Certainly the nature of the God we see revea~ed in Jesus is a 
qualitative beinc whose concern it is to promote righteousness 
and goodness: 11 I came ti•Bt they may have life and have it 
1. ST, I, 2u7. Tillich seems to want the practical value of 
a personal God withuut admitting personulity to God. 
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abundantly."l "But seek first his kingdom and his righteous-
ness.112 
(iii) God as living. 
One of the most meaningful passages in the Bible is 
the first verse of the gospel of John. C. J. Virlgho inter-
pretint; this passage writes: "When the l''ourth Evangelist 
wishes to express his faith that the eternal God had never 
been inactive, never silent, he said: 'In the beginning was 
the word, ana the Word was with God, and the Word was divine. • 113 
we have already seen that for Tillich the word is f:i.rst o1' all 
the principle of divlne self-manifest&tion. The ground of be-
ing is of such a nature that it creates, it manifests itself, 
4. 
it has logos character.~ Tillich lists six different meanings 
of the word.5 The element uf the self-manifestation of God 
is prominent in each meaning of the Word. 
The many different meanings of the term "Word" 
are all united in one meanine;, namely "God-
manifest"-- manifest in himself, in creation 
in the history of revelation, in the final 
revelation, in the Bible, in the words of the 
church and her members. "God-manifest"-- the 
mystery of the divine abyss expressing itself 
through the divine Logos -- this ~s the meaning 
of the symbol, the "Word of God. 11 
Much of the import of Tillich' s thought of God as ground 
concerns the creativity and activity of God. God structures 
1. John lO:lOb. Revised Standard Version. 
2. Matthew 6:33. Revised Standard version. 
3. Wright, lill!IJ, 678. 
4. ST, I, lb7, 158. 
5. ST, I, 157-159. 
6. ST, I, 159. 
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man and tbe world. In so dotne; God mantfests himself, Again 
the connotation is that God is rational in so far as he is 
manifest. Indesd, man's thought in torms of relation --
causality arrl substance-- symbolize the activity of Ciod in 
finite be1ngs. The ground may be interpreted as cause or as 
subs ta nc e. Spinoza hss elaborated the idea of' God as substance. 
Tillich rejects thJ~s idea, however, because Spinoza 1s elaboration 
denies human freedom, and with it God 1 s freedom, for God is merged 
into finite beings t<D> the extEnt that their being i~s his teine;.l 
As Christianity holds to the spontaneity of the non-human and 
the freedom of man it has rejected the category of substance. 
'l'he category of causality, fol1owJnG the elaboration of 
Leibniz, does not fare any more prosperously in Tillich. Cause 
and effect are not separate. 'l'hey include each other and inter-
oenetrate each other. They form an LDf'inite series in both 
directions. What 1s effect from one polnt of view is cause 
from another. As God ca'lnal:; be dragged into this series, his 
uniqueness as 11 first cause" is sugc;ested. In that case the 
category of causalHy is used to deny the same cate~;ory. 
In other words, causality is bein,~ used not as 
a category but as a symbol. And if this is done 
and is understood the difference between causality 
and substance disappears, for if God is the cause 
of the entire series of causes and effects he i~s 
the substance underlying the whole process of be-
coming. But trois 11 underlying11 does not have the 
character of a substance which underlies its 
accidents and which is completely expressed ~by 
them •••. It is substance not as a category 
l. ST, I, 237. liith the exception of freedom, however, 
Tillich 1 s view is quite similar to Spinoza's view. 
but as a symbol. .A.'>d if taken symbolically, 
there is no difference between prim~ causa 
and ultima substantia. Both mean, what can 
be called by a more directly symbolic term, 
"the creative and abysmal ground of being. 11 1 
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Thoue;h Tillich 1 s insistence here that substance is a 
symbol and not a category is vague in this passac;e, the cen-
tral idea of substance and cause is clear. They are terms 
from man's finite experience to symbolize the ground-nature 
of God. God is ground as the form or logos which creates 
finite beings. God is ground as the creative power which 
acts to bring finite beings into existence. The two ideas 
of cause and substance are held together in the concept of 
God as ground. 
The inconsistency about whether God is logos or ground 
of logos iG still a point at issue. The fact that Tillich may 
explain this by sayint:; that God is logos in that he is the 
ground of logos does not remove the difficulty. References 
from other contexts indicate that he may wall hold to that 
resolution of the i_nconsistency, that God is logos in that he 
is the ground of logos. He says that we cannot speak of God 
as living in a proper sense. For Tillich life involves the 
actualization of the potential. And in God there is no dis-
tinction between the potential and the actual. 11 God as living" 
must be thow;ht of symbolically for Tillich. "God lives in so 
far as he is the ground of life. 112 In like manner Tillich 
1. ST, I, 238. 
2. ST, I, 242. 
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speaks of God as personal. This reference, too, is a symbol. 
That is, God is not a person, but 
as he is the ground of everything 
he is personal in so far 
1 
personal. Adopting this 
principle one could continue ad infinitum. For God is the 
power of being in which everything that is participates. If 
God is the ground of everything, in a symbolic sensa he be-
comes everythint;, and in so becoming he is nothing of stable 
or dependable value. Perhaps Hegel's remark that Schelling's 
Absolute is like a dark night in which all cows are black is 
applicable ~o Tillich 1 s God. 2 In the concise paragraph fol-
lowing the difficulty is clearly put. 
Since God is the ground of being, he is Lhe 
ground of the str-c~cture of being. He is not 
subject to this structure; the structure is 
grounded in him. He is this structure, and 
it is impossible to speak about him except 
in terms of this structure. God must be ap-
proached cognitively through the structured 
elements of being-itself. These elements 
make him a living God, a God who can be 
man's concrete concern. They enable us to 
use symbols which we are certain point to 
the ground of reality.3 
Here Tillich maintains both that God is the ground of struc-
ture, of logos, and that God is the structure. This is the 
difficulty in interpreting Tillich 1 s idea of God. Is God a 
ground somehow behind and under every form and structure, or 
is God a ground which has a form and structure? Most of 
Tillich's writing has intended to show the unconditional 
l. ST, I, 245. 
2. Hegel, POM, 79. 
3. ST, I, 238. Tillich is inconsistent here in saying that 
God can be approached cognitively. 
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nature of God, the unapproachability of God, the non-objective 
character of God. In his most recent and most systematic 
effort, 1 however, there is an indication that he has difficulty 
with his own amorphous God, and he emphasizes God not only as 
ground of reason, but as reason; not only as ground of struc-
ture, but as structure. 
The basis for this new emphasis is in the idea of God 
as ground of being and meaning. The discussion of God as 
ground has led us to understand the ideas Tillich wishes to 
suggest in the concept of God as creative, active, living. 
God creates man as a self with a world. In the context of 
his experience man is confronted by God in the form of an un-
conditional demand, a norm of love, truth, goodness. The 
question which has been implicit and explicit throughout the 
discussion is whether God as ground manifests his nature (him-
self) in creation or whether he just creates. Is there any 
continuity between the nature of God and the forms his creative 
activity assumes? Is there an analogy between God and man? 
The suggestion has been made that Tillich affirms that God 
manifests himself, that as ground of being and meaning God is 
rational, or of a logos nature. It is difficult to interpret 
Tillich•s meaning otherwise when he writes: 
The meaning of being manifests itself in 
the logos of being, that is, in the rational 
word thaL grasps and embraces being and in 
which being overcomes its hiddenness, ~ts 
darkness, and becomes truth and light. 
1. Systematic Theology, published in I:~ay, 1951. 
2. TPE, 90. 
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The primary definition of God with which the section 
on the attributes of God opened contained two poles -- God 
as ground ~nd God as abyss. The discussion of God as ground 
has led us to conclude Ghat there is some positive content 
in God's nature, that Cod is rational in so far as he reveals 
himself a~ grocmd. Our discussion must now turn to the other 
pole of the definition, to God as abyss. A final statement 
about God as ground must await an investigation of the rela-
tionship between the quaLity of God as ground and the lack of 
quality of God as abyss. 
(2) God as abyss. 
In the preceding discussion we have seen how God as 
ground is the element of meaning in God. 'Ne must now con-
sider God as abyss, as·power of being. 1 We have seen how God 
as ground is the element of r~>tionaLity in God. Under that 
concept the mystery of being becomes manifest in its relation 
to the ral.ional character of mind and reality. Upon that con-
cept social, ethical and value typ~s of relision have been 
construcc;ed. Reason in man as the imago del was e~phasized. 
we must; now consider how God as abyss is the eLement o!" Lhe 
prerational or the nonrational in God. Under whe nac;ure uf 
abyss the mystery of being becomes manifest in its relation 
1. "Human intuition of the divine always ha~ distinguished 
between the abyss of the divine (the element of power) 
and the fulness of its content (the element of meaning), 
bet;ween the divine depth and the divine logos 11 (ST, I, 
2o0). 
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to the prerational characcer of mind and reaLity. Upon that 
concept individualistic and paradoxical types of religion 
nave oeen constructed.! 
Through the concept of the abyss Tillich wants to pro-
tect the inexhaustibility of God. God as ground of logos 
forms creation. But no creation can express fully the richness 
of God. If the depth were not inexhaustible, 
and if il could be exhausted in the form of things, 
then there would Oe a airect, raLiona~,deslgnable 
way from the depth of things to t 11eir form; then 
the worlu could be comprehended as the necessary 
and unequivocal unfolding of the basis of existence; 
then the supporting basis would pcur out entirely 
into the cosmos of forms; then the depth would 
cease to be dep"h, ceasing to be transcendentaL, 
absolute.2 
Abyss means for Tillich t£1e 11 depth of the divine life, its 
inexhaustible anu ineffable character. 113 No man can know 
God completely. Indeed, in the light of the provisional 
conclusion above, no man can know God. There is always a 
depth in God which man• s reasun cannot fathom. "That depth 
is what the word God means." 4 
The three attributes of God which stem from God as 
ground and aoyss of being and meaning fall into this order: 
verum ipsum and bonum ipsum belong to the elaboration of the 
11 ground11 and esse ipsum belongs to the 11 abyss 11 nature of God. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
ST, I, 119. 
IOH, 8:5. Just 
r .. tionality as 
ST, I, 156. 
SOF, 57. 
why Tillich regards inexhaustibility and 
mutually exclusive attributes is not clear. 
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(i). Bemg-itself. 
God is not a bein[!; because God does not exlst. F'or 
Tillich God is being-itself, esse ipsum.l As teinc;-itself 
God is t:te "power of beins in which ev8ryt!:ing participates • 11 2 
Beir:g-itself is different from~ highest being V1lcen infinite 
and uncondi.tional power ani meaning are attributed to it. 3 
In saying that God is beirt, -itself Tillich intends to convey 
the ideas of source or power of te ing. God is the power of 
bein:; in everything and above· everythine;.4 11 God transcends 
every being and also the totality of beings -- the world." 5 
Tillich believes that there is a relationship between 
the finite and the infinite through the concentmtion of all 
power of being in bein('; itself. 11 The power of being is the 
power of everything that is, in so far as it is. 116 Ev>rything 
that is exists through a participation in t>1e power of being. 
Yet the contmdictory to "participation" is also true. F'or 
11 being-itself infinitely transcends every finite beinc;. There 
is no proportion or gradation between the finite and the in-
finite. There is an absolu.te break, an infinite ',jump. ,n7 
This double relationship of beings to being itself is possible 
because of the double characteristic of beinc; itself. Being 
l. ST, I 
' 
189, 205, 230, 235, 237' 243, 247. 
2. ST, I 
' 
230. 
3. S"'i' I, 235. 
4. 3'~' _, I, 236. This passage suggests an impersona 1 monism of 
power. 
5. ST, I, 23 7. 
6. ST, I, 231. 
7. ST, I, 237. The "wl:olly -otherness 11 is quite clear here. 
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itself· is creative in that eveL'Ything participates in it, 
It is abysmal in that every finite being is infinitely 
transcended in being-itse.Lf. 
The traditional category or omnipotence is included 
in the concept of God as oeing-itselt". Gou "s puwer of oeing 
resists anu conquers non-being.l In the Christian belief in 
an "almighty God," Tillich sees a confidence in the inex-
haustiole power ur Oeing to resist nonbeing. Only "the "al-
mighty" God can warrant man• s ultimate concern. 2 Nonbeing 
is eternally overcome in the divine life. The omnipotence 
of God does not mean that God is able to do whatever he wishes. 
It means, for Luther and Calvin, the "divine power through 
which God is creative in and through everything in every mo-
ment." 3 It means for Tilli ch 11 the power of being which re-
sists nonbeing in all its expressions. 114 
The power of being which resists nonbeing holds form 
and dynamics in a polar relationship. Dynamics cannot come 
into being without form. Through the emphasis on form Til-
lich.preserves the structural oneness of everything within 
the absolute, Through the concept of dynamics, the me on, 
he preserves the unfinished manifoldness of the real. God is 
• 
ground and abyss, form and dynamics, in a dialectl.cal relation-
ship. It is doubtful that Tillich can hold the polar concepts 
into an ontological unity without either placing one above the 
1. ST, I, 27::!. 
2. ST, I, 2'13. 
3 • ST, I, 2 73. 
4. ST, I, 273. 
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other or suggesting a higher one which holds these concepts 
together. 
(ii) Glory and majesty. 
Glory and majesty are symbols for the all-transcending 
holiness of God. 1 Holiness connotes the unapproachable charac-
ter of God, the impossibility of the finite's having a rela-
tionship with him in the proper sense of the word. 2 God is 
not an object of our knowledge or a partner in our action. The 
abyss-nature of God secures this aspect of God for Tillich. 
There is a close relationship between glory and majesty 
and mystery. Mystery also characterizes God as abyss, parti-
cularly in the epistemological sense. For "mystery character-
izes a dimension which •precedes• the subject-object relation-
ship.113 Mystery characterizes the experience of that which 
our reason cannot comprehend, the ground and abysa which pre-
cedes reason. 4 The majesty and glory of God refer to that 
which does not annihilate man 1 s reason, but which in its rich-
ness man's reason cannot grasp fully. 
The glory and majesty are not conclusive either way as 
to the rationality or irrationality of God. The holiness in-
dicated may be supra-rational, toward an understanding of 
which reason gives valuable clues; or it may indica"Ge a "ub-
rational which overwhelms through its incomprehensibility. 
1. ST, I, 2'12. 3. ST, I, 109. 
2. ST, I, 271. 4. ST, I, 110. 
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(iii) Is the abyss irrational? 
The suspicion expressed above that Tillich•s God of 
power comes near to beins a sub-personal God is strengthened 
now. If being-itself is the basic cb.aracter of God, that is, 
being-itself as inexhaustibiUty, depth, abyss; if everything 
that is exists through participation in t_he ultimate power of 
being, God becomes a sort of monopolistic reservoir of power. 
But it is power without DUI'])ose unless the "ground" nature of 
God is enphasized as well. What Tillich is trying to maintain 
throush the concepts of abyss and being-itself is tbe i:rti.nity, 
the uniqueness of God; that God cannot be exhausted by any 
1 
creation or by any totality of tl:em. The majesty of God is the 
issue here for Tillich. But Tillich goes to a tense extrerre to 
protect God 1 s majesty. l'or, having spoken of God as abyss and 
as being-itself in order to indicate the majesty of God, Tillich 
must now strengthen his statements about theother side of God•s 
nature, the ground. The reader may infer from the extreme 
statements about the abyss that the ground is subordinate to 
the abyss and may ultimately be swallowed up in the abyss. It 
may well be that it is to guard a;;ainst sucb an interpretation 
that Tillich speaks more and more of the rational nature of 
God. 2 And as we shall see below in the discussion of the trini-
ty he must unite what is treoretically separate, tbat is, abyss 
and ground, dynamics and form, in the concept of Spirit. 
1. ST, I, 79. 
2. Yet he says that the abyss is what makes God God(ST, I, 250). 
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Tillich wants a con tin ui ty from the ground of being to 
,_/ 
beings, but he also wants a leap, an absolute transcendence. 
Both cannot be held consistently. 'l'he issue centers in the 
question of continuity, of mean:ing, of logos, of the rationali-
ty of the abyss. Is the abyss of bein;;-itself an abyss of in-
exhaustible mean:ing (the richness of God's personality) with 
which man 1 s "meanings" are analogous? Or is the abyss of be-
ing-itself an irrational abyss which swallows up all finite 
meanings? It seems that in spite of contrary pas sages, the 
abyss is not irrational. 'l'he abyss manifests itself in lot;ical 
forms, meaningful structures. "The depth of reason is the 
expression of sor.et"ing tbat is not reason but w"ich precedes 
reason am is manifest tr:rough it." 1 
One cannot deny the non-rationality of tbe depth here, 
but neither can one deny the reason through which the depth 
is manifest. And as God could not be conditioned by reason, 
for God is unconditional, reason must be an integral part of 
the nature of God. Tillich would still deny all approximations 
to makine; God a being beside other beings, a being with acci-
dents arrl. positive characteristics. But Tillich himself can-
not rest with an abysmal God. He must emphasize more and more 
the rational nature of God as "ground." The atys s is non-
rational; but it is not irratimal. And in manifesting itself 
it must do so tr,rout;h reason. 
1. ST, I, 79. 
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What may we conclude regarding Tillich's definition of 
God as the ground and abyss of being and meaning? The central 
indications of the concepts are clear. Tillich means by the 
abyss the mysterium tremendum, the inexhaustible depth of 
God's nature, that in God which caused Moses to take off his 
shoes 1 and which caused Isaiah to feel undone as he heard 
the seraphim sing, 11 Holy, Holy, Eoly. 11 2 This abysmal nature 
of God is not irrational. It is more a nonrational, unformed 
dimension of incalculable power. 
Tillich means by the ground, on the other hand, the log-
leal, orderly, calculable, revealing, knowable side of God. It 
has been said above that God is ground and abyss in a polar or 
dialectical relationship. Tillich's own remarks give rise to 
the expression. For Tillich says that the abyss is what makes 
God God. 3 Yet Tillich is confident that "the abysmal quality 
cannot swallow the rational quality of the divine lif'e. 114 Til-
lich states too much when he says that the abyss is what makes 
God God. For if there is any conclusion possible to this sec-
tion it is that Tillich regards the abyss as power and the 
ground as form, and that he holds to both abyss and form in 
speaking of the nature of God. So far as God's revealing ac-
tivity is concerned, that is God's relation with existential 
man, God as form is always in control of the abyss. As there 
1. Exodus 3:5. 3. ST, I, 2b0. 
2. Isaiah 6:3ff. 4. ST, I, 279. 
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are simil&rities between Tillich's "abyss" and E. S. Bright-
man's 11 given11 in God, there is also a similarity between Ti_l-
lich' s idea that Gou' s form controls }·>is power and Brightman-'s 
idea that God's reason controls the given. 1 
But the formal control of power in Tillich 1 s cone ept 
seems to be true only of the manifesti..ng phase of God's na-
ture, God in relation with existential man. The recurrent 
emphasis by TilUch that the abyss is the fi_rst principle of 
God and of the trinity suggests that in his essence Tillich's 
God is primarily abyss. We shall return to this idea below. 
Bric;htman clea''ly states that the balance is in the other di-
rection, that God's reason controls t'Je Given. For Brightman 
God in his essence is meaning, will, purc>ose, value and ra-
tionality; he is the "Controller of Tl-e Given." 
Tillich tries to hold to the nature of' God as c;round 
and abyss, however. '-Ce emphasizes tr-e abyss as tl-;e primary 
essence of God, while holding to the primacy of' form in Gcx'I 
as God is related to existence. 
1. The abyss for Tillich is inexhaustible power, infinite vi-
tality, which Tillich ree;ards as the pr-imary evidence of 
divinity. The 11 Given" of Bric;htman indicates the eternal, 
uncreated laws of reason and tl:e processes of a rational 
consciousness; quali_ties of sense o-cJje<Jts, disorderly im-
pulses, and experi.ences of pain(Eric),tman, POE, 337). Til-
lich is- not ccns:i_stent in maintainin(j that God 1 s form con-
trols hi.s power, for he defines demonry as "tlJe form-
destro;rinc; eruption of the creative basi_s of tJ-Jings" \IOH, 
e:, \. What Tillich intends to say, however inconsistently, 
in the exprecssion that God 1 s form cant rcls his power, is 
what BrightmWl intends to say in the expression that God 1 s 
rational natupe controls the :;iven. eltimately a nonra-
tional power cannot prevail against God 1 s logos. 
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ii. The traditional attributes. 
Tillich 1 s basic constructive thought about God is pre-
sented in the concept of God as ground and abyss of a.Ll being 
and meaning. One accustomed to the traditional treatment of 
God's nacure under varlous attributes will feel like a "strang-
er" in the discussion thus far. Tillich relates his basic 
thought about God to the traditional attributes, however. We 
have already seen that omnipotence for Tillich means the 
power of being which resists nonbel.ng and which is manifest 
in the creative process of all forms. 1 We must now consider 
God's eternality, his omnipresence, and his omniscience. 
(1) God is eternal. 
Two interpretations of eternity are rejected, that of 
timelessness, and thac of the endlessness of time. Rather 
than meaning timelessness, eternity means "the power of em-
bracing all periods of time. 112 The eternal keeps the temporal 
within itself by maintaining "the transcendent unity of the 
dissected moments of existential time. 113 ThePe is a similarity 
between t:ne eternality of God and the eternality of a mathe-
matical proposition. The different modes of time are not dis-
solved into a simultaneity, yet God is related to evAry mode 
of time. The etornity of God does not mean timelessness. 
Neither does the eternity of God m<3an endless time. In 
1. ST, I, 273. 
2. ST, I, 274. 
3. ST, I, 274. An all-embracjng time-span is the idea nere. 
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both of these misconceptions a sort of mechanical, quanti-
tative thought is evident. The idea of an endless redupli-
cation of dissected moments of time is a quantitative concept 
which subjects man and God to a great "mechanic of time." 
The quality-structure of eternity is overlooked in such con-
strvctions and the heart of the concept of eternity is 
thereby missed. 
A symbolic indication of the meaning of the eternity 
of God may be found in human experience, in the unity Of re-
membered past and anticipated future j_n an experienced present. 
As the present is predominant in human experience, eternity 
is symbolized as an eternal present. 1 This present is not 
simultaneity. It does not eliminate the experience of change 
and progression, of past and future. "The eternal present is 
moving from past to future but without ceasing to be present. 112 
The future and the past are genuine, are open in that the new 
can havpen. Yet the future and the past are not rampant in 
their possibilities. Thsy are not absolutely open. They are 
within the anticipation of God, within God's direction in a 
broad sense. They are within the logos. 
New products of the historical process are at-
tempts which can succeed only if they follow 
the demands of objective reason. Neither nature 
nor history can create anything that contradicts 
reason. The o~d and the new in history and 
nature are bound together in an overwhelming 
rational unity which is static and dynamic at 
l. ST, I, 275. 
2. ST, I, 275. 
the same time. The new does not break tl,is uni-
ty; it cannot because objective reason is the 
structural possibility, the logos of being.l 
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E. s. Brightman would say that God controls the ''Given.n2 For 
Tillich and Brightman, then, the concept of eternity means the 
openness of the past and future, yet a control of that openness 
by God 1 s nature as ground or lof,Os_. Many new thint;s al'e pos-
sible, but they all depend upon the unity of God, the ground-
nature of God. In this sense of quality or meaninG, God is 
eternal in such a way that the distinctl_ons within the flow 
of time are preserved. 
(2) God is omnipresent. 
Again misconceptions must be rejected and the element 
of quality must underlie an understandins of God as omnipres-
ent. God's omnipresence does not mean tbat he is endlessly 
extended in space. Nor does it mean that God is spaceless. 
Omnipresence means thac God creates extension out of his 
nature as ground and that God is the sround :in which all space 
is rooted. Space is in God, not God in space. Bowne puts it 
clearly: ''Instead of saying, then, that being is in space, we 
l. ST, I, 79. Note again the formal nature of logos for Tillich. 
2. 11 God•s control of The Given means thot he never aJ.lows The 
Given to run w:tld,that he always subjects it to law and uses 
it, as far as possible, as an instrument for realizlng the 
ideal good 11 (Brightman, POR, 338). There is also an inter-
esting comparison of Brightman's 11 Given11 with Tillich 1 s 
"-Abyss" written by Dr. Harkness [11arkness, Art. (1938)]. The 
discusslon of the nature of God thus far suggests a1.so an 
ana logy between the 11 Gi ven11 of Brightman and the 11 me on" 
of Tlllich. - -
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muse; rather say that space is in being. 111 "':od's omnipresence 
is his creative participacion in the spatial existonce of his 
creatures. 112 f"an can be nowhere where God is not. That is 
the meaning of omnipresence for Tillich. 
The reiig1ous value of the con~eJJt is i1n:mense. Wherever 
man is he is "at home" in the groc,md of God. One is a_t_ways 
11 in ]-,is sanctuary" when he experiences God r s· umnipresence. 
When the sacramental presence of God is felt, every place is 
a "holy place." There is in that situation no difference be-
tween the sacred and the secular. Man is in a situation of 
"' theonomy.w
(3) God is omniscient. 
God is not a hi;;hest being Wf'O ':nows everything. The 
omniscience of God means, on the contrary, the s:Jiritual 
qu8iity of God as "ground" to uarticipate in the subject-
object structure of the finite world as weil as to transcend 
that world. God knows everything i.n the sense tr,at everything 
that is known is "grounded" in him. God's omniscience means 
the very possibility of knowledge for man. "The divine omnis-
cience is the logical (though not always conscious) foundation 
of the belief in the openness of reality to human knowledge. 
We know because we participate in the divine knowledge. 114 At 
this point, perhaps more than at those preceding, the personal-
------·---
l. Bowne, WIET, l33ff. 
2. S~l\ I, 277. 
3. A theonomous situation is one in which an age 11 in all its 
forms, is o,"Jen to and directed toward the divine" (TPE, 44). 
4. ST, I, 279. 
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ity of God is indicated. When one speaks of a divine knowl-
edge he implies a knowine; subject with content to be known. 
Tillich does not allow one to speak of God as subject or ob-
ject. He insists that God is the oriu13_ of the separation into 
subject and object. 1 The "personality of God" will receive our 
attention below. At this point it is suffic~ent to take cog-
nizance of ths personalistic implications in Tillich•s concept 
of God's onmiscience. 
Tillich understands another sicn1.ficemt i.dea to be 
contained in t':o.e concept of" omniscience also. God 1 s omnis-
cience means that 
nothing is outside the centered unity of his 
life; nothint; is stranc;e, dark, hidden, iso-
lated, unapproachable. nothing falls outside 
the logos structure of being. The dynamic ele-
r~ent cannot break the unity af the form; the 
abysmal qua.Lity cunnot swalzow t.c>e rational 
quality of the divine life. 
This passac;e runs counter to much of what Tillich has been 
sayinz, and it also expresses quite openly tho diff~.c~lty any 
interpreter has to nresent Tillich 1 s thought s 'T :s t (_=}mat -t c a l J v. u . . -~ 
It is difficult to reconcile the notion that nothill.L in God j_s 
11 strange, dark, hidden, isolated, unap8roachG.ble" with the 
concept of the abyss. The inexhaustibility and ineffability3 
certainly sugc;est stranc;eness, hiddennes.s, and even unapproach-
ability. 11 It is the abysmal character of the divine life 
1. Art.(l946)3, 10. see Chapter II above. 
2. ST, I, 279. 
3. ST, I, 156. 
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which makes revelation mysterious."l The inexhaustibility of 
the abyss is an active inexhaustibilHy, threatenine; every 
form with its destructive power. It is a 11 consuminc· fire" 0 
2 
which becomes a real abyss for every form. It i.s not easy 
to reconcile this type of abyss with the abyss which can.Dot 
swallow the rational quality of the divine life. TilDU!;h 
Tillich denies existence to the satanic (mere devouridg of 
every form), be admits the idea of the demonic. 
There is in the abyss-nature of God the possibility of 
a formless eruption resulting from dem nic di.stortion. 11 Demonry 
is the form-destroyins eruption of the cr·3ative bas.i.s of 
t '"·l· ""8' 113 
.Ll ···b • Dr. Iiarlmess, interpretinz Tillich 1 s idea of the 
demonic writes: 11 God must have a 'dark naturG 1 within hi111, 
an aspect of the divine being which the Hebrew prophets 
grasped when they spoke of a God of wrath. 114 
These references indicate that Tillich tries to hold 
to somethinG deep, strange, hidden, mysterious and unapproach-
able in his idea of God as abyss. The question raised above 
concerning the irrationality of the abyss, however, receives 
lig.ht in the opposite idea of the omniscience of God. It seems 
that in saying that God is omniscient Tillich is saying that 
God is essentially "ground," he is essentially rationa;L, 
thoUGh finite rationality cannot fully comprehend the abundance 
1. ST, I, 156. 
2. IOE, 83. 
3. IOE, 85. But Tillich writes more recently that the dynamic 
element cannot break the unity of t'l.e form(S'l', I, 279). 
4. Harkness, Art.(l938), 504. 
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of his power or the riclmess of his meanL'lg. In saying that 
"nothing is outside the centered unity of God," that "nothing 
falls outside the logos structure of beint;," that the "abysmal 
cannot swallow the racional quality of the divine life, 11 Til-
lich is saying that God is logical and rational,and perhaps 
that everything is God. 
Tillich is not consistent hero, though a distinction 
between what God is in essence and what God apneaPs to exis-
tential man to be makes the inconsist·mcy less ric;i.d. A con-
slderation of the three-fold nature of God follows below in 
the discussion of divine love and justice. 
iii. Divine love and divine justice. 
The love and justice of God are not distinct and equal 
attributes of God. Love is the essential attribute. Justice 
is part of love. Love is the ontologicnl concept.l Justice 
has no independent ontological standing. It is in a sense 
parasitic, a part of love's activity. Justice :is that aspect 
of love which rebuke's and surrenders to self-destPuction that 
wh:tch resists love. Justice is a side of' lova 1 s action. Th..e 
divine love includes • +. JUS u_i08 • This interrelationsh:lp of love 
and justice is seen clearly in Tillich's insistence on speaking 
of God as Lord and as Father. Justice and love cannot be sepa-
rated. Neither can God be thought of as either Lord or Father. 
11 The I,ord who is not the Father is demonic; the Father who is 
l. ST, I, 279. Again Tillich :is attributing content to God. 
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not the Lord is sentimental. 111 Substituting words the expres-
sion would read: Justice which is not love is demonic; love 
which is not just is sentimental. Recognizi_ng the complementary 
nature of these concepts we may examine them separately. 
(1) The divine love. 
The statement man may make about God which is most lit-
erally (least symbolically) true is thac God is love. 2 Love is 
an ontolo,;ical concept, belonging to the stru:;ture of being-
itself. Thus it may be said with equal validity and meaning 
for Tillich that God is love and that being-itself is love. 3 
If love is an ontological concept every being participates in 
love, whether by an attitude toward lava of indiffercmce, of 
rejection or of acceptance. One cannot know God except in the 
sphere of love. Loving God means loving love as the ultimate 
reaiity and power, as being-itself. 
The distinction between the ontolo~ical nature of God 
as love and the antic manifestations of love in specific his-
torical acts gives rise to the two-fold af:fir:nation: God is 
love and God has love. 4 It is this two-fold nature of God's 
love that is at the center of the idea of the trinity. To say 
that being itself has the nature of lo'Ie is to say that being-
itself has trinitarian structure. The love structure of being-
1. ST, I, 2tl7. 
2. Along with the stateme~t that God is spirit. 
3. ST, I, 279; Art.(l949) , 1. This j_s not consistent with 
Tillich•s insistence that being-itself is not a being with 
attributes. Tillich is not content to be so positivistic 
that he cannot arfirm anything about the nature of being-
itself. 2 4. Art.(l949) , 0. 
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itself is the structure of differentiation and reunion, of in-
dividualization and participation. 1 Being-itself is in process 
of realization, of self-realization, through existential dif-
ferentiation and eschatological reunion. Every life process· 
illustrates the trinitarian principles, un:tting a trend toward 
separation with a trend toward reunion. 2 
When Tillich says that God is love he applies the exper-
ience of separation and reunion to the divine life. But this 
attribution is symbolic, not literal. Tile d:lvine life does 
have the character' of love, but, as distinguished from human 
life, the divine life is beyond the distinction between poten-
tlallty and actuality. After Tillich defines life as the "process 
in which potential being becomes actual being 11 3 one wonders what 
content is left in the concept to justify the assertion that 
God is living. Tillich approaches the proolem in two ways, try-
ing on the one hand to explain what meaning is still imparted 
through the concept, and, on the other hand, admitting that 
this is a mystery. Trying to explain his meaning 'fillich says 
that in saying that God is living we assert that "he J_s the 
eternal process in which separation is posited and is overcome 
1. Art.(l949) 2 , 3, 4. Tillich does not indicate precisely the 
reason for the differentiation into the ontic realm of 
beings. Nor does he stac;e clearly the contribution which 
the historic differentiation makes to the life of God. 
These facts together w1th others incline us to state below 
that Tillich beli_eves that God, along w::_ th man, is of a 
three-fold nature. 
2. ST, I, 279. 
3. ST, I, 241, 242. 
by reunion. 111 Or ae;ain, 11 God lives in so far as !1e ~s the 
ground of life. 112 Yet in speaKing more specifically about 
God's character of love as being beyond the distinction be-
tween potentiality and actuality, Till~ch says simply that 
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this means "that it is a mystery for the finite understanding. 113 
It is clear to the finite understanding how God could be the 
''eternal process in which separation is posited and is overcome 
by reunion" if God were some sort of substance or power. But 
if God is a consciousness to whom time is real, how God could 
be love and also be beyond the distinction between potentiality 
and actuality is, indeed, as Tillich says, a "mystery to fi-
nite understanding." 
Several types of love must be dist'_nguished: the libido 
type, the eros type, the philia type, and the agape type. "Love 
as libido is the movement of the needy tov~ard th8t which ful-
fills the need. 11 4 Libido includes eating and drinking, but 
culminates in the aexual experience. "Love as eros is the 
movement of that which is lower in powGr and meaning to that 
which is higner. 115 It is love as eros that dr~ves one to seek 
beyond forms to pure form. The element of participation in 
the ultimate is prominent, culminating in mystical union. 
"Love as uhilla is the movement of tlle equal toward 
union with the equa1_. 116 This type of love is bound to person-
1. scr, I, 2 4G. 
2. ST, I, 242. 
3. ST, I, 280. 
4. ST, I, 280. 
.5. ST, I, 2CJO. 
6. ST, I, 280. 
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ality. Philia love does not consume as does 1ibido love, 
neither uoes it surrender itself as eros love does. PhiLia 
love joins equals in the creation of a c;hird rea.Lity, the 
community. Friendship is ;,wssible on this level of love. 
There is equality through a mutual self-fulfillment in the 
other. These three types of love contain an element of se.Lf-
centered desire. But there is a fourth tw e of love, agape, 
which is concerned about the fulfillment of the longing of the 
other being, the longing not for self-fulfillment but for the 
fulfillment of the other. The agape-love oelongs properly only 
to God. For agape unites lover and beloved in the image of God 
as their fulfillment. Agape is univer~ally true, tow8ra all be-
ings. Thus agape includes elements of suffering and forgiveness. 
God is LOVe as agape, for "God works toward the fulfillment of 
every craature and toward the bringing-together into the unity 
of his life all who are separated and disrup-ced. 111 
Agape indicates an attitude of God t;oward man and an at-
titude of men toward men. But man's love for God, in Tillich' s 
thought, is not of the agape type. There is no e.lement of suf-
fering or forgiveness in man·' s love for God. Nor would Tillich 
allow that through his love for God man contributes anything 
2 
to God's fulfillment. "For God is not in need of anyt;hing. 11 
l. ST, I, 2tll. Tillich 1 s 
with existential man. 
ultimats.ty significant 
ject, God. 
2. ST, I, 28L. 
analysis app.iies to God's relation 
But the benevolence of agape is not 
if there 1s only one ultimat;e ~ub-
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Here a difficulty in the interpretation of Tillich is of con-
siderable im}Jortance. Tne life of God as spirit is that of 
existential separation-union and e~chatological reunion or 
fulfillment. Tillich 1 s ascription of importance to history 
and freedom indlcate that fulfilled SpiriL is richer than 
essential Spirit. It is difficult to understand how Tillich 
can say that God is not in need of anythinG and at the same 
time hold that God is fulfilled through separation and reunion. 
A possible vlew whlch would reconcile these seer.1ing contradic-
tions is the view tha L time is not rea 1 to God except as his 
creation and that in God everything is contained in one span 
of consciousness. But if this view is taKen, what happens Lu 
the 11 process 11 of the divine life? And if thb view is taken, 
is this not precisely the position which Tillich rejects in 
Hegel, an absolute supra-historical posicion which synche-
sizes the aialectical conflicts? 
In the chapter on reason in man above, a question was 
raised concerning the love of man for God, whether in actuality 
man's love for God is not Goa's love for himself. Tlllich says 
clearly that man's love of God is the love with which God 
1 
loves himse.1.f'. 11 This means that God J.S the subject even when 
he appears to be the object. The trinitarian aistinctions of 
sevaration and reunion maKe it poss1.ble for God to luve himself. 
"Through the separation within himself' God loves himse.J.f. And 
1. ST, I, 28~. Tnis suggest~ Spinoza 1 s amor dei. 
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through seJJaration from himself (in creaturely freedom) God 
ful!"il.Ls his love of nimse.Lf primarily because ne loves 
thac which is estranged from h~mself. 1 Th~re is ti basic con-
cradiction here. If Tllllch is ~erious in his concencion chat 
God through creature.Ly freedom separates !"rom himselr, chen 
there is a center of consciousness in Lhe creacure which is 
properly a "subjecc" and to whom God is an "objecL 11 because 
vf the partial separation. In the .tlgnt or th.Ls fact, T1i.l1ch 1 s 
statements thac man's love of Guo .LS cne love with which God 
loves himse.tt" anu that Gvd is .. lways the subject even where 
he al-'pears to be thE\ object, are cuniusing. 
Tillich seems to want cO oe un the borderline aga1n, 
noluing to both sides, giving exclusive commitment cO neicher 
side. If man is not a subject, at least existentia.L.Ly, there 
is no creation, th.,re is un.iy emanation. Ana emanation can 
contribute to God's fulfillment only if God lives, that is,, only 
if God passes from potentiality to actuality. Again the issue 
concerns Tillich's ontology. Is his monism qualitative only? 
Or is his monism quantitaLive as well as qualitative? 
The seeming inconsistencies which have recurred through-
out this chapter suggest that God has a history comparable to 
man's history, that God may be considered in his essential na-
ture, his existential nature and in his eschatological nature. 
God is love in his essence. God has love for that which in 
1. ST, I, 282. 
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existence is separated from him and which will ultimately be 
reunited in himself. If God has three natures, three phases, 
then the statement that God 11 is the eternal process in which 
separation is posited and is overcome by reunion" 1 makes 
sense, though, indeed, time is real for God in this case. 
If God is regarded as having three natures in this sense, 
still another difficulty is cleared up. The seemingly contra-
dictory statements that God is not in need of anything and that 
history is important fall into a pattern. In his essential na-
ture God is not in need of' anything; he is all in all. But 
existential separhtion is real and history is therefore of' im-
manse importance. Thus it is through history that God will 
manifest himself and ultimately win that back into union with 
himself which has been partially separated from him. It is as 
true, then, to say that God is fulfilled through history as it 
is to say that God is not in need of anything. The latter is 
true for God's essential nature. The former is true for God's 
existential and his eschatological nature. 
As we recall the conclusion of Chapter I that what Til-
lich is really saying is that the life of man is a phase of 
the actualization of' God and not a separate metaphysical real-
ity, the conclusion that the study of' God's nature has inclined 
us toward seems more convincing. Tillich's statements that man's 
love of God is the love with which God loves himsel£'2 and that 
1. ST, I, 242. 
2. ST, I, 282. 
wan's knowledge of God is God knowing himself through manl 
strengthen this conclusion. Finally, the method of corre-
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lation, as we shall see below, indicates a real interdepen-
dence between God and man in their existential phases. Til-
lich can maintain that God is das Unbedingte and also that 
there is a real correlation between God and man by recognizing 
that God must be seen in his essence, his existence and his 
ultimate fulfillment if he is to be seen adequately. Seemingly 
contrad.ictory statements about God may be true as separate 
statements aiJout tb.e di.fferent phases of God. These contra-
dictions are reconciled to a large extent when one considers 
the fullness of God in the three natures. The dialectical 
method is more than a method. It attempts to mirror the 
movement of reality through self-affirmation, goinG out of 
itself' and returning to itself. 2 If one would understand 
Tillich's God he must study this movement of God which the 
concept of the three natures seeks to express. 
Let us return to the issue of God's love. Aside from 
the difficulties involved in Tillich 1 s thought about God's love, 
Tillich regards love as an ontological principle, the nature 
of being-itself. God is love and God has love. God's love for 
man includes suffering and forgiveness and culminates i.n the 
satisfaction of man's deepest longings. Agape_ is the ground 
of libido, eros and philia as well as tl1eir crHerion. As love 
1. S'E, I, 172 . 
2. ST, I, 234. 
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is the structure of being-itself love is the basic nature of 
being-itself which determines God's disposition toward all 
beings. Agal.n Tillich's thought of God as das Unbedingte is 
compromised by the attribution of love to the basic nature of 
God. In stating that love is an ontological concept, however, 
Tillich does not mean to deny justice. Justice is also an 
attribute of God, else love would become soft and flabby. 
(2) The divine justice. 
It is clear by now that justice is not P distinct attri-
bute of God, that justice is a 11 side 11 of the OtJeration of God's 
love. In this context Tillich takes the freedom of man quite 
seriously. 1\an is independent enouc;h of God to seek union 
again with God or to work against th&t union. In each side of 
the dialectJ_cal God-man relation there is actual dignity and 
freedom. As the possibility of man's rejection of love is real, 
God acts differently toward the man w},o accepts love and the 
one who rejects love. In each case God's essential nature of 
love is the basis of his action. But as t£-,e action of God 
toward the creature is different in the two cases, one speaks 
of God•s love and his justice, indicating thereby the two-fold 
action of God's love. For justice is God's love reacting 
against that which violates love. 
Condemnation is not tbe negation of love but the 
negation of the negation of love •••• It is the 
way in wh:ch that which resists love, namely, the 
reunion of the separated in t';e divine life, is 
left to separation, with an implied and inescap-
able self-destruction.l 
1. ST, I, 283. 
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When Tillich speaks of divine justice, then, he means the 
activity of divine love which surrenders thDt which resists 
love to self-destruction. Man's experience of God's justice 
is the 11 swareness of the self-destructive nature of evil. 111 
Justification is the fj_nal expression of tre union of 
justice and love in God. The validity of the structures of 
justice are maintained yet God's love conquers tr'e consequences 
of man's rejection of love. God r,1akes just the man whom justice 
condemns by taking to himself the consequences of man's viola-
tions and reestaolishing man in unity with the divine love. 
Justice is preserved and transcended within divine love. 
iv. The value of a consideration of God's attributes. 
Tillich places the discussion of God's o~Dipotence, 
eternity, omnipresence and omniscience in the larger context 
of the relationship between the divino ;ower (and holiness) 
and the creature. "Relation" so far as God is concerned means 
that 11 as being-itself God is the ground of every relaticn. 112 
But these relations are in no case external relacions, rela-
tions of God with something else. "They are the inner relations 
of the divine life. 113 God cannot become an object for man•s 
knowledge, though in t.he epistemological relationship every-
thing knovm is spoken of as an object for a l::nowinb subject. 
In the ego-thou relationship of the creature with God the 
thou embraces the ~· This is true to the extent t':1at 11 if 
-------
1. ST, I, 2tl4. 3. ST, I, 271. 
2. ST, I, 271. 
there is a knowledge of God, it is God who knows himself 
through man. 111 In like manner, God recognizes and loves 
2 himself through man. 
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The absolutism of Tillich 1 s position here is intended 
to comprehend God in his divinity and man in his humanity. 
But its effect is the opposite. In making God "all in all," 
"power of everything that is," "being-itself," God is robbed 
of his divinity and man of his humanity. God is no longer a 
11 fighter for ends, 11 a ere a tor and sus tainer of meaning. l{e 
now sustains lack of moaning as much as meaning. And man is 
no longer a creature endowed with an autonomous reason which 
is challenged to turn itself toward God. In this absolutism 
man 1 s irrationality and his turning away from God are as effi-
cacious as h:\.s rat:\.onal:\.ty and his turning toward God. If 
Tillich were consistent here he should discuss along with the 
internal relations of om_r:lipotence, eternality, orr.nipreso~~ce 
and omniscience the relations of powerlessness, temporalit;y, 
absence, and ignorance. F'or as man's exlstence is in any way 
that of the lack of power, eternallty, presence or knowledge, 
God is the ground of that lack also. 
In short, man's individuallty, freedom and dignity con-
stitute man's delusion. Man should cease his strife3 and allow 
l. ST, I, 172. 
2. ST, I, 271. 
3. One of the wr'.tings of Chuang Tze comes to mind. "Repose, 
tranquilllty, stillness, inaction, -- these were the levels 
of the universe, the ultimate perfection of Tao. Therefore 
wise rulers and sages rest therein." From "Tbe Tao of God," 
quoted on page 560 in R. Ballou, (ed.) Tbe Portable World 
Bible. New York: The Viklng Press, 195o;-
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God to do what he wills. 
There is some value in saying t21at God knows and loves 
himself through man if one intends thereby to emphasize sym-
bolically the fact that God controls the Given, is victorious 
over ~ Qg, is King in the Kingdom, is the One God. But Tillich 
could have used other language if that was :(ds intention, 
languase that would have been le.,s destructive of man and 
more sympathetic to the strife of h:~stor:i.c exj~st8nce and the 
purpose of history. 
Tillich•s purpose in discussing the attributes of God 
is to show that God is not a being with attributes which men 
affirm or deny. His idea is that the purpose of theology is 
evangelicai, "to contemplate the real in such a way that its 
div;ne t;round becomes transparent in it and through it."l 
The discussion of the att">ibutes of God serves a valuable pur-
pose in contributing to the 11 such a way" that men contemplate 
the real. In spite of the abyss-nature of Tillich 1 s God, there 
is content in his idea of God. God is truth, power, logos, 
meaning, goodness, and love. In a serr1on on the theism of 
atheism Tillich includes much of the content of God. 
We must show to them [atheists] that nei tlwr they 
nor we are outside of God, that even the Atheists 
stand in God -- namely, that power out of which 
the? Hve, th~ truth ~·or ':"hich. they grope,. and ~he 
ult1mate moan1ng of l1fe 1n wh1ch they oel1eve. 
1. 1'PE, 217. 
2. SOF, 127. 
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God is ground and abyss of being and meanins, but the abyss 
never swallows the ground. God manifests himself to existen-
tial man as truth, goodness, order and love. But as we shall 
see below, the abyss still seems to be the essence of God. 
3. The Trinity. 
The doctrine of the trinity is not the illogical as-
sertion that three are one. Rather it is a q1wlitative char-
acterization of God. It i_s an effort to express the richness 
of the divine life. The doctrine of the trinity gives the 
answer to man's search for ultimacy and concreteness as well 
as unity and plurality. Trinitarian monotheism expresses a 
dialectic not only of thought but also of the movement of 
reality through a 11 yes 11 and a 11 no 11 and back to a "yes." The 
trinity is a logical expression of the life-activity of the 
divine; 11 self-affirmac;ion, going out of itself and return::ng 
to itself. 11 l 
As we have already considered what arG usually referred 
to as the ''first two persons'' of the trinity, the abyss and 
the ground (logos), we shall summarize them in reference to 
the trinity and discuss at greater length the third person, 
the Spirit. 
It is tlle abysmal character of God, the element of 
power, which is the basis of the Godhead, "wccich makes God 
God. 112 The abyss indicates God's infinite power to resist 
l. ST, I, 234. 
2. ST, I, 2bO. See also ST, I, lb6. 
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nonbeing, his inexhaustibility as the ground of everything 
that is. God as Father is power. 
The second person (or principle, as Tillich prefers) 
is the logos, the element of meaninr, tc1e element of structure, 
fullness, content. "The logos opens the divine c;round, its 
inf1.nity and its darkness,and it malies its fullness distin-
·n·l df" ·t f" ·t 111 gu1s ~an e, e lnl e, 1n1 e. The logos indicates God's self-
manifestation, his self-objectification, the mirror of the 
divine depth. God as Father is a 11 consumint; fire," chaos, un-
harnessed power. It is potentiality which must subject itself 
to logos. The first and second principles combine to be mean-
ingful creativity, or creative meanins. These ooles wit':lin 
God•s nature have been indicated in the basic definition of 
God as abyss and ground of being and meaning. But Tillich is 
not at ease in this polar concept or the nature of God. There 
is a third principle, that of spirit. 
In the concept of s')iri t, power and meaning ar'e un:tted. 
Sp:trit means the fulfilment of the telos of beine;-itse.Lf. 
~elos indicates the 
inner directedness of life toward splrlt, 
the ure;e of l:tfe to become spirit, to fulfill 
itself as spir:tt. Telos stands for an inner, 
essential, nece"sary aim, for that in w!1ich a 
being fulfills its own 11ature. God as liViYJ6 
is God as fulfilled in ~imself and therefore 
spirit. God is SiJ:tri t. This is the most em-
bracing, direct, and unrestricted symbol for 
the divine life.2 
l. ST,I, 2ol. 
2. ST,I, 249. 
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Spirit includes ell the ontological elements, the 
elements of pov1er and of meaning. Centered personality, 
sel~-transcending vitality, and freedom of self-detsrmina-
tion are elements of power inclclded in spirit. Universal 
participation, forms and strusturas of r8a1ity, [Jnc1 1:lmitint; 
and directinc; destiny are elements of meaning which are :i_n-
1 
eluded. The po1ar stru()tures of 1oass1on and truth, libido 
and surrenaer, will to power and justice are sustained in 
the life of God as spirit. Spirit is not a 11 part 1' of Goa, 
nor is it a spec:i.al fun .. ~-cion. Spirit mouns tl.'_,:J s.ll-embrscing 
unity of the livint; God. "Spirit is the :1ccBr tbrow;h w,'lich 
meaninc lives, and it is tb.e mer.nine; whJch 0 ives direction 
to power. 112 Whenever one speaks of the livinc; God one speaks 
of God as Spirit in which the principles of power and meaning 
are actualized into a unified divine life. God as Spirit, it 
seems, cranscends the eiemanLary principles of power and form 
and brings them as consLituents into a living, concrete re-
lationship. God as Spirit is a personal God, it apnesrs. But 
Til1ich denies that God is a person, having mucb to say upon 
the point. This leads us to a consideration of the personality 
of God. 
l. ST, I, 849, 250. 
2. ST, I, 2bu. Spj_rit here is the unl-cy of Goa, embracing 
the ground and abyss in a living, creative, meaningful 
essence sj_milar to personality. 
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4. Is God a per~on? 
A consideration of the persmwlity of God is of parti-
cular interest in this investigation. Tillich 1 s definition 
of a personality is "that being which has power over it-
self.111 The distinguishing characteristic of a person is 
lois self-determination. Th~ s means that a person possesses 
freedom. In the exercise of this freedom man can transcend 
l:is given nature and reach universality. 11 Persona.Lity is 
that being in which the individual is transformed by, and 
united with; the universal structure of being. 112 
Personality indicates not only the capacity of self-
determination but the crsative use of tr:is freedom as well. 
For nwn is confror"J.ted w.i.th a deme.nd to bee[ Tne an act·J.al per-
sonallty. Tbis demand to be free is not 11 im:.osed 11 upon man 
from without. It is tJ-1e natural quality of thG expression of 
man's own being, of the ground of man's ex!_stance. The depth 
of bei.ng as freedom becomes man:tfost in the self-determination 
of parti.cular me:1. Indeed, "the unco:ldi.ti.u"wl character of 
the demand to become personal i.s t>,e ethical ex~Jres.sion of the 
ontological structure of being itself." 3 For Tillich, then, 
there is a structure of iJeing more fundamental than personali-
ty. Personality is not ultimate. It is rooted in the struc-
ture of be':nz. Personality is not ''given.'' It has reality only 
1. TPE, 115. It is assumed that "power over itsel:c" 11 implies 
consciousness of self. 
2. 'rPE, 116, 117. 
3. TJ:-l~.!;, 118. 
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11 in a free self-realizatj_on on the basis of a pre-:Jclrsonal 
vitality. 111 If personality is an emer~ant of pre-personal 
development, then body or impersonal power of some sort is 
the basis of personality. Thinking of t·ce ,)Bl'sonality of 
or 11 power 11 ? L;jt as put eside tL·e q_uestion forl 3 r::onent to 
consider the posl.tivo value of a "personal" God for Tillic[l. 
sonality. His utterances are most explia1_t in refsr~nce to 
Jesus. T-Ie is commontin,~ nn the uniqueness of t:,e u_Yl_:versal-
become-concrete. 11 !-To myth, no myst~.ca1 vision, no metaphysical 
princlple, no sacred law, has the concreteness of a persoaal 
life. In comparison with a personal life everything else is 
abst::'act. 112 This is a stronc; statement, which may well indi-
cate an emphasis on the third trinitari.an principle, the 
Spirit, and in so dolne; represent God as essentially personal 
and concrete. };e writes again: 
In the New Eeint; which is manifest in Jesus as 
the Christ, the most concrete of all possible 
form.s of concreteness, a pe.rscn<:-:1 lj_:f'e, is the 
bearer of that which is absolute without condi-
tion and restriction.3 
Tillich sees Christ as the principle of concreteness in God, 
yet he holds to the unj_versali ty of' Christ as the Loc;os. In 
spite of the polarity the thoc-ght t' at a nerconal lU'e is the 
1. TPE, llB. 
2. S'r, I, 16. 
3. ST, I, 150. 
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most concrete reality compreh_ensiDle j_s an insistc~ce ·which 
we must keop before us. 
Tillich matntains that the ultimate concern of man can-
not be less than a person. 1 ~an's relationship with God is in 
a person-to-person framework which imparts a warmth to man's 
religious confidence. "In Christianity providence is an ele-
ment in th<3 person-to-person relationsilip between God and :nan; 
it carries the warmth of belief in loving protection and per-
sonal guidance. 11 2 Speaking of the elements of the two main 
s·ymbols for God Tillich writes: 
The symbols 11 life,n 11 spirit, 11 t1power, 11 11 love, 11 
''grace,'' etc., as applied to God in devotional 
life are elemonts of the two r.1ain symools of a 
person-to-person relationshi.~ ~lth Cod, namely, 
God as Lord and God as Father. 
In both these instances man's relatio~ship to God is on a 
person-to-person bas:'s. Anytning which may be said a'JOut a 
supra-personal God must include what ever pe;:>sonal attributes 
are essential to maintain this person-to-person relationsl1ip 
with man. II • The relation of the ground of revelation to 
those who receive revelation can be conceived only in per-
sonal categories.•• 4 
The insistence upon a person-to-person relationship 
between man anc.l God is based upon man 1 s understcmdinc of his 
own nature and his symbolization of God in terms of his ovm 
1. ST, I, 156, 244; TPE, 63, ll'<J. 
2. ST, I, 2b8. 
3. ST, I, 286. 
4. ST, 
.L, 156. 
beinv. As a self man 
is an individual person who participates univer-
sally, he is a dynamic self-transcending agent 
within a special and ;;eneral form, and he is 
freedom w!:ich has a special destinl and which 
participates in a general destiny. 
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Han therefore sees the divine life as free, dynamic and per-
sona.L. lie cannot see it otherwise. );!an can comprehend God 
only to the extent that there is analogy betweon ;}od and man. 
Tillich labels his entire phtlosophical-theolo~i~al method a 
"method of correlation. 112 He wants to understand the question 
in the light of ths answer, and the answer in the light of 
the question, and both in the light of that which precedes 
t . d 3 ques lOn an answer. :,'an seeks to unders Land God in terms 
of t"',e hic;hest that he knows, his own noture as a person. 
Sticks and stones are incapable of symLJolizing the nature of 
God to any degree of f'ullness. 4 Since God is not accessible 
to man as an 11 object 11 which man mi<;ht knoVJ, the nature of God 
5 
must be expressed in symool~. Just how the insist~nce upon 
sym~ools to express the "awareness" of God removes the danger 
of our thinking of God as an object of knowledge is not clear. 
11 Awareness" seems to denote 11 some thine:; of which one is aware" 
in the same sense that "knowledge" denotes "sometl'ing whj~ch 
one knows." 6 
1. ST, I, 243. 
2. Art • ( 1949 ) , 733; c•rn >...) -~' I, 59ff. 
3. ST, I, 61. 1 4. Art. ( 1940) , 10. 
5. Art. (1940)1, 10; RS, x. 
6. See page 123 above. 
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The situation that Tillich fears in reference to ths 
personal God is that man will forget the symbolic and sugges-
tive nature of the languac.;e about God's beins cJersonal and 
will accept the language as precise and fully descriptive. 
The danger of the personal symool is only that 
its symbolic character may be forgotten and 
that a judgment about the depth and meaning of 
reality may be transformed into a judgment 
about a special being beside or aoove us, the 
existe!l.ce and nature of which is a matter of 
proof or disproof. If this takes place, the 
ground of things itself becomes a thing, a ~art 
of the world, anq, if it claims aosoluteness, it 
becomes an idol. 
One must be in correlation with revelation, that is, 
in a religious mLtd, to a~Jply a symbol to God and raalize that 
it is a symbol. God is called a person, yet not in the sense 
of a finite person; not in finite separation, 11 but in an ab-
solute and unconditioned participation in everything. 112 God 
is then called dynamic, yet not in contrast ac.;alnst form, but 
11 in an aoo ol-ute and unconditional unity with form. 113 God is 
then called 11 free, 11 yet not in arbitrariness, but 11 in an ab-
solute and unconditional identity w:Lth his destiny. 114 Thus 
t:·1e symbols for God's nature are taken from the concrete re-
lations'lips of finite men w1th God, but they imply God's ul-
timacy. They imply a God in whom these finite qualities are 
in a volar relationship with infinite qualities, a God in 
1. TP:~, 119. This, of course, is a dane;er with any symbol. 
2. ST, I, 244. 
3. ST, I, 244. 
4. ST, I, 244. 
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whom the polarities disappear in the ground of being. 
It is clear, then, that God can:-wt be conceived in 
sub-persona 1 terms. The symbol, 11 personal God, 11 is an es-
sential part of man's t'--coul)lt of God in order to embody the 
person-to-person relctl:c:1ship involved. Nothing less than 
personality can evoke man's ultimate concern. But as personal-
ity iYlVolves ind5_viduaj_',_ty, may one think of God as an indi-
vidual_? a "ort of 11 absolute individual"? Tillich allows the 
term "absolute individual," in the sense of an 11 aosolute par-
ticipant. 111 The terms must be employed together. This means 
that both individualization and participation are grounded in 
God. once again we must move beyond the form and structure of 
rilality to think of an amorphous puwer, which, being nothing 
particular in itself, is nevertheless the ground of every-
thing and every person. TillJch will allow the term, 11 personaJ. 
God, 11 but this does not mean that God is ~ person. 2 The term, 
"personal God," "means that God is the ground of everything 
personal and that he carries wit':lin himself the ontolo.c;ical 
power of personal_ity. He is not a person, but he is not less 
trcan personal." 3 
Pollowing the line of critic ism above we find it diffi-
cult to think profitably of God as being good, or sustaining 
meaning in the universe, or as love, on the basis of tl1is 
1. ST, I, 244. 
2. Dr. Earlmess ln her article comparing Tillich 1 s abys,s with 
Brightman's given agrees with Tillich thac God is not a 
person. 
3 • ST, I, 2 4b • 
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infinite potency. On this basis all statements about God• s 
attributes are meaningless. God is love in that he is the 
ground of love. God is purpose in that he is the 3round of 
purpose. God is personal in that he is the ground of person-
ality. Yes, and if' God is the power of everything that is, 
one must continue and say that God j_s hate in so far as he is 
the ground of hate. God is purposelessness in so far as he 
is the ground of vacillation. God is impersonal in so far as 
he is the ground of impersonality. 
It seems that the choice is between a nersonal ana 
rational God who is in a real relatio1ship with man, with 
whom man can be in communion, to whom man can pray, on the 
one hand; and a uon-porsonal sround, an 11 absohltely uncondi-
tional, 11 an 11 unapproachably holy," a pl"inciole whlch is the 
power of every relationsl-\ip but wbicl:-:. :ls in no r'3lationship 
outside itself, on the other hand. It is certain that think-
ing of God in terms of personality opens the danger of objecti-
fying God, of not fully appreciating his divinity. l:lut at 
lea.st in this case ohe idea of God has moral and rationa_t_ con-
tent and meaningful p.urpose. This does not prohibit one from 
feell.ng a "seeming" infinite distance between man's folly and 
God's wisdom, man's lethargy and God's intense loyalty to his 
purpose. Yet in spite or this distance man ap;:roaches God con-
fident in Goa's nature as ground of the raLional gond, the true, 
the beautiful. As such God is rational, good, true, and beautiful. 
There seems to be little uanger of objectifying God, 
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however, in the concent of God as power, as unconditional ground 
and abyss. The danger ~ere is in another direction. Here the 
danger is that the abyss shall swallow tile lor;os, that God be-
comes an abstract principle, the principle of power. There is 
no partiaular locale of the power. God becomes a sort of dynamo 
enere;izing and empowering everyt.l1 inc; that is, wit.hout discrimina-
tion. Perscnality, consdousness and self-detCJrmination are 
emergents on tl.-is strict view. God he:::'B is a "pure absolute, 11 
but he is not the living God. Tillich speaks of God as living. 
Most of the so-called anthrop:lmorpl-dsms of the 
biblical oicture of God are expressions of '"is 
c!::eracter as liv3 .. r.r;. Fis actt·:Jns, his passions, 
his remembrances and anticipations, ::is suffering 
and joy, his persona 1 relations and his olans--
all these mal{e a living God and distingnish him 
from the pure absolute, from being-itself.l 
This passage suggests a difficulty. Tillich has stated 
explicitly that God is being-itself. "et J,e holds that God is 
living. Here he utters a thou:::;ht which. we have suspected, that 
being-itself is a pure absolute and rather different from a 
living God. 
WFJ began tl1is discussion with Tillich' s definition of 
a person or personality: "that bein~_:; which has power over it-
2 
self." The study of Tillich' s view of persmality and God 
---------
1. ST, I, 242 • 
2. On the basis of this definition of personality God is the 
only real person, and finite beings are relative approxima-
tions. But Tillich's argument is quit<? the reverse, that 
finite beings are personal ( tlcout;h not completely powerful 
over themselves) and that the infinite is not personal ex-
cept in the vac;ue sense of being the ground of personality. 
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has .ted us to think of .tlnite man as a person capable uf 
developing personality. Being aware, being conscious as a 
person, man has regarded God in -cerms of the hit:;hest caLe-
gories he knows, in terms of' conscious per~ona.ti ty. But one 
must guard aec:ainst using the "Germ, "personal God," literaJ.ly. 
It is a symbol man uses LO refer to the inflnc1."Ge t;round and 
abyss of' being. This ultimate principle is not .te~s than a 
person nor is it a person. It is 11 beyond-persona.t11 Lhough it 
is the ground of personality. God .ts not personal except as 
the ground of personality. TilJ.ich does not want us to think 
of God as a person in the ~ense that we are persons; limited, 
in anxiety, sinful, Yet he wants to pre~erve Ghe versona~ 
qualities o!' God which become manifest in the warm person-to-
person relationship between God and man. The princip.te of 
formless and infinite power1 and the principle of logos al'e 
embodied in the concept or Spiri"G. God becomes a .tiving God. 
God is personal., but beyond the way in which we are personal.. 
Wha-c finite per<Jons are in parw, God is in fullness. 2 
1. It is suggested Lhat me on is in the nature of God for 
Tillich. In that caseGoo is being-itselr and he is an 
infini"Ge "potentiality of.being.'' Ir me on has untological 
s·Latus it is either within the na cure 01' God in Tillich' s 
trinitarian monotheism or it is in dialect.Lcal relationship 
with God in an ontoJ.ogical strife (dua.tism). The 1'ormer 
explanation is more consistent with TiLllch's thought. An 
inconsistency is avoideu thruugh the concept of God as 
Spirit, che llving unity of the on-cological e.tements. 
2. This concJ.usion is comparable to tha"G reacheu by E. s. Bright-
man, a personalist. Man is on1.y fragmentarily conscious and 
~ersonal. God .ts consciousness and personality in their 
rullness(Brightman, POR, 368, 669). 
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One may emphasize the kinship between man and God, the 
rational continuity, the imagQ_ .Qei, and speak of a "personal 
God." On the other hand one may enphasize the infinite dis-
tance between God and man, that "his ways are not our ways, 
and our ways are not his ways, 11 and speak of a personal God 
within strict limitations, or not at all. Kierkegaerd goes 
to the furthest extreme along this line. Tillich tries to 
maintain a position "on the boundary," retaining the personal 
categories within God, but refusing to say that God is personal. 
He does this .through a skillful formulation of h~ s thesis: 
God is persona 1 in that he is the ground of persona li ty. In 
this case it is not God's personal c1'aracterlstics which are 
ultimate, it is the grm.'nd of s orne sort. Tillich must face 
more realistically the question which Bown~ faced. Is it 
more coherent to explain the rationality and personality of 
God in terms of a non-rational and non-personal ground, or 
to explain the non-rational and non-p•arsonal ground in terms 
of personality?l Tillich wants to explain personality in 
terms of the ground, holding to an unconditional God w'•ich, 
it seems, is closer to a sub-personal power t ica n to a supra-
personal entity. 
1. Bowne, JIET, 42lff. Bowne faces tbe question in a sli;:;htly 
different form. Fis question concerns explei.ni.ng persona-
lity in terms of the categories or the categories in terms 
of personality. "is decision for the latter led to hi.s 
doctrine of "transcendental empiricism." 
CHAPT3R IV 
To this point our investigation has centered around 
the place of reason in Tillich's conceotion of men,in reli-
gious luowledge, and in God. The discuss:'on of the role of 
reB son in the knowledge of Cod includr;d an element of n:e thad 
BS well BS an element of conclusion about man's ability to 
know God. It concerns us now to ex2mi':!e more exactly the 
:~wt'~.od Tillich follows !_n working out his conclusions and in 
co!1structins a systematic theolo;y. T:--~-e purpose here is to 
determine the place of reason in TilliGh 1 s raethod. It will 
be interesting to note whether or not there is consistency 
between what Tillich says about reason and the way ~n which 
he actually uses reason~~ tlJ3 structu~e o· bis systam. 
A significant sta'cement of Tillich 1 s, to wU.ch further 
reference will be mac1iJ, is contcd_ned in 2 paper called nF'rag-
ments of an Ontolo~y of Love.nl It is Tillich 1 s oelief that 
every ontolosy is necessarily fra5menta~y beca'>SB of the i'i-
niteness of the human nind. Thus, in spite of the publication 
of' tl'e f:lrst volume of his Systematic 'rheology, Tillich be-
lieves that a complete ontologic8l system is beyond the e:;rasp 
of the finj_te mind. "The logical character of an ontolo;_;y 
nust be implicit in the f'ra::,nents not explicit in a system. 112 
Since Tillich states this a0ain in his Systenwtic Theology, 
it is well to regard the utterances of the Svstarcatic Theology 
1. Art.(lv49)~. 
2. Art.(l949) 2 , 2. 
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against the backr;round of this stated conviction. ''hether the 
theology be of fragments or of a system, however re£Json plays 
an important role. 
It n-ey lend to understanding at t.ri s point if Tillich' s 
defini ti_on of reason is recalled. 1 TilE cb believes that it is 
inexcusable if a theolocian uses terms witho d ha vine; defined or 
ci_rcumscribed them. 2 In consequence or this conviction he· gives 
a definition of reason. But in the course of .bis Svstematic 
~--
Theology Tillich wanders from his deri':lition. .::lome or the in-
consistencies in Tillich's regard for and use of reason have 
been indicated already.3 For our present purpose, however, let 
us recall Tillich's definition of reason. 
Tillie h 1 s basic definition of rea son contains two poles, 
the ontoloc;ica.L and the technical, the d:ynaeic and the static, 
or the ecstsUc and the technical. In Tillich 1 s view both on-
tological and technical reason rr,ust be active in a systematic 
thea loc:ian. 4 Tillich thinks of ontoloc;ical reason in a way 
comparable to coherence, in accordance to classical tradition. 
Ontological reason is the nous of the Gre3ks. It is the 
11 structuro of the human mind" which enables the mi:;_d to ru1der-
stand reality and seek for the good, tbe true and the oeauti-
t' 1 5 - u ....... Ontolosical reason is Losos, is form, but not ststic 
form. It is more also t':lan consistency. It is that in the 
1. See the Introduction, pp. ixff. 
2. ST,I, 72. 
3. Introduction, pp. ixff. 
4. s~:, I, 74. 
5. ST, I, 72. 'l'he word "structure" is not well ch.osen. It 
sugg3sts a static form. 
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mind which arrives at truth through an "experiential efficacy" 
which was termed a "coherence of meaning" in tr'e discussion 
1 
above. Brightman defines coherence as a 11 systematic related-
ness which discovers connections, laws and DUrposes ••.• the 
presence of relation. 112 Brightman says again that coherence 
means "sticking toe;ether," a "comprehensive, synoptic view of 
all experience.•• 3 DeWolf says that the rational method is 
that type of synoptic method which appeals to unlimited com-
prehensive cohersnce. 4 The assumption underlying the remarks 
of DeWolf and Brightman is that God is rational purpose and 
that the search for meaning and purpose, synopsis, is the 
search for God. 
Tillich includes the relationship to God in his concept 
of reason under the idea of "ecstatic reason," reason grasped 
into unity v1ith the contents of faith. 5 One aspect of reason 
in Tillich's view, then, is ontological reason, reason with a 
vertical outreach toward being-itself, toward structures, values 
and meanings, toward God.. This is the aspect of reason which is 
in correlation with revelation. But there is another distinct 
aspect of reason which Tillich calls ''technical reason." 
Technical reason is the function of the lower side of 
reason, that which engages in the process of 11 reasonine;," or 
the working out of means to achieve given ends. Technical 
reason is the reason of the theological scholar which constructs 
a consistent system. Technical reason is comparable to dis-
1. See p. 129ff. 4. DeWolf', HRAR, 197 
2. Brightman, POH, 190. 5. ST, l, 53. 
3. Brightman, ITP, 61. 
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cursive reason working from given premises on the basis of 
consistency. Technical reason operates horizont~lly, inte-
grating the implications of intuition into a system. It is 
this aspect of reason that is most apparent in Tillich 1 s method. 
1. The source, medium and norm of theology. 
The source of theology is the Unconditional, God, the 
ground of being and meaning. Tillich believes that the empiri-
cists have actually drawn from God as source while c:j_aiming 
that experience is their source. Though Schleiermacher meant 
something quite near to what Tillich expresses as an "ultimate 
concern about the ground and meaning of our being" in his 
phrase, "feeling of absolute dependence, 111 he nevertheless tried 
to derive all the contents of the Christian faith from the ex-
perience of absolute dependence. But experience is not the 
source, actually. Experience does not create that wr~ich we 
call God any more than reason creates God, Christian theology 
regards as its source that which is given in history, that which 
is given in experience. "Christian theology is based on the 
unique event Jesus the Ghrist ••.. This event is given to ex-
perience and not derived from it. 1' 2 
Experience for Tillich, then, is not the source of the-
ology, but it is the medium through which the source is mani-
l. ST, I, 42. 
2. ST, I, 46. It should be said in defence of the empiricists 
Tillich criticizes that there is a difference between an 
epistemological and an ontological source. Tillich is un-
fair to the empiricists because he disregards this distinc-
tion. 
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fest. Tillich's distinction is valuable as a warning ae:;ainst 
regar·ding experience itself as ultimate reality. But the dis-
tinction does not minimize the very close relationship between 
source and medium. The discuss~~on of the source would be mean-
ingless apart from the context of the r;wdium. Tillich is aware 
of this almost ambiguous relationship when he speaks of evangeli-
cal enthusiasm. For evangelical enthusiasm, "the experience of 
the man who has the Spirit is the source of religious truth and 
therefore of systematic theology."l Tilli~ch is aware of this 
interdependence again when he says that t:1e medium colors the 
presentation and interpretation of what it receives. This fact 
makes it necessary to adopt some normative standa1od by which 
the authentic source is distinguished from the coloring it 
receives in experience. 
The norm which Tillich advocates by which the authentic 
content of theology is to be judc;ed is tl:e "New Being in Jesus 
as the Christ as our ultimate concern. 11 2 It is important to 
note the three parts of the norm. The New Being is Tillich 1 s 
terra for the reality in which the conflicts and self-estrange-
ment of our existence are overcome. Tillich 1 s thought here is 
based ori Paul's idea of a ''new creation,'' meaning the "power 
of overcoming the demonic cleavages of the •old reality• in 
soul, society, and universe." 3 And where is this New Being mani-
fest? In Jesus the Christ. Christ brings the new reality. And 
l. ST, I, 45. 
2. ST, I, 50. 
3. ST, I, 49. 
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Jesus is the Christ. In Jesus the New Being is a reality not 
an abstract ideal. Thus the material norm is Jesus as the 
Christ, brine;ing a New Beine;. The third part of the norm adds 
an "ultimate concern," which Tillich speaks of as the critical 
principle of all theology. The complete norm is the "New Being 
in Jesus as the Christ as our ultimate concern. Tbis norm is 
the criterion for the use of all the sources of systematic 
1 
theology. 11 
In order to understand what Tillich means here, one must 
consider the functional implication of the norm. Jesus as the 
Christ is not the norm in a credal sense primarily. Nor is 
Jesus the norm in a formal or abstract way. We saw above2 
that Tillich 1 s criterion of truth is a sort of "experiential 
efficacy in life" which is close to rational and empirical co-
herence. This criterion inevitably involves meaning. Tillich 
speaks of the verification of his type of ontological systems 
in their "efficacy in t!oe life process of' mankind. They prove 
to be inexhaustible in meaning and creative in power."3 Creative 
meaning, then, is operative as a test of truth. And it is in 
the light of this test that Jesus is regarded as the final reve-
lation. Meaning is an extremely important concept in Tillich 1 s 
theology. Jesus is the center of history because of the meaning 
which Jesus gives to the entire bistorical process. Indeed, in 
a previous discussion we have termed Tillich' s criterion of 
1. ST, I, 50. 3. ST, I, 105. 
2. See above, pp. 1~9-34. 
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truth that of a "coherence of meaning." 
Thus the norm of theology which to a superficial exami-
nation appears to be formal and dogmatic proves itself upon 
closer examination to be quite actual and rational. Reason 
plays a role in the arrival at the "center of meaning 11 of his-
tory. Indeed reason receives the revelation as we saw in 8hap-
ter I above, and more must be said upon this point. But Tillich 
regards the principal role of reason in the construction of a 
systematic theology to be that of interpretation. For systema-
tic theology tries to give us "an interpretacion of the 8hristian 
message which is relevant to the present situation."l 
It is interesting at this point to consider the relation-
ship between reason and experience. It ap')ears from the above 
discussion of source, medium and norm thac; reason has no place 
in the reception of revelation. Yet it was maintained above" 
that for Tillich one of the most important activities of exis-
tential reason is the reception of revelation. Reason receives 
revelation. ''Revelation could not occur if it destroyed the 
organ of its reception. And tbis organ is reason. Man, in con-
trast to all other created beings, can receive reveiation be-
cause he is a rational being." 3 Rather than being contradictory 
assertions, these statements indicate the ciose relationship 
between experience and reason in Tillich 1 s thought. Reason is 
l. ST, I, 53. 
2. Chapter I, 3. 
3. Art.(l943), 9. 
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not only an instrument of criticism, it is the conscious 
center of reception. Tillich speaks of 11 ecstatic reason, 11 the 
organ which receives the contents of faith. Reason does not 
produce its object. Reason is "grasped" by its contents. 
Ecstatic reason is reason grasped by an ultimate 
concern. Reason is overpowered, invaded, shaken 
by the ultimate concern. Reason does noo produce 
an object of ultimate concern by logical proce-
dures, as a mistaken theology tried to do ln its 
11 arc;uments for the existence of God." The con-
tents of faith c;rasp reason.l 
There is another way of saying that God confronts t1an 1 s rea son 
as an ultimate meaning and power. God is not a product of rea-
son any more than of experience; God gives himself to reason, 
to experience. Reason and exnerience are almost analogous 
terms for Tillich because all of man's exl-'erience enters his 
''structure of centeredness 11 which is subjective reason. 
Tillich's intention in the discussion of source and 
medium is to destroy every theology wh:'Lch makes experience an 
independent source of truth about God instead of a dependent 
medium through which God manifests himself.<:! This is also true 
for reason. God is the source of truth about himseJ_f. Ex-
perience and reason are media through which God manifests 
himself to man. But man does not make God out of experience 
or reason. JEan finds God in experience and in reason. 
1. ST, I, 53. This is in contrast to Tillich's assertion that 
there is "no corn:,on basis batween t[leolo;;y and plc!.losophy" 
(ST, I, 26). 
2. ST, I, 46. 
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2. ConstructJ'Je theolo:;y presupposes contact w'Lth God. 
In discussing the possibility of a philosophy of reli-
gion, Tillich dis tin;;uishes two tyJJes of' chUo~ophy of reli-
gion. These are the ontologica.L type and the cosmological 
type, which Tilllch characterizes respect'vely as "tl:e way of 
overcoming estrangement" anG the 11 way of me0t~_ns a stranger." 1 
Tilltch's puroose in this distinction is to show that the onto-
logical method is basi.c for every philosophy of' religion. This 
is true because the ontological method dise)els at the outset 
the myth that "man stands alone" until throur;h his c&lcula-
tions he establishes the existence of God. This distinction 
does not deny the valid contribution of tbe cosmolot;ical method. 
But the cosmological method is seen to be dependent upon a con-
stant participacion of man in an ontologica.L reality. 
Tillich maintains tha"G theolo,;ians !:ave actuaJ.ly found 
the basic structure of tl1eir theology before they have rerlected 
upon the methou used. This holds for tbe same reason that a 
discussion about the method involved in the awareness of God 
presupposes that there bas been an awareness of God and that 
some method has already been employed. 'lie saw above in the 
case of Lotze and Kuhn that "what is," the ontologically real, 
~ determines what one "oue;ht;" to do. This seems to be the case 
also regarding method. What is ontologicaJ.ly real determines 
1. Art.(l946) 3 , 3-13. 
2. Chapter III, p. 162. 
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the method by which it shall be l;nown. As Tillich reflects 
upon his own method he confesses to what extent he knows God. 
The test of the method is that it prove adequate to the 
awar8ness of God. 1 
If cosmological philosophies of religion depend upon 
an ontolot;ical awareness, and if reflection about method pre-
supposes the actual use of some method, it is equally true 
that an attempt at a constructive theology presupposes an ac-
tual contact with the contents of faith, with God. In the 
chapter on religious knowledge above, it was sean that reason 
plays an important role in man's contact with God. 
Reason asks a question in the light of which contact 
with God is meaningful. Reason then criticizes the contact 
to purify it of spurious elements. True revelation cannot 
violate reason; thus reason acts as a cat.'•art:ic to eliminate 
antirational elements which claim authenticity. Deyond these 
activities rea8on receives and conceives revelation. It is 
man's reason which is aware of God and which relates this 
awareness to all other experiences. Throu~h the contact with 
God reason is mGde full. Reason 1 s questio:1 is answered. All 
the conflicts within reason are reconciled t:::rough contact 
with God, It is apparent again that reason does not oroduce 
the contact with God. God manifests himself to man and 
reason receives the manifestation and interprets it. 
l. ST, I, 34. 
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The lcnowledge or avJareness of God is ',lresupposed w:1en 
one begins to construct a systematic t~eoloc:;-,;'. '1eason 
11 grasped 11 by the contents of fa~th is the reaGnn that is at 
still reason, 1-cowever, and may even be called the most coherent 
reason of wr,ich man is capable. It is to the actual functim 
of reason in the construction of a systematic theolot:;y that we 
now turn. 
3. Reason's functj_on in constr'Jctin;_; a systematic 
theolosy. 
According to Tillich there are three principles which 
dete >::oline the rational character of systCJmatic theolo;;y; se-
mantic rationality, locical rationality, and methodical ra-
tionality. 
i. Semantic rationality. 
The first rational principle of syst,Jmatic t"neology 
concerns verbal comt~unication between rn_inds, semantics. Com-
munication is -ocssi!Jlc only u:r:_;on the basls o:t' r,_tio-~.-~.al beings 
and rational terminolo::;y. 1'he theolosian is confronted with a 
challenge to attain "semantic clarity and existe:-J.t:i_al purity. 111 
He must use words w':,ich have rather unique meani_r,e:;s in various 
contexts. I-;e must use words adequate in richness for the ex-
oression of the idea, but yet whose central 111eaning is cmmis-
takably clear. Central indications and attributive connotations 
are both important. In the case of the word, Spirit, i'or 
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example, Tillich does not insist upon the exclusic)n of the 
various connotations. Spirit means one thing as a philosophi-
cal or psychological concept, it means another t}cint; to the 
mac;:Lc world view, and still another as the ascetic opposition 
to flesh. Tillich does not exclude these meani'lgs, but he re-
lates the term, Spirit, as 11e intends it, to each meaning of 
spirit. In so doing Tillich elaborates the ce:1tral meaning 
he has in mind and he preserves contact wl.tn the various fields 
of experience in which the word has meanL1[';. 
The semantic principle is d'_fficolt to a:J·:-ly but i_t is 
necessary if' there is to be effective communication between 
minds. It is necessary because every sie:;nificant theological 
term 11 cuts through several levels of' meaning and all of ti1em 
contribute to the theolo;_;ical meani:1g. 111 
Let us extlmine Till:.ch's method as he speaks of some of 
the New Testament categories for the interpretation of history, 
as he speaks of the ~ on, and of tl-J.e ontological elements. 
(1) Categories in the interpretation of history. 
11t the conclusion of a discussion of non-historical and 
historical philosophies of history, 2 Ti.llich lists some New 
Testament catee:;ories of interpreting history, contrasting the 
greek and the Christian meani:1g of these categories. We con-
sider kairos, telos, logos and ecclesia as illustrations of 
1. srr, I, 55. 
2. TPE, 16-31. This address was delivered at the annual 
meeting of the American Theological Society, Eastern Branch, 
1939. 
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Tillich's use of semantic rationality. 
Kai ros, the 11 right time, 11 meant for J~ristotle the tiY!E 
w~ich was good for the fulfillment of something. In this sense 
everything has a kairos, a "good time" for its fulfillment.l 
But for Aristotle time itself has no kai ros. The hi_storic 
Pl'Ocess has no kair_.SJ__"l_ because the ultimate f'ulf'i1lment is 
above history, not in history. In Pau1, on the other hand, 
11 kairos designates the fu1fi1lment of time as a who1e. 112 
There is a kairos for every thing, ]Jut much more significantly 
there is a kairos for the entire historical process. Fistory 
itself has direction, movement, fulfillment. In the New Testa-
ment the kairos indicates the appearance of the good or of 
fulfillment at one moment of time, separ>-'ting time into two 
segments, that before the kairos and tlmt after the kairos. 
The kairos, the comins of Jesus, is the center of hi-story for 
the New Testament. T!-,e Greek word is ret&ined, out its conno-
tations are related to a new center of meaning. 
Til1ich treats telos the same way, indicating its Greek 
meaning, then the Christian meaning which r~teins the essence 
of the Greek idea but in a transformed way. ~elos for Aris-
totle means with all potentialities bctualized. Absolute actu-
ality in which there is no potentiality at all is the telo__"l_ of 
a thing. This is ultiraate L:tli'Jllment. The novement here is 
1. TPJ~, 27. 
2. T·PE, 28. 
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vertical, implying a fulfillment from above w>oich, as in the 
case of the Greek concept of kai~os, negates history. In the 
New Testament the emphasis is shifted to a horizontal direc-
tion but with the vertical idea retained. In Paul's thought 
the telos is the end of the ages in our days, "the moment in 
which God receives the Kingdom from Christ." 1 The New Testa-
ment idea of the telos emphasizes the vertical movement of 
something new coming from above. But it also emphasizes tlcat 
this something new assumes a horizontal movement in history. 
Jesus comes into history vertically but his reveali~g power 
is in his remaining in history horizontally. Eistory is saved 
by a new power which is not a creation of history because it 
is a New Being, but which lives in history to redeem history. 
Teleios as the finished or ''perfect'' meant the actualization 
of potentialities for the Greeks. For the early Christians 
it means the perfection of history not by its own development 
but by the introduction of the fullness of ·:;hrist into history. 
The theoloJical meaning of telos, then, retains the Greek idea 
of development but sees that development ln the light of the 
New Being which Jes'us brings into history. 
The word, logos, undergoes a similar transformation in 
the New Testament. Logos meant form, structure, essential na-
ture, for the Greeks. Reason was in things and in man, a law 
of nature as well as of' human thinkinc;. It is always present 
1. 'rl:'E, 28. 
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as the active power which shapes the passive matter. For the 
Greeks reason was the principle of rationality. But for the 
Christians the logos became flesh. 11 T~B lo3os becomes history, 
a visible and touchable individuality, in a unique moment of 
time.ul The logos becomes spirit. History and t-'le logos of 
true being are not in contrast with each ot}Br. Indeed, the 
logos ·has a history. "True being, or logos, appealos in its 
fullness in history. 112 Thus the Greek idea of logos is re-
tained but transformed in Christian theology. 
Another Greek concept which the Hew Testament transformed 
is that of the eccles~_a, the 11 assembly11 or the "church." In the 
Greek c_-':;y-state the assembly was composed of those who were 
called-out of their privacy to make public decisions. For Aris-
totle those eligible for such a cal~ing were those who were 
free, which provision excluded the barbarian and the slave. But 
for the stoics all men are free by virtue of their possessim 
of reason. Til1ich says that in the case of Aristntle and the 
Stoics it is nature which has made the election. In the New 
Testament, however, the ecclesia is spoken of in connection 
with God or with Christ, and indicates a continuity with those 
of the Old '"estament, the 11 tru_e people of God." Tl-;.is election 
is not a matter of race, of natu2e or of reason. It is a mat-
ter of ''historical destiny. 113 Men are made rree by the salva-
--------
1. TPE, 30. 3. TP3, 31. 
2. TP:O:, 30. 
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tory 11 callinr; of God." The action of God j_n history is empha-
sized. The spatial ecclesia of Greece has been transformed 
into a dynamic, historical ecclesia in Christian thought. 
!n each of these cases Tillich retains the connotations 
of the various words but he gives a new center of meaning to 
the word in the Christian sense. J-Ie does not, of course, do 
this explicitly with every word. But he does it with many 
words, enough to indicate -che basic orienta-cion of his thought. 
In so doing he applies a semantic rationa_1_ity, ut;lizins the 
richness of connotations yet 11 pin-pointinc;" the meaning which 
he uses the word to express. 
(2) Me on. 
Tillich' s use of me £!:! is a good example of ;-j_s semantic 
rationality. In discussing dynamics ~:nd form as polar e_1_emm ts, 
1 he indicates that it is "something" which every form forms. 
This concept is difficult to grasp becaus3 if it were concep-
tuallzed the 11 something" would have form. This 11 sometl•ing" is 
and j_s not, depending upon how one looks at it. Tillich names 
th]_s "something" the ~ £12· 11 It is the me on, the potentiality 
of oeing, which is nonbeing in contr&st to things that have a 
form, and the power of being in contrast to pure nonbeing.''2 
Pure nonbeing would be ouk on. Ouk on is a "nothing" Which has 
no re_LaLion at a_1_l to being. Ouk ~ is nondialect'cc~:l nonbeing. 
l. ST, I, 179. 
2. sr.r, I, 179. 
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But;:-~ 2E is in a dlalectica.L rela-r;ion with being-itse.L1'. 
Me on is 11 nothing except in re.Lation to being. 111 Every fi-
nite cruature is a unity of being and dialectical nonbeing. 
Everything wblch is finite participates in being and nonbeing. 
11 l':!an 1 s finitude, or creature.Liness, is unintelligible without 
2 
the concept or dialectical nonbeing. 11 
Applying the principle of' semantic rationality, Tillich 
must show in what ways me on iS nonbe1ng and yet how me on is 
distinguished from ouk on. It is impossible to state explicitly 
wnat me on is, for it can:wt be conceptualized except in union 
with form. Thus again Tillich must depend upon Lhe discussion, 
the distinctions and the connotations, to suggest to the retider 
his thoughL about ~ on. This type or semantic rationality is 
essential if one 1s to introduce new concepts or clarify old 
concepts to the understanding of the reader. 
(3) The ontological elements. 
Another aspect uf Ti.l.Lich' s semantic rationa.L:cLy con-
cerns dialectical statements about finj_te L.fe, then the ap-
plication of obese statamenLs to the divine 1L,·e. The onto-
logical elements are individualization and participation, 
dynamics ana form, and freedom and destiny. Ontological e.Le-
ments are qualities in everything thac exists. 
Individualization lS that self-centered character of 
1. ST, I, 189. 
2. ST, I, 189. 
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rth .. th 1" 't 0 •• h tl"" . df" "t ~·· ever~ lDS LD __ e l[:;D or w rue_ a _lJ_n.:=; lS a e J_D.J_ e u.L;.ln[;. 
In tte case of' man individualization meam t''e indiv:'. sible 
unity or conscio•Jsness, selfhood. but man's individualization 
is not absolute or co:•:plete. The element of DartJ.ci_()ation is 
in polar relation with individualization. Lel.bniz sJeaks of 
the rc1icrocosmic structure of the r~onad.l Whitehead spea.~s of 
the "prehension" of the w'ole by the aJtual occas1on. 2 2-oth 
indi cote the element of participation. ''artin 0uber empJ--asl.zes 
the role of the 11 thou11 in the developmcmt o!.' tne "I," the role 
or partici.pation in the process of' ind5.vidualization. It is 
only in the communion of' pers mal encounter that persons can 
grow. 3 !•an, trBn, is an individual who participates in society 
and the world. Individualization anu l'articipation are ln a 
dialectJ.c,LL relationship. "Without individualization nothing 
would exist to be related. Without participation the category 
of relation would have no basis in reali cy. 11 4 
But how are these polar elements of everythin~ that has 
being related in beL1g-itself? It is in TilHch's answer .to 
t2:1is question tllat vve sec ~1is sem2.ntic rationality at worl:. 
The proper sense of t:2_e concepts rr1ust be distint~uis r~ed fror-:_ 
t.'B ir symi:Jolic sens0, Tillich "lainkirs. The synbols taken 
from finite rela.tionsl-::.ii_JS must be qualified wten e..p~:-::,lied to God. 
For exar1~1le, concemin_; t1-:e qv_estion of God 1s ~:)8rsoni..:l:lty, or 
1. T.eibniz, ~~onad_glos.z, par. 62 3. Sr:I1 , ..L, 177. 
2. Whitehead, AOI, 300. 4. ST, _, 177. 
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the symbol, "personal Gou," a defini "Ge individuality ls 1m-
.. 
pl1ed. As we saw above individualizatlon means the indivisible 
uniLy of consciousness, selfnood, But does Tillich see ~ny 
meaning in speaking of God as an indiviuual? 
The answer must be that it is meaningful only 
in the sense chao ne can be called ~he "absolute 
participant." The one term cannot be applied 
without che other. This can on.Ly mean tha"G both 
individua.Lization and participation are rooted 
in the ground of cbs divine life and that God 
is equally "near" to "a"h of chem wbile tran-
scending them both,.L 
God is an individua.L and a person as the ground or 
everything individual and pe rs anal, God is the "princ iple11 of 
individualization and participation; God as being-itself is 
ohe ground of both. This doet~ noc mean chat r;here is something 
alongside God in whic~ God participates. God's participation 
is not a spati .. l or "Gemporal presence. God's par•ticipa"Gion 
and his individualization are symbolical. For God as being-
itseli' .is the ground o!' inuividualiza"Gion and participation. 
God is not subject to the !fcHarity of the ontologic:al elem<:~nts. 
"Within "he aivine lil'e, every ontological elemenc inc.ludes its 
polar elen::ent completely, wJ.thout tension and without the threat 
of dissolution, for God is being-itself. 112 Thus God is a person, 
an individual. But he is not a person in finite separation. 
God is an individual person 11 in an absolute and unconditional 
1. ST, I, 244, 245. Tillich 1 s ontological monism is implicit 
here, 
2. ST, I, 243. This is another way of saying that there is 
one substantial subject, God. 
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participation in everything. 111 
Here is a clear example of Tillich's semantic rationa-
lity. The symbols, individualization and participation, are 
taken from the context of finite existence and applied to the 
divine life. But to symbolize the divine life, they must be 
stripped of certain existential connotations. Tillich depends 
upon semantic rationality in his written words. He uses seman-
tic rationality to clarify meanings and to suggest connotations 
so that he may suggest to the reader the basic orientation of 
his theology. Again Tillich's absolute monism is apparent, 
there being one individual who is the absolute participant. 
But it is only from the standpoint of revelation, of unity 
with God, of the theological circle, that one is enabled to 
think this thought. Words with rich symbolism aPe chosen; 
then they are qualified and scrutinized so that their central 
meaning when applied to God is largely transformed. Semantic 
rationality is the basis of communication. But communication 
may be clear or vague. If one is to be clear in systematic 
. theology he must make use of semantic rationality to accentuate 
the central meaning which words are used to impart. 
The principle involved in the application of the elements 
of individualization and participation to God is followed with 
the elements of dynamics and form and freedorr. and destiny. In 
1. ST, I, 244. 
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man there is a tension between dynamics and form as well as 
between dynamic form and being-itself. Vitality or dynamics is 
the power of life, open in all directions toward channels of 
expression. But man's vitality is conditioned by his form, his 
relation to meaningful structures, universals. Thus the conflict 
within man between power and form is reconciled in the unity of 
formed power, directed vitality. But there still remains tre 
tension in man between what he is, his self-conservation, and 
what he feels that he ought to be, his self-transcendence. 
Dynamics and form, when applied to God, suffer a quali-
fication. If one applies tbe dynamics-form polarity to God, 
he does not mean thereby that there is tension within the divine 
life. Fe rather means that in God possibility is united with 
fulfillment. "Neither side threatens the other, nor is there a 
threat of disruption."l God cannot cease to be God. His "going 
out from himself" is united with theeternal "resting in himself." 
God is dynamic in absolute unity with form. 2 Again Tillich 
uses semantic rationality as a tool of discourse, to impart 
richness of ideas yet retaining the basic orientation of his 
position. 
The third ontological polarity, freedom and destiny, 
follows the pattern of the other polar elements. In finite life 
freedom and destiny are in a polar relation of interdependence. 
1. ST, I, 247. 
2. ST, I, 244. 
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In finite life destiny is the basis of freedom1 and freedom 
participates in shaping destiny. Time lS real in the process of 
finite life and there is a novelty to the future. Man can change 
his destiny through the exercise of bis freedom. But when the 
elements of freedom and destiny are applied to the divine life 
tbeir meaning is altered somewhat. God is free in an absolute 
identity with his destiny. God is his destiny. The essential 
structures of being are not strance to God but are the actuali-
ty of his beinc. God's freedom does not shape his destiny. There 
is an absolute unity and identity of freedom and destiny in God. 
In each example of the ontological elements syrr~bols are 
taken from man's finite life and a~plied to the divine life. 
But in each case a quallfication must be made. Each element 
must include God's ultimacy, 11 the ultimacy in wi'ich the polari-
t.Les of beint; disappear in the ground of beinc, in being-it-
self.112 Tillich uses semantic rationality as a means of ap-
plying sy-mbols from the finite life to the divine life. Conno-
tations and meanings must be recentered, and perhaps altered, 
to make this transposition possible. God must be thousbt of 
as t':o.e ground of the polarities of finite life; "out as being-
itself God is not subject to the tension of the polar elements. 
The polar elements are united in God. 3 
l. Destiny for Tillich does not mean a stranse power which 
determines us. Destiny is 11 myse.Lf as given, forr.1ed by na-
ture, history and mysslf 11 (ST, I, 185). 
2. ST, I, 244. Essence contains the polarities of' existence. 
3. This analysis suggests the anti-Tillichean possibility that 
God might be considered as a 11 highest being." 
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The first rational principle of any theoloGy, then is 
that of semantic rationality. words are burdened with meanings 
and connotations. The theologian must choose his words care-
fully, eliminate elements not compatii:Jle wj_th his intention 
and centraliz" the connotations around rds primary meaning lf 
he is to be understood correctly. Every theology must utilize 
semantic rationality. 
ii. Logical rationality. 
The second principle which determines tf'e rationality 
of theology is that of loc;ic, logical l'ationaEty. F'ormal 
logic is as essential for theology as it is for any other 
science. Logical irrationality ha's hac! its voice in Christian-
ity through Tat ian, . 'rertullian, I,uther, Eierkegaard and others, 
maintaining in general that what appears to men's minds as ab-
surd and illosical is what God chooses as the truth. According 
to Paul God uses the foolishness of t)l..is world to confute the 
world's wisdom. 1 Sone philosophers in the name of dialectics 
have revolted against logic. some theologians in the name of 
paradox have revolted against logic. But Tillich insists that 
theology is nevertheless dependent upon logic. Theology must 
be logically ra"iona~. What, then, does Tillich say to the 
protests against locic? 
Tillich says in the first place that a protest against 
t)ls logic of a static set of abstractions is welcome and timely. 
1. I corinthians 1:26-28. 
250 
ontology is dynamic, not static. Beyond this, however, Til-
lich insists that there is no resl conflict between logic 
and dialectics or between logic and paradox. A dynamic onto-
logy is compatible with paradox and d:Calectic, but a·dynamic 
ontology is neither antirational nor antilogical. 
Dialectics follows the movement of' trLouzht and realj_ty 
through a yes and a no, but dialectics descri.bes this process 
through logically correct terms. "The same concept always is 
used in the same sense; and, if the mesning of' tt-e concept 
changes, the dl.alectician describes in a logically correct way 
the intrinsic necessity which drives tje old into the new.ttl 
Theology is not antirational when it mainta~ns the doctr~ne 
of the trinity. The doctrine of the trinity is not the affir-
mation of logical nonsense, that three are one and that one is 
three. The doctrine of the trinity describes in dialectical 
terms tl1e movement of the divine life 11 as an eternal separation 
from itself and return to itself. 112 Dialectical thinking is 
not composed of genuine logical contradict:lons. It is not in 
conflict with the structure of thinkinc. Dialectical thinking 
is loc;ical, dynamical Jy logical, mirror inc; the movement of 
reality itself. Dialectics protests against the static nature 
of an ontology, not ac;ainst the logical and rational nature 
l. ST, I, 56. We have seen Tillich aiJnly this principle in 
the illustrations of semantic rationality given above. 
2. ST, I, 56. 
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of an ontology. 
As dialectical statements do not violate the principle of 
logical rationality, neither do the paradoxical sta'ements. For 
the essent:i.al meaning of paradox is not "az;ainst reason 11 but 
"against the opinion. 11 Paradox is not used by Paul to say 
sometc·•ing illogj_cal, but to give an "adequate, understandable, 
and therefore logical expression of t:C.e infinite tensions of 
Christian existence." 1 Luther in speaking of the justification 
of th.e sinner and John in speakinc; of the Logos becomine; flesh 
do not state something that is antirational. They mean to 
witness to tlce fact that God's action transcends all human 
11 opinions," all human expectations and ant:i.cipations. God acts 
in such a way that finite reason is transcended, superseded. 
Thus God t s action appears to be pa·~adoxical in an antirat5.onal 
sense. But the pa raaox simply points beyond t:·:e realE: w':lere 
finite reason is applicable. Christiani.ty does not demand the 
blind acceptance of 11 senseless combinations of words as divine 
wisdom. 112 Christianity accepts and witnesses to the new Beine; 
which breaks into our ex5.stence from above. 3 This New Belng ls 
not absurd, lt ratr•er fulfills and heals reason. Paradox is 
the form Christianity must use to break one 1 s satisfaction with 
the finite so that one may recognize a hig.her reason. Paradox 
11 shocks" finite reason and drives finita reason beyond itself. 
1. ST, I, 56, 57. 
2. ST, I, 57. 
3. ST, I, 57; Art.(l950), 511-517. 
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Paradox i.s not illogi.cal. Paradox has its place in logical 
rationality. 
iii. Methodological rationality. 
The third principle which determines the rational char-
acter of systematic theology is that of methodological ration-
ality. Semantic rea,on and logical reason are active in Til-
lich 1 s method; but beyor1d these, methodological reason must 
insure the orderliness of the way of deriving and stating 
propositions. There must be a definite LletLod w'Jich is adhered 
to consistently in the stru~ture of a systematic theolocy. 
Otherwise the adjective, systematic, is a misnomer. "Tr_e final 
expres sian of consistency in applyins methodoloc;i cal ra ciunali ty 
is the theological system. 111 System does not mean a static or 
closed organization. Systom means the "consistency of cn,_;nl-
cive as'sertions in all realms of methodological knowledge. 11 2 
The system should reflect the movement of' life f'rorn a consis-
- tently-maintained viewpoint. For Tillich 11 syscem" anc'i 11 frag-
ment" are closely related. we saw above that f'or Tillich a 
closed system is impossible; therefore Tillich writes "Fragments 
of an Ontology of Love. 113 A system is a drawn-out fragment. 
In each system an experi_enced fragment of Ufe is expanded to 
cover areas where vision is missing. Tillich mantions Hegelrs 
1. ST, I, 58. 
2. ST, I, 58. 
3. Arc. ( 1949) 2 • 
2b3 
system as an example. Hege 1 1 s sys uem was bu11 t on his frag-
mentary vision of existenoe. we have referred above to the 
faot that Tillioh 1 s view of man in nis essential and esohata-
logical naLure is an inferenoe from Tillicb•s experience in 
existenoe. 1 "A fragment is an implioit system; a system is 
f t ,2 an explicit ragmen • 
Tillich realizes that o•e is denyi"'S much tbeologica.t 
thought when he defenas a system. Since Kierkegaard it bas 
been espeoiaily popular to deplore a systJm. But '.i'illioh 
defends the prinoiple of the rational system. Opposition 
to the system oenters in three attaoks. 
The system is attacked by som.e who confuse tr system'' 
with a 11 deduotive system." But a theclogy oannot be a deductive 
system of Christian truth. The existent:Lal ciaraoter of Chrl~stian 
truth prevents suoh a possibility. System means for Tillich a 
totality of oonsistent assertions, not oi' deduoed assertions. 
A seoond attack upon the systenatio EB thad is in the name 
of dynamios aca1nst the closed door of tbe system. But as a 
matter of fact, the c;reat systems have stimulated research as 
muoh as ol!ey have inhibited research. 'rhe system is not a 
static closure but a thread of meani~g which gives perspective. 
But any system or total v'~ew involves diff:Lcc;lti~es ond the rae-
ing of' new questions. Whether a sysuem impedes lii'e and re-
l. Chapter I, 2. 
2. ST, I, 58. 
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search seems to depend more on the na~ure of a partlcular 
system than upon "system" in general. 
A third attack is a sort of emotional axpression of the 
second. System seems to imply a stLfling of spiritual life to 
some people. But in Tillich 1 s view order is more spiritual 
tLan disorder. The great systems of' Greek philosophy produced 
scholars who deviated from the prevailing thought of the school. 
The schools were not 11 in-srown" in their ioeas. 1 It is certainly 
not inherent in the idea of "system" tlcat thought sh>1ll be regi-
men~ed. The death of t!louc:;ht is the death of' any livins system. 
Tillich is a rationalist as regm"ds theolo ical method. 
He defends the systomat:Lc statemG'lt uf theoloc_;y w'·ile insisting 
that the system is not rigid, closed, "'" <.tesd. '~ons::..stenc:r is a 
signiricant word for Tilllch as he dGf':1 nos and derends the sys-
tematlc method. This neans a consistGll.CY in the ElGanin::; given to 
words (semantic rationaJ.ity), consjs+;o'lcy in tb.e expres~ion of 
views (logicai ra~ionality), and cons5.st0n8y in tho ·bas1c orien-
tation and elauoration of a ,,;osition (mcJt:.wdolot>;ical rationality). 
}or Tillich the cuuse of God amons men is the cause ~ 
reason. Ancirationalists are antitlBist3. Tillich is expl:tcit 
on tllis point. 
It is not only bad theology but also a kind 
of ascetic arrogance when some theologians 
since Tertullian -- inaulge in nonsensical com-
1. Aris~oLle fraely criticizes Plato. Arlstotla, t~T, I, 9, 
990b ff'. 
binations of words, demandlng o1' alJ. true 
Chr~_st;ians that; in an act of inte.Llec cua_1_ 
se_i_f-destructlon they accept nonsense as 
11 divine sense." TLe 11 fool1shness of the 
cross"(Paul) has nothlns to do with the 
assumedly good but accually uemonlc "work" 
of the sacrifice of reason.l 
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Revelation, tLen,does not destroy reason. '.c'he antil'ationa_~_ 
is the demonic. But revelation lifts reason to a higher per-
spective and a participatlon in a higher beint_;. The experi-
ence or ecstasy does not; negate reason. Ec~tasy is "a state 
of mind in whlch reason is beyond itse_1_f, that is, beyond its 
2 
subject-ooject structure." 
We have seen in another context that Tillich regards 
the denial of reason (logos) as antihuman and antidivine. 
~he service of God is the use of reason, not the denial of 
reason. Tillich uses reason without a)olocy, believing tnat 
any sound tbeolo;:;y must embrace the use of semantic reason, 
logical reason, and methodological reason. 
A word should be said in regard to Tillich•s failure to 
apply his theory of semantic and lo;;ical rationality in the con-
struction of his own system. Indeed, one of the prinCJipal diffi-
culties an interpreter of Tillich faces is to dist 'nc:;'.l.ish that 
1. ST, I, 15ln. 
2. ST, I, 112. It seer::ts it would be r.core ccns:i.stent for 
Tillich to speak of ecstasy as the state of mind when rea-
son 11 is 11 itself rather tLan beyond -Ltself. If he had said 
that ecstasy is that state in which the ;·1ind 11 is 11 itself, 
he would have been sueaking from the standpoint of reason's 
essential nature. When h.e speaks of reason belne; "beyond" 
itself he speaks from the standpoint of reason's ex~_sten-_ 
tial nature, from the stand~oint of finite rationality. 
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in Tillich which is truth, par'adoxically st<•tecJ, and that which 
is simply inconsistent. It is sugse.stec1 in these )ac;es that m.any 
of the seemin,s l.::lconsi:Jt9ncies i!l Tillj_r-:h becor:1e r,ssolved if one 
interprets Tillich as an absolute monist, t)'e t"ree sta;;es of 
God and man )arallelin~ each other. B~t this reading of Tillich 
does not resolve all the difficulties. 
Tillich speaks repeatedly of God as being-itself. A 
typ::cnl state•cent follow::: t1God does •lOt exist. Ee is being-
itself beyond essence and existence.t1l Yet in s~1ee1kin;_; of God 
as living Tillich implies that i:Jeinc;-Hself ls a static absolute, 
an idoa which Tillich rejects. Tillich speaks of God's actions, 
passions, remer:~brances, anticipati':_,ns, su:r:t·erinss and joys. 
11 All these make him a l:Lving God and distinguish >lim_ from tre 
pur'e absolute, from beinc-itself. 112 It is tr~J_e tLat there is 
not a ri0id inconsj_stency hero. But t::--:.e po5.nt is tbat Till"ic}_! 
clouds tl:e fine pC!int of the distincti o:: he is try~.nc; to make 
oy using lleing-Hself bot.h as t'c>e pure aQsolccte !'e is rejecting 
and as t~e dynamic, living God he is advocating. 
The::_"e has been oG;;asion in t!.le foregoing discussion to 
com .. it1ent u)on the obscur~_ty of Til:J.~_c:0 1 s epistemology because 
he ch::mces from an epistemolo;;ical to an ontolo,;icol orientation 
'"'l. t·,., 0" t ·"a"'n' nr 3 vv ,.._ ...._ \• J.. L_ V • It has been suggest:Jd t:-,at Tillich r.1akes this 
shift easily because be holds to a monlst!c ontolo6y, and 
l. 3T, I, 205. See also 'r?"1~, 63, ST, I, 139, 205,2oO, 235, 247. 
2. ST, I, 242. 
3. see page 102 above. 
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regardin;; knowledge of God, a monistic epistemology. One ac-
customed to reac;ing clear-cut discussions of epistemology and 
of ontolot;y finds Tillich slippery to grasp. For example, he 
admits that everythin;o; that becomes real to us enters the sub-
ject-object correla-cion. 1 But a sentence before tr•is, Tillich 
says: "God is no object for us as subjects."<: ]ranted t"·at 
the experience of God is real to exist·ontial man, the inconsis-
tenoy is rath<lr sharp. But Tillich is speaking in the former 
case of man i£1 h.is ex 1 stones, livinc on a horizontal level of 
subject-object relations'.i_Ds. In the latter case, he !_s 
speaking of nmn in exist·Jnce, but it !S !ran who real~zes his 
essence, bis unity with God, a unity in itYlLL8L man as a sepa-
rate center of consciousness is dissolved. 
Another example of Tillich' s confusing use of words is 
his definition of soul. soul is the 11 prepersonal, vital, un-
conscious, and collective e;round out of w_·,ich tr1e personality 
3 
grows." After describing the soul in tc1ese biological terms 
Tillich sneaks of the interrelation b•otw3en tbe consc:L::ms cen-
ter of the personality and the "psychic foundatlon," meaning 
the interrelation between the conscious center of the person-
ality and the soul. 4 To speak of the soul as vi tal, preper-
sonal, unconscious and a.Lso as psychic is somewha,; confusin~,· 
'Z 
1. .Art. ( 1946 ):J, 11. 
2. Art. ( 1946 )'3, 11 
3. TPE, 120. 
4. TPE, 131. 
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One more example will s~ffice. Tillich makes the 
sweeping statement that there is no cu:•;:wn basts between the-
ology and philosophy. 1 Against this assertion one ~1i13bt quote 
almost any passage of Tillich' s concernin,:: his nethod of cor-
relation, the question of' ph:l_losophy and the answer of theology. 
This complementary relationship which i:'lvolves reciprocal in-
fluence is not possible except on a common basis. "Theology 
, .. 
is as dependent upon formal logic as any other science."" In-
deed, as we shall see in tbe discussion on the method of corre-
lation below, the implication of correlation is that God and 
man are not only integrally related, but that ontologically 
and in essence God and man are perhaps identical for Tillich. 
Tillich 1 s references to God's going out from himself and his 
resting in himself suggest a monistic readinG of Tillich. 0 
Tillicn also says that all relations are the inner relations 
of the divine life. 4 If Tillich is teLching an absolute 
monism there is certainly a common basis for evary act of being. 
But one does not have to intarpret Tillich monistically 
to see in the met:c·:od of corJ'elation a ;JOsi tive assu_l'lption that 
there is a common basis for tteology and philoso,Jhy. Tillich 1 s 
choice of a method of correlation ovor dualism centers around 
his uppreoiation for this common basis. 5 
1. ST, I, 2b. See also the Introduction above, page 
2. i:::>T, I, 56. 
3. i:::>T, I, 247; Art.(l949)2, lb. 
4. ST, I, 271. 
5. see below, page 2b9ff. Tillich is clear when he says 
11 Apologetics presup,:oses common ground" ( ST, I, 6). 
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4. '"illich' s method of correlation. 
Tillich says tha~ the method which he actually puts 
into effect through the use of reason has been called "nee-
orthodox," "neo-supernaturalist" 1 or 11 dialectical." 2 But Til-
lich rejects tbese characterizations of his motl1od, 11referring 
to think of his as a method of "correlat:~on" or as a "nee-
dialectical" nethod. 3 Correlation indicates the relationship 
between theoloey and philosophy, a relationship t:,at is oasic 
in Tillic.h's thought. Tillich believes that there !.s an inter-
dependence between tbe questions to w\1i ~h pllilosophy is driven 
and the answers c;iven in r;1·rictian theolot;y. The entire struc-
ture of systematic theology is built unon the interdei)endence 
of question and answe '", of ))hi los ophy and theology. 11 Philosophy 
and theology are not separated, but they are correlac;ed, and 
t'c.eir correlation is the methodological problem of a Protestant 
theology." 4 
i. The negative mem ing of correlation. 
In his method of correlation TilHch embraces a philo-
sophical theology, a real theo-logy. In so doing he clearly 
rejects the methods of supranaturalism, hu:mani.sm and dualism. 
1. Art.(l949), 732. 
2. TPE, xxvi. 
3. TPE, xxviii; ST, I, 60ff.; Art.(l949), 733. 
4. TPE, xxvi. It has been shown that Till:iLch is inconsistent 
and unfair to his own nosition in say::.ng thst there is no 
common basis for theology and nhilosophyl S·T, I, 26). 
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(l) supranaturalism. 
The method of supranaturalism erh,,has5 zes tJ.ce dis con-
tinuity between God and man, heaven and earth. 'l'lle suprana-
turalistic method emphasizes the Christ:ian message as tr'e sum 
of reveaLed truths which are injected into history without 
preparation and actually without rece;Jtion by man in :'iS natu-
ral state. There is no mediation with the hcman situation. 
"I:an must become something else than human in order to receive 
divinity."l 
The ma5_n exponents of supranatural1srn, as Ti.llich de-
scribes it, ar•e Tertullian, Luther, :Kierkegaard and Barth. But 
it is his contemporary, Y:arl Barch, whom Tillich attacks most 
pointedly. 2 According to Barth a philosophical theology is 
impossible. Por philosopl'Y belongs in human culture and the 
sphere of huraan poss1bili ties. But theology rests on revela-
tion, which is from beyond the human posslbility. TilHch re-
jects this supranaturalistic separation of the human and the 
divine. 
Were an event only a foreign subst8nce i_n >tistory 
it could neither be aosorbed by history nor could 
it continue to be operative in 'Jistory. It is as 
far from ri,;ht to ca.Ll history God-abandoned as to 
call it simply God's revelation. Indeed, w'cen 
speaking of revela-r;ion one must say that his-r;ory is 
always equipped with revelac1on because it always 
contains divine answers and human questions.3 
1. 3T, I, 65. 
2. Especially in Art.(l935)G, 1~7-l4b. 
3. Art.(l935)2, lv8• L. H· DeWulf has written a critical 
appraiscl of the general position which Tillich describes 
a~ supranatu:•,;listic. De'Nolf titles the book, The Rel:iJQ-ous 
Revolt Against Reason, actacking the views of Kierkegaard 
in the main. 
In the same context but in a partial summary of his 
criti_cism of Barth, Tillich again rejects the radical dis-
continuity of supranaturalism. 
Certai~ly God is ln neaven and man is on earth. 
But man can make this statement only in case 
heavsn ana earth have ~ouched one anot~or time 
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and again, not only once, but in a process of 
history in which statements and then doubts have 
been expressed about Gods who are thought to be 1 
on earth and men who are ~hought to be in heaven. 
Perhaps Tillich' s clearest renarks upon the point, however, 
are as rollows: 
Revelation would not be even a divine possibility --
revelation j_~ indeed revelation to man -- if it 
could not be received by means oi' forms of culture 
as human pnenomena. It would be a destructive 
foreign substance in culture, a dlsruptive "non-
human" entity within the human sphere, and could 2 have had no power to shape and direct human history. 
In the me~hod of correlation Til~ich intends to express 
his conviction about the Ltterdependent relationship between 
question and answer, between phi~osophy and "theology. The 
infinite qualitative distinction between man and God which the 
method of suJJrana turalism teaches, tnen, is for Tilli ch com-
JJle~ely rejected. 
( 2 ) Humanism. 
Tillich's me~hod or correlation is no less directed 
against the false method o1' bur!anism ttan :cc is a;_;c,lns"t the 
method of supranatura lism. But the cri t :_cism of humanism is 
1. Art. ( 1935 ):0, 1:58. 
2. Art.(l~35) 2 , 1~0. 
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not that t Le message of Uod is a foreign sc_Jbstance tlc.rovm into 
the hunan si tuati Ol'l as sEprenaturalism te2 ches. ·:;:at l:er 'Ni th 
hur~anism the 11essace of God is sc~'ehow spun out of rnan 1 s nat-
ur a 1 tho ~1ght • T.:runanism (or naturalism) develops the answer 
to its questions out hunan existence. It identifies 11 r:an•s 
existential with his essentia 1 state, overlooki11Q the break 
betvr3Gn t> an v!liL c:_;. is reflected in t hG unive !.'3 al hlL-:tan condi-
tion of self-estranc;enent and self-cor.tradiction." 1 "'Tce!aarlisrr 
would ap:::;ear to Oe a proper method if !-.~an '<vera in. h1s essential 
state of unio:.J. v1i th. God. 2 But n~an is in existence and, thout:;h, 
in mornent s of ecstas·,:r man is united wit.~1 God, rnan in existence 
is r;:an witb n split, self'-estrsnc;ed reason. 'l'':us existential 
man is powerless to speak the healin~ '.vord cf unio11 ~:;o hieself, 
because he himself as ex:·.stinc::_. IT~ an is tl1e qt:est5.on. 
FLrmanism teac1:es that t~1ere is onl7T one dj_r.1ensio:1 in 
life, the horizontal dirne?::.s:i.on.. 
faith are expl8ined as creat~"ons of 11 mon's rel:Lgious self-
realization in the pro;resslve process o!.' ::.->'3lj_giolJS history. 113 
There are no absolute norms, tLere is no G-od "1V~1o speaks to man 
f:!:'om be:rond rl8n 1 s exist6nce. 'l'here is no vertical relationship 
w.t_,_at soever. 1¥hatever is is in nan com;Jlctely. :q,ue sti ons and 
answers are on the sane level as creations of man. Acccrding 
to hunanism everything is said by man, nothino:; is said to man. 
1. ST, I, 65. 
2. See Chapter I, 2, i, above. 
3. ST, I, 65. 
Tillich smrunariz~s Barth's critical appraisal of 
hunwnism with approval. 
Therefore, the ~iberal theo~ogy is heresy. In 
pla~e of the sinner it substitutes che self-
developing person~~icy; in place of Cnrist, the 
self-ueve~oping man Jesus; in plac" of the 'Nord 
of God in Scripture, the self-developing reli-
gious consciousness of humanity.~ 
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The denial uf Gou and the incomplete v:tsw uf m~n which 
sees man with a horizuncal relationship unly couse Til~ich to 
reject humctnism and l!.beralism. To see "veryching in terms 
of the natura~ is as much an error as to see everythir~ in 
terms o!' the supernatural. Each is partially right in what 
lv affirms, each is partially wrong in what 1t denies. But 
both must be rejecteu so long as they claim to be cumplete 
acaounts of reality. 
( 3) Dualism. 
Tillich pr·otests against a chira method, the method of 
dualism. But tne protest here is not as strong as it 1s against 
supranaturalism ~nd humanism. For dualism. is aware of the prob-
lem which the methou of correlation faces, though uualism does 
not ufrer an acceptable answer. Til~ich's concept of dualism 
is tnaG of a supernatuPa~ strucoure ouilt upon a natural suo-
structure; che concept uf natural theology and supernatural 
theology as comprising the whole or reality, but each with 
parcicular methods, !'ields of investigation, criteria of truth 
and uonclusions. Dualism, according to Tillich, tries to relate 
G 1. Arc. ( l>13b) , 1.3~ •. 
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tne"e separated fields in man in a complementary way. !!tan is 
able to learn some theological truth through the exercise of 
his natural faculty of reason, this being called "natural reve-
lation. 11 But there is a limit to the capacity of this faculty. 
Man learns other theological truth through God 1 s revealing ac-
tivity, through "revelation" which man is able to receive by 
faith. 1 It is as if man reaches his destination through two 
vehicles. The vehicle of natural reason can carry him for a 
distance, but never to the destination. Man leaves the vehicle 
of reason in favor of the vehicle of supernatural revelation 
when the end of reason's 11 line" is reached. The ultimate des-
tination of full theological truth can be reached only through 
a combination of faith and reason. 
Tillich rejects the method of dualism because of its arti-
ficiality. T:1e "arguments for the existence of God" constitute 
the principal part of natural theology. But Tillich sees a 
self-contradiction in the phrase, "the existcmce of God," for 
he does not believe that God ''exists.•• 2 The value of the so-
cal.Led natural theology according to Tillich is not to prove 
God's existence, but to witness to the finiteness of' man's 
existence. In existence man's reason is split and he cannot 
spin out of' reason answers to the questions which existentj_al 
reason must ask. Tillich rejects the idea of' a "natural" revs-
1. The system of Thomas Aquinas is a typlcal example of' a s~tem 
Tillich regards as dualistic. Note the Summa Theologica, Part 
1, ';,;.uestion I, art. 1 and Part 1, Question XII, arts. 12, 13. 
2. See Chapter III, introductory remarks, above. 
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lation, a "natural" theology 
So we can say: There is revelation through nature; 
but there is no naturar-(rational) revelation. And 
there is theology dealing with natu~e; but there 
is no natural theology. Reason elaborates but does 
not produce theological propositions.! 
In giving the name, correlation, to his mJthod Tillich 
protests against supranaturalism, humanism ancl dualism. Having 
considered what Tillich denies by the netlloel of correlation we 
are ready to exnmine what he affirms by the use of that method. 
ii. The positive meaning of correlation. 
Tillich thi"nks of correlation as meaning the correspond-
ence of different series of data, th~ logical interdependence 
of concepts, or the real interdependence of things and events. 
As a description of the method of systematic theology TilUch 
uses the term, "correlat:on," in all three senses. 
(1) correspondence of data. 
Correlation means correspondence of data in the sense of 
a correspondence between religious symbols and that which is 
symbolized by them. It is upon the assumption of this corres-
pondence that all utterances about God's nature are made. This 
correspondence is act::tal in the logos-nature oi' God and the 
loP'os-nature of man. Tillich speaks of ontologi8al reason as 
the structure of the mind which enables it to crasp and shape 
reality. 2 The fact that God and man have a common logos-nature 
1. Art.(l947), 24. 
2. ST, I, 75. 
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makes possible an understandable contact between God and man. 
This contact gives rise to attempts to com,-,mnicate to other 
men t~e content of the experience of God. Hence tl1ere is t~ 
further correspondence between the symbol and the thing s:nnbol-
ized. 
There is a problem here because God is always more than 
ground or reason, God is also abyss. The abyss-nature of Gcd 
makes it impossible for man ever to speak about God E-,cept in 
symbolic terms. The abyss may be called tte "depth" of reason 
which man's finite reason is incapable of sounding. 1 The abyss 
makes God inexhaustible. 2 
The concept of the abysmal God prevents one from identi-
fyin{S God with any finite word, form, person or deed. The abyss 
indicates the infinite gap between God's spirit and man's spir-
•t 3 l • In an article evaluating dialect:Lcal theolocy Tillich 
states clearly tr>at at tbis point Barth is correct. 
God 1 s sovereit;nty is not blended with any forr.1 
of human existence and action. Unquestionaoly, 
this seems to me to be the truth that is pre-
served not only in the Barthian theology but in 
any theology that deserves the name. 
As God then cannot be approached directly, man must resort 
to cult, to myth and to symbol, in order to commu_n.icate the idea 
5 
of' God. 'rillich' s idea of' a symbol has been investigated above.6 
1. ST, I, 79. 
2. See Chapter III, 2, i, (2) above. 
3 , ST, I, 65. 2 4. Art.(l935) , l3b. 
5. Art.(l92b), 82u. Also RS, x. 
6. Chapter III, 3, iii, (3). 
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It was shown there that Tillich uses 11 symbol" to mean a finite 
reality wLich is grounded in the ontologj_cally real and which 
conveys in part the nature of the ontolo::;:l.cally real. A symbol 
is not interchangeaole because of its ontoloc;ical moorineo;, lu t 
yet the symbol never sets fortb_ directly and exolicitly the 
nature of t!wt ontological reality in which it is moored. 
Cor"elation as the correspondence of data r.1eans in this 
particular case that there is correspondence between religious 
symbols and that reality which these symbolize. Once a true 
relicious symbol has been discovered one can be suro that here 
1 is an implicit indiGation of the nature of God. Religious 
awareness is oossible because t~ere is a correlation between 
reason and revelation. 
(2) Logical interdependence of concepts. 
A second meaning of correlation is the logical interdepen-
dence of concepts. Tillich regards polar relationships as falling 
under this meaning of correlation. It is on the basis of a cor-
1. Here a weakness of Tillich 1 s position is apparent. It has 
been objected elsewhere that every effort to cor~nnunicate 
forces one to use s;y~~llols.. All language is symbolic. Til-
lich' s emphasis that one must resort to s;ymbols in order 
to communicate the idea of God is not sound, except as one 
must resort to symools to express Dny idea. The crucial 
issue here is the d:lstinction between the "true symbol" 
Tillich mentions and the 11 false symbol." Tillj_ch 1 s posi-
tion would be stronger if he emphasized sonewhat less the 
uniqueness of the fact that God cannot be approached direct-
ly and if he emphasized much more stron0ly his criterion of 
truth. It is granted that when one has discovered a 11 true 
relic;ious symbol" he can be sure t'-,at he has an indication 
of the nature of God. In the light of this fact, more 
detailed exposition of the importance of the criterion of 
a 11 true 11 symbol is needed. 
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relation, an interdependence, that Tillich speaks of 11 being 
d t "' t · of God." an .1'8 ques J_on The world does not stand by itself. 
Particular beint, is in correlation with beinc;-itself. In the 
second meaning of correlation, then, Tillich moves beyond an 
epistemological consideration to an ontological consideration. 
Tillich finds it profitaole to develop a concept of the 
ontological elements. These elenrents are individualization and 
participation, 1 dynamics and form, 2 and freedom and destiny. 3 
These stand in polar relationship with eacn other, neither pole 
existing completely apart frorrc the oth1r. T:,e ontological polaP-
ity is shown further in beine; and non-being and the finite and 
the infinite. Throue;h a discussion of these polar :;oelationships 
Tillich is trying to develop positively what he finds lacking in 
supranaturalism, bwnanism and dualism. Dualism is aware of the 
two poles of reality, but dualism conceives these in a static 
conplementary relationsbip. Tillich r,Jair:tains that they are re-
lated in a dynamic j_nt-3raction, that one pole never exists out 
of relation to the other ;Jole. One feels here again that it is 
upon this lss-cle tbat; Tillich criticizes Hegel. For, according to 
Tillich, Pegel transcends the tension of existential involvement 
in the concept of a synthesis. 4 Tillich bolieves that no exist-
ing spj_rit has t:,,e perspective of God, the uerspect:i_ve of syn-
1. ST, I, 174. 
2. sr.r' I 
' 
178ff. 
3. ST, I, 182. 
4. IOH, 166. 
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thesis. All existing life is lived in ambiguity, tension, 
l 
and angst. 
Correlation in the sense of the los:ice1l interdependence 
of concepts, then, implies s polar-structuc"e of all existen-
tial reality. Dynamic interaction of t 1:e ontological elements 
characterizes existing reality. 
(3) Real intordependence of things and events. 
The third meaning of correlation is the real interdepen-
dance of things and events. The part-;"' 1 P:o relationship about 
which Tillich speaks under this meaning of correlation is the 
relationship between God and man, the divine-human relation. 
The implication here is clear, that if therre is a divine-human 
correlat:ton God must be to some extent dependent upon man. On 
tr.is point Tillich makes a statement of crucial significance. 
But although God in his abysmal nature is in 
no way dependent on man, God in his self mani-
festation to man is dependent on the way man 
receives his manlfestation.2 
}Iere is the key to what has been puzzl;_ng in Tillich, the in-
sistence that God is das ·:Tnbedingte and at t'·•e san18 time the 
insistence thKt there is a real correlation between God and 
man, between qcJes-cion and answer. The two ideas are not inoon-
sistent if we grant what Tillich is appar~ntly saying here, that 
God in his essence is to be distinguished from God revealing 
hirr.se1f' in existence. ':/e have seen above how 'l'i11ich thinks of 
l. IOII, 137, 141; Art.(1939), 210. 
(1938), 511. 
2. ST, I, 61. 
See also Larkness, Art. 
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man in his essential nature, leis existent:ial nature, and in 
1 his eschatological nature. The distinction between God's 
abysmal nature and God's self-manifestin('; nature which allows 
Tillich to say that God as abyss is unconditional wtile God as 
self-manU'esting is conditioned by man's reception of the mani-
festation suggests that God, too, has a history; that God, too, 
has an essential, an existential and an eschatological nature. 
It is certainly clear tha"L Tillich is insisting upon the 
real interdependence of things and events, o:t' Cod and man. 
Tbe divine-human relation, anci therefore :cod as 
well a~ uan withln this rela~ion, changes with 
the stages of the :istory of revelation and 
wit!' the stages of evary personal development. 
There is a mutual interdependence between "God 
for us" and 11 we for God." TJ-,e divine-nmnan en-
counter" (Emil Brunner) means sor,,et: ing re~l for 
both sides. It is an actual correlation. 
In a real sense,then, God enters history, God manifescs 
himself in history. This manifests-cion is never complete be-
cause God as abyss is inexhaustible. But God as logos is man:i-
fest in history and is in real intcirdependence with man and man's 
logos. God and man change in this relationsrlip, but there is a 
limit to the shange. God as abyss is still the one essential 
power over history within which power the historic interdependence 
transpires and into which power the historic relacionship must 
ultimately be dissolved. In existence rnan is partially split from 
1. See Chapter I, 2, above. 
2. S'l', I, 61. 
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God. But man and God stand in a relatio:>sl:Hp of real inter-
dependence. The method or correlatlon seeks to express this 
relationship as well as the e>Jistemologlcal curres,,ondence of 
data and the logical interdependence of concepts. 
(4) The metaphysical implications or the method 
of correlation. 
It was stated aoove that a r•18taphysical system implies a 
metJ_ocl, and t'-,at a method must inevitably reflect sc athing about 
the ultir.Jately real. T;Tis is certainly the case w:cth Tillich. 
For the discusslon of his method has almost "b-urst :Lts seams," 
burdened as it is wit_h meta:ll':'si_cal implica-r;j_nns, There was 
first a ccntacc with ontoloeical reality. This contact was 
through a method det'H'mined by the ontolo;_;ically real. All 
reflection about methou is secondary to the primary fact or 
actual contact with reality. The truth of the method one theo-
rizes a oout depends u:pon tb_e adey_uacy '."Jl th wh:"Lch the method 
explains the actual contact with reality. "Whether or not a 
n:echod is aciequate cannot be decided a priori; it is continually 
being decided in the cognitive process itself. l:!echou aud system 
determine each other. 111 The method of correlation implies some-
ti1ing alJout the nature of ontological reality and man's relacion 
to that real'Lty. It 1s our purvose now to invesT;icate whHt 
thac implicacion is. 
(i) Man. 
The first implicat:~on of t,__e method oi' correlation is 
1. ST, I, 60. 
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that; man in ezistence is a cr·oa"Cure of t>·.e worlci, yet c1e is 
more than this. pan is temvted cO regc.Pd himself as independent 
but be is aware of his own finiteness. Man gains an insight 
into all existence through the examination of itis own existe •• ce. 
Pan comes to know himself as a raoional creature, a struc"Cure 
of centeredness, yet even in !1is reason thBre is a traae of 
finiteness and tension. Exis"Cdnce is not self-explanatory. 
I.Iun in ruising cr'"estions auuut his existen2e probes :fop answers 
which man cannot find in l;_imself. Ex"·_stinc r:tan, t.he~_..is in-
cor.-;.pletJ in himse1.1·. Ee can -·ot spin t>o an.s.,-;er~ cy·_;_t of his 
O\'Vn reuson as a false hurnanism asserts. Feitb';e can he accei:t 
answers against ~is reason, foreign substances t}~rown at l1im, 
as a f'alse suprsnFttu:ra..lis!Y'" asserts. J·T;-_,n in ex:!_st<Jnce Iaaintains 
a ra-cionsl integritv, ·yet even riJants reasun is tdnse in the 
re_Lations]··j_p uf j_nteract~_on -;:ith Goa. ~-~:<.:.n in ex:!.s"Cence, then, 
cannot be explained without reference "Co God. This leads us 
to cl·>e secono implication of' Ti1Jich 1 s n'ethod. 
( ii) Goa. 
T~'e second implication of the met:•od of correlation is 
thut God lS of such a natuPe that he manifes-cs himse.Lf in history. 
God is of a logos, self-manifesting nutupe, Tillich does not say 
that God manil'ests himseJ.f cumpleteJ.y, }[e does not even say that 
God is primarily a sel-1'-manifesting powei', On the contrary, the 
aoys" a" that which makes Goa God ap,oears to be the predominant 
side of God's nature. But Tillich tries to hold to an abyss-
ground nature of God without emphasizing either over the other. 
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But so far as existence is concerned, God manifests 
himself in such a way t}Jat he is act:ve in tbe logo~ of nan. 
God in existence, then, cannot be explained without l'eference 
to man. God appears in exist,mce as the answer to ean' s ques-
tions about himself and about existerice gene~ally. 11 God is 
the answer to t:"'B quest:Con i~mPlied 1~n human finitude. 111 If 
it is the eyistential threat of nonbein~ wh:ch is the question, 
God is called the infinite power of being. If the question is 
an existential anxiety, God is called the "infinite ground of 
courac;e." If the question is a':Jout the ex5~stontial distortion 
of values and meanine;, God and r"is Kinsdon are called the unity, 
'~ 
tl1e meaninc;, and t:1e fulfillment of hi~story.~ 
The nothod of correlation asserts that man is incomplete 
in history. The method also asserts that God in >is seli'-mani-
festation is incomploto. One must consider God if J~e would under-
stand ex~'stent~l.Bl ~we1. One must consider man if he V/ould under-
stand the self-manifestc:tion of Goci. God is logos, ground of 
structure cf centered.ness, in so far as I'r~n cor·:pY'8henc1s Gcd r s 
the .abyss, w}'_i.ch nen cannot ·~omprollenc1 by '--._:Ls reason. T.Tsn can 
exorcj_sc; faith toward God 'Nl"}_O is SroCJ.nd.-l,Oyss, --:_o·,7evor, :·-.:Ln 1 s 
l. (1 fl1 I, 64. 0"' 
2, C" r;1 ' 64. --.;....__, ~, 
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participation in tl1e J0ew ~~eing is a falth relatioilship. Faith 
is not anti-rational. Yet T!llich would ins~st that faith is 
a kind of COBnition ''qualitatively different from the cognition 
involved in the technlsal, sc·~-~.olarly ~-'lO:L~k of t~e thoolosian. 111 
T'l]_s faith is a sort of :.ntuition, a 11 l'eelinc;-uni.on" in wlc_ich 
the i!l.itiative is VJitfl GoO.. CoQ grasps mant s reason. Then nan 
must orc;anize the meanin,; of this experience in relatj_on to his 
otlJGr experiences. }'ai th o :Jcurs when nan is gras:JeLi into union 
with God, a st&te TilJ5.siJ sa~]_s 11 ecstat~c reason.'' Reason works 
on ancthc;r level i!l .relstinc tJ-1:Ls ex_)erj_ence in an or~cL1.i7:ed way 
to other experiences, a state Tillich calls "technical reason." 
One cannot h0ln but ask if t~is reason in m2n is one or 
two. Tillich speaks in such a way that tho two-foldness is 
empbas:i_zed wit:~out b~~int; ric;idly r1ainb.:inec1 :Lr1 an exclusive 
way. But lf' te is loyal to his criticioni of sc~1olastic dualism 
above, Tillich must empj,asize the unity of reason. ve must 
:m.alnta~ ... n that it is the same reason w>.2.ch i.s 0 rasl)8d into unity 
with God and which operates on anoth8r level to relate this 
experience to otier experience. 
rrl1_e Y;letllod of correlation has cleai'lJ' .set furth two 
metaphysical 'cmplications. rTan is not self-ex)lanatory in his 
existence. To understsnd existential man completely one must 
consider God. I.~ikev;ise 3-od ln his scli'-man:~festat:ion is not 
self-explan&tory. To understand God's man'fecctotion completely 
one must cons:Lder man. 
1. ST, I, 53. 
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( iH) God-man. 
The conbined force of an '_nvest<e;ation of God and of 
man· is to seek an underst:c.mdint; of each in a correlative re-
lationship with the other and not as an isolated entity. Here 
the metl-c.od of correlation :<_s most expl:·c~it in a metap:l;:sical 
postulate. Whatever God and man are in essence or in eschato-
losical fulfillment, the nethod of cor:'elatlon sees God and 
man in an ex:Lstential relntionship of interdependence. We 
l::.ave already seen t}'lat ~illich reco~nizes that. in tllis asser-
t:i_on he Y".a\ces God partly dependent u~)On man. If God were not 
:n so:ctG way dependent u~Jon man ther-3 would be no correlation. 
l'c.n 'ws cHe;ni-~y as an existential creature. Jven God must 
oons:"_der how man receives :1im and understands him. Tillich 
. 1 
speaks of a 11 mutu8l j_nterdependence 11 in t is oonnectlCm. 
The effect of this correlation, t"en, is to compromise 
the concept of God as das Dnbedingte and to suggest ~he reality 
of time for God in the assertion that God !las a history. Cor-
relation as a net:lod would rnean •<othinc at all unless it ex-
pressed a relutionship which exists in reality. CC'hus it 
ap;Jears that God has a r'cstory whi~h SOT•0 8WicOt m,rallels the 
histo.~y of man. God is tllG one ultimate cround and abyss of 
bGj_nc. God crsates man in unity with .21imself; that is, in 
essence o logC2E. united with himselL 2 But man is croated with 
i, 61. 
l, 206. See above page 2~ff. 
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the capacity of act;_]_aliz at ion, of exercising !'is will in free-
dom. Man exercises his freedom to act a~:al.nst his essence, 
'-'" 1 Thus l"n exl" stence man is a split, torn oe:rson. But ,,)_S ogos_. _ _ _ 
God rescues mom from the condition of existential slavery by 
enterins hi.story through Jesus and bringing a New Being to 
man, through which Being man's self-estrangement is overcome, 
his schism healed. Thus man enters th8 :Kingdom of God, or a 
theonomous situa ti on 1 by freely devoting h:lmself to the will 
of God. 2 Man is created by God, but he is created with an 
eternal essence. That is, man is a separate metaphysical 
entity thrugh he uses his freedom to devote hi.mself entirely 
to the doing of God's will.3 
God has a lc.istory paralleling that of man. God creates 
man. When man uses his freedom he comes into exister:ce. In 
existence man is not God-abandoned. On the contrary man is 
upheld in his existence by the power and self-manifestation 
of God. The existential relationship is that of correlBtion, 
of' mutual dependence, thoush it must oe remembered that God 
as abyss always stands in. the shadows as the one, the sole 
power upon wruch everything depends but which itself is depend-
end upon nothing. Ultimately, in an eschatological sense, man 
l. 11 If we could see the holy in every reality, we should be in 
the Kingdom of God 11 (TJ:'E, 111). 
2. A theonomous situation is one in which all forms are open 
to and directed toward the divine(TPE, 44), a situation in 
which the ultimate meaning of existence shines thrmgh all 
finite forms of thought and action(Tl'E, xvi). 
3. Whether man is ultimately distinct from God in an.y way is 
a question for any interpreter of Tillich. Tilli.ch's 
language is that of a pantheistic mysticism in most cases. 
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receives God's self-manifestation and uses his own freedom to 
devote himself completely to God. Man is not necessarily 
11 swallowed-up" in God, thoue.;h Tillich' s thoue.;ht st,rongly 
suggests an ultimate monism, a pantheism, comparable to that 
of Shankara. 1 
The method of correlation sugc;ests, then, that God has 
a history and t>,at God i.s enriched tl;rocct:,h history. God is 
the one source of creati.on. Created man stands in a nositi.on 
of unity w:'.th God while bein::; separated ::,artially from God. 
In manifesting himself to man God is in a sense dependent upon 
man's reception and understandin8 of him. Throush this sta8e 
of ex:: stential estranGement God will win man ultimatety back 
to ' imsolf. Dut these stages are real for God and God's pur-
pose is not ultimately realized until God overcomes this es-
tranc;ement. God has a history and God becomes a richer power 
as Ground and f,byss throuch his redemption of history. Whatever 
the status of xnan and God is before man's existence, and what-
ever their relat1onshi~ is arter this existentisl estrangement, 
in existence God and man are in the co::;n:i.tive relationshiD of 
mutual dependence. This fact the method of correlation in-
tends to make emphatically clear. 
l. See Chal-'ter I:'::' above, page 2U7ff. See also Chelpter I, p::~ge 
6lff. Tillich' s absole1te monism sc.cssests the tl-:ought of Shan-
kara, with the analo~_;y espec',a.Lly close wl"ien tl1e impersonaJ. 
nature of Shankara 1 s llrahman is emphasized. See Chapter III 
above, page 217ff. There is no written acknowledgement by 
Tillich, however, indicating a di_rect influence. The influ-
ence of ?lotinus, Spinoza and Hegel have been mentioned. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
The following theses may be stated as conclusions 
drawn from this inve'stic;ation of the place of rGason in Til-
lich•s concept of God. 
1. Tj_llicl'_ defines reason in -cerms of two fu..Ylctions, 
that of intuition or awareness of God and t~at of discursive 
l 
reasoning or the consistent relating of experiences together. 
Yet Tillich actually develops his system of thought in such a 
way that the intuitive function of ress:''' as coherence is ne-
glected and tice consist,Jncy of reason as static form is empha-
. d 2 SJ_Ze • 
2. Man's natur8, according to Tillj_ch, is thot of a 
dynamic unity of two ,,olos, form and power. 3 Form is logos 
and power is the vital foundation. Tillich oelieves that 
ideally form and power fulfill each other. l:lut the arwlysis 
of man into the two elements or functions reflects Tillich•s 
impoverished concept of ranson as stat:cc form.4 
3. Thou:::,h in its essence man's reason is uni,ted with 
the Logos of God, in existence man's rCJason :i.s blurred and 
l c; distorted, Hsoeing throt·,;;h a glass darkly.' u Sut existential 
. ~. ll b ' . l . ~. ll l 6 man 1s suJ. man ecause r~_L'3 ogos 1s sul _ ogos. Euman 
reason, then, thaw)·, split and distcrted st:tll ftmctions to 
l. See above, D-,-) • v, 
2. See above, ilP • 15, 10, 47, 50, 51, ilo, l6:C:, 171, 175, 187, 
139, 216, 252, 253, 254. 
3. see above, P• 136. 
4. See above, s;p • 50, 51, b2, 53. 
5. See sbove, pp. '' t:..,._)' 25, 2'/' 31, 55. 
6. see above, pp. o3, 54, 60, lo6, 137, 144. 
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seek, receive, evaluate, and relac;e revelatJ.on. 1 
4. The criterit:'l1 of truth Tillich ac;vocates is that ot' 
an "experiential efr"_i_cacy in .Life,""' or & coh2ronce of neanine;.3 
T.~ouc;P TilJich speaks of the stt.lf-authont~_cat;ion t.:::t' the aware-
I• _,_. r d .. '- • 14 ness OJ_ u.'l8 dllCOD J.L>lODa he also speEks of' the role of rea-
~on in distin~uishins the true awareness of the Uncondi1~ional 
from the false awareness of the UnconciitionaJ.. 5 T.r.us in spite 
of ids broad ulaim for the self-eviaence of' an ex;:Jerience of 
God, Tillich actu,1Jy comn:ends the met'•od of rac;ional coherence. 
In !'is view demonic possession uestroys che rationa~ structure 
of the mind. Divine ecstasy fulfil.ls t;-,e ratJ.onal st~,c~ure 
of the mina.6 
5. In Ti1Jich 1 s t~cousht rectson (logos) is the ana.Logia 
enti.s, the imago dei which is ohe gro1.mc' of' unity betweEJn Gcd 
and man. 7 It is by virtue o1' this comFIOn ground tl·at a genuine 
correlation is maintElined bec;ween question and answer, l-'hilos-
ophy and theoJo:::;y, man and God. 8 
6. Tillich's basic and most oonsistGnt definition of God 
is tnat God is the ground and abyss of power and meaning. 9 
This definition is an amplification of what Ti11ich met3ns when 
~ ,, f d th d't' 1 10 
.,e spear.s o Go as e Uno on l l ona • But to speak of God 
1. see above, pp. 135-145. 30, 33, 48, 56, 137' 139, 
2. see above, p. 133. 143, 265. 
3. See aoove, P• 135. 8. See above, pp. 16, 20, 32, 
4. Seo above, p. 133. 3:)' 42, 48, 57, 96, 136, 138, 
5. See above, P• 119. 140, 142, 220, 259, 265' 2b9. 
6. See above, pp. 119, 140. 9. See above, _q ,J. 47' 50, 153. 
7. See above, pp. 16, L;, 20, 159, 168, 170, 186, 193, 1D9. 
10. See above, ,_lp. 101, 153, 160' 
161, 166, 130. 
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as ground and abyss of being and meaniclG does not give mean-
ingful content to God. Thus, though Tillich :wlds t'cat God 
1 
is not an object to ~s as su0jects, he nev3rt~eless is 
forced by bis apologetic task in the Systematic Theology to 
speak of God as an ep' s tnmolo;;i~Bl object anc'i to <:;i ve content 
. 
to the conception of God as if God were a being. God is esse 
. 'b . cl • 2 ~ l . . . ~ 3 ' d 1psum, onw--n l~)S~ an veru._~ ~UJi1. ,_,oc '.s -snlr~u, [ElG Go 
is love.4 Tillich tunds to move fron t 1 e assertion that God 
is the ground of reason to t:ne assertion that God is rc.tional. 5 
There is a Oasic incons.istency :ln Till." ch at this poi~1t, f'or 
he wants to maintain both positions -- that Clod is the ground 
of all being but not a be:'.n,;, and thE>t Goci is love, truth and 
~oodness, Yihich qualities imc'lY a person>Jl bei'1G· 
7. 'rhout;h :i.n t 1 eory he seJks to :n:eseJ:'VO the two-fold 
nature of God as ;round and noyss, nnd t>e 1mj_ ty of the ;:;round 
and abyss in the conception of God as spirit, Tillicb insists 
is the nbyss, inexhaustibility, power. Tillich c 1woses the 
less t_ban .-l~r"O~r-1 +"o exoJa1n ·~Ap•nnnl~t~ ~--·' .__, ~~o u , 1 _ _ _-· ._., ._;,_,_i c., ___ _:_ ", 
8. ~ .. r:any statements in Tillich wL~_ch arEJ otherwise incon-
1. See above, PP· lL-1, 103, 105, 110, 154, 211, 280. 
2. 3G8 above, PP• 168, 176, 1?7, 17S, 187, 213. 
3. See abo•.Je, PP• 1, 175n, 215' 216. 
4. see above, p f1• ln, 201, 202, 209. 
5. see above, pp. 185, 192. 
6. See above, .cop • 102, 103, 111, 165, 1:14' t::; 1 f) ~'-", 222-226. 
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sistent along v;ith many 1)0sitive statene-:lts affirm:i.ng s·Lich a 
monist. Tillich believes that there 1s only one s1ilistantial 
subjent, God, but that in existence t:~wre is a real correlation 
between God and nan. The majc•rity of Tillich 1 s utterances fall 
into a consistent patt(:Jr:::J. if he is intor1_Jreted as a morLlst. God 
actuallzes himself, e;oes out from hlms•Jlf in the histor',c ex-
istence o1' r:1an. But eschatologically God returns into himself, 
a richer spirit for the historic exper>ience. An8losous ideas 
in ?lotinus, Sbankar8 and Legel have been noted. 1 
9. If one adopts a monistic interprettition of Tillie], 
many seeming inco~sistencies are reconciled. 2 :Sut t·,·_ere are 
still so~1e outstandinc inconsistencies which cause any reader 
of Tillich to be confused. Some of the most glarinc inconsis-
tencles are as follows: 
thes~s 3 but at the same 
(a) Tillich cr~;_tic:,_zes Easel's syn-
+- • 
ulTL18 takes a·position quite as super-
bistorical as Hec:,el' s ;_)osition. 4 (b) 'l'ilHch states that God 
5 6 is Unconditional yet l1e states that God i.s t_:;ood 8nd that God 
7 is love. (c) Tillich insists t:-,at God is not an object to us 
as subjects8 but he says that whatever we think about becomes 
8ll object for us.9 (d) A m8jor premise of Tillich 1 s entire 
systom of thought in the Systematic Theology is that there is 
l. see above, PP• 4:C, 44, 61-67, 153, 180. 
79, 104, 105, 206-209, 271-277. 6. See above, pp. 178-179, 
2. See abovG, pp. 206-209' 2b9. 7. See above, pp. 201-206. 
3. See above, pp. 83, 34. s, See above, tJ () • 101, 102, 
4. see auove, PP• 85, 86n. 105, 110, 1~~4' 154. 
5. see above, }P• 101, 147, 9. See alJovG, P)· 111, ll:O • 
185. 
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a real correlation betu1een question and answer, ohilosophy 
d t k l cl ~ - l an· ,,eo ogy, man an vOC1. But in t':Je same Svst·3matic The-
ology Tillich says t:Cat revelation i_n no way interferes with 
2 
ord:i_nary knowledc;e, and, wLat is more stril;ircr;, tlcat philos-
OCJ.hy and theology have no common basis.3 
10. A najo:r d:l.ffi_culty Vl~-~ic!-1 co:,_1fronts any inter::n ... eter 
of Tillich is Tillich's habit of shifting his orientation from 
the essential to the ex1stantial, from the msta9hys1cal to the 
epj_stemological, fron the ontological to t:-,e _c,:·,enomenal, with-
out ind:lcatint; to the reader that the s} ift has been made.4 
SevGral cl-•1ar emphasGs in Tillich' s ti:ought elicit ap-
preciative remarks. Tillich's stimulus to stiff theological 
tlcinkin;; is much needed in our day.. Tillich feels the need 
for a restored corlllllu_nication between religion and culture, and 
he f'L-1ds the basis for this communication in an ontolo;::;ically 
grounded unity of' relic;ion and culture. viben many voices in 
Christian theology decry metaph:•sical thinkin;::;, it is refreshing 
to be recalled by Tillich to the ontolo[;ical crow'l.dinc; of' religion. 
'rillich' s keen insight into the '•:cstory of' thought, both 
religious and secular, is evident in hls writ~ng. In spite of' 
his retaining the abyss as the essence of God, Tillich makes 
stimulating and strikint; stat,ments arJout the dit;nity of' hUlllan 
reason, the clearest of' which is that the antir2t:i.onal is the 
1. see above, f'P· 2U, 33, 37, 59, 100, 115, 120, 123, 138, 2o9, 
261, 2o5-27l, 2?5-277. 
2. See above, pp. 20n, 94, 96, 117, 143. 
3. See abo~e, p~. 127, 258. 
4. See above, pp. 80, 83n, 102, 103, 114, 148, 256. 
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antidi vine. 
One should also express an appreciation for Tillich's 
protest against absolutism in all its forms, whether in church 
or in state. It is demonic if the finite claims to be infinite, 
if the tenp oral claims to be eternal, if man claims to be God, 
and Tillich is sound when he appealsto rational coherence to 
distinguish the demonic from the divine. 
But alone;side these appreciative remarks, one must ex-
press certain misgivings about Tillich' s thoq:;ht. 'l'illich' s 
paradoxical style, his method of correlation and his basically 
monistic ontology combime almost to overwhelm his readers. F'or 
it becomes exceedingly difficult a"ld crucially important to 
know whether Tillich is sueaking epistemologically or onto-
lo;_;ically, whether he is speaking in paradox to provoke thought 
or simply inconsistently,, whether he is speaking fron the stand-
point of the one substantial subject or from the standpoint of 
existential 1ran. vHth all this, however, it is not about 
Tillich's style that one is most deeply disturbed. It is 
r"ther h:i.s ontolocy trot causes grave doubts. 
As we stated above Tillich does Christian theology in 
our day a great service by reemphasizing the importance of a 
metaphysical mooring, an ontological ground for theolo;:;y. But 
concerning the actual grounding Tillicb gives theolocy serious 
questions exist. For Tillich defines tl"-e ontological essence 
of Goo in terms of the abyss, the inexhaustible mystery within 
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God, a sort of reservoir of power which empowers every being 
that comes into existence. In so doinc Tilli~h questions the 
ultimate stao:Llity of the good, of lovq, of purpose, of mean-
ins, and of logos. Thouch Tillich says that the abyss can 
never overtake the logos, he also speaks of t~e abyss as a 
"consuming fi.re," a 11 chaos 11 wl"_ich Tillich maint&ins is the 
primal"Y essence of God, God's fatlcerhood, Eolclint; in theory 
to the idea that God is a dynamic unity of :)ower anu reason, 
Tillich thinks that it is Dower tb.at makes God God. !-,'any of 
his readers will prefer that, if a choice must be made, ra-
tiorull love should be thought of as tlcat wh:i.ch makes God God, 
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ABSTRACT 
The problem of this dissertation is to present a critical 
exposition of the place of reason in Paul Till:i.ch' s conception 
of God. 
A discussion of the def'cnitioc:t of reason as well as t!Je 
place of reason in man and in his knowlede,e of God is 1:\ pl'e-
requisi te to the consideration of the ce'ltJ."a 1 nroblen of the 
dissertation. Reason is defined in terms of .its ontolo~ical 
and technical functions. Qntolobical reason is active in the 
awareness or intuition of God and the ideal norms of c;oodness, 
beauty and tn:.th. Ontoloc;ical reascm fu .. nc;tioc'ls tn relate man 
to that which is ultimately real. 'i'ec1m5.cal reasort, on the 
other ~",and, ·functio_,r·_s to a~Y:n•opriate all !~:nowled~e, to organ-
i7.8 all experience into a cmsiste nt 1mity. But it is t·'le same 
reeson vr.:~.ic:r .. is act~!..ve in each case. 
L'an is a cOJ;r:JOsi te un:i. ty of for·n (reason) and vi tal) ty 
(power). In essence rrwn is in unity vi5_t]'J_ God, r.'lan's lot;~~ is 
united with God's logo~. In his essential natura, then, nan 
is lli'1itscl with God anc1 there is no distinctc:on between reason 
and revelation. But ·nan is free as H3ll as ratiOrJ.Gl, and he 
exercises his freedom to act by actins partially against his lo-
p;os. In so do:!"n~ man comes into axj_stence. T.hus ex5_sto~1tial 
man is in p8rtial separation fro:n and 0&rt:1_al union -.vith God. 
In ox:Lstenco L!an's reason is 11 f'1:::llen," it does not nerceive 
God with absol~Jte clar:i. ty. But exj_st>1tial :>eason is not VJ~olly 
depraved; it still has the capac;_ty to ao Jre1,end the world 
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mean:i.ngfully and to be aware of God. Indeed, reason is t~e 
common basis upon which c ommunicat :Lon ~oetween God and man is 
possible. ThoLl;_:';h reaso'i. cenr-~ot ~ roducG the ,gxper::_ ence of 
unity w:i.th God, reason perfn:rr~;s t1ce l.mport2.nt functions of 
recei vine;, ju:igi ng anc~_ appr::-priati ns reve la ti on. 
Tl.l1icrc revolt" a:;21i~nst all cJ~·3.~ussto''l of God v1 deb ob-
jectifies God, makes C:-od an object to 11.3 as S'i:Jjects. God is 
neve:.':"' a being alonsside oth0r tJeings ·,J,'OSe ex5_3teno e one ::r~a:v 
dis cuss. In an ontoloc;i cal sense God is a l)rius of unity w!Ji ch 
is logically prior and ontologicc;lly r.1ore f'c_mdamert ol thon the 
subject-object distinction of existentlol knowledge. God is 
the One whose being and neality is basic f'or both S'.lb;ject ani 
object. God is presupposed in every question about God. 
1'.-Tan in ex:5_st ence is partially s epa rated frorr1 0-od, but 
knowledge of God in the sense of 11 awareness 11 of God is possible. 
Tillich uses the tern, "awar'eness of God," to Lnd:~cote t'~e im-
mediacy of man's exper'ence of' God. "Awareness" ind:Lcates man's 
being g:--asped into unity vv-.i th GOO, man's surrender of }-:_is sub-
jectiv~lty in J:.is experience of oneness ~tvltb t>-1·3 lJ.lt5_rr1Ete, ,,vi.th 
beins-itself. Fnr Tillich the epist3E,oloc:;icoll;r monistic po-
sition is the concomitant of' his ontoloGical monism. There is 
onl;-~ one s·c1bstantial knower, one substantial subject, God. 
God's nature is twofold in a way analogous to man•s 
nature. Tillich speaks of God as das Unbedingte to indicate 
the acJsoh'te danand with wh:i~ch nan is cmfronted. 13ut 'I'il-
lich•s usual definition of God is as be:tng-itself, or as the 
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ground ( Sinngrund) and abyss ( Sinnabgrund) of power and mean-
ine;. Tillich wants to protect the non-ex:tstential status of 
God. God is that reality without whi± notl•ing is. GJd is 
be~nc;-itself, the power of beine; of everythtnc; that is, in 
so far as it is. God is personal in that he is the ground of 
personality. God is good in that he i" the c;round of ;:;oodness. 
God is rational in that c'e is the ground of reason. But Til-
lich must adr.1it that if God is personal, good and rational in 
tbis sense only, God is also inpersonal, evil and nonrational 
in so far as he is also the ground of L' unsse. 
Tilli:Jr seems to recognize the ae!bi.c;uous nature of his 
God. For in his latest wo2'k, the Systematic Theolo:v, he speaks 
clearly about God as ground, as spir~t, as good and as love. 
God as ground is lo.;os, reason, form. This indicates God's 
self-nanifestin;_; character, God's opposi.tion to nonbe:ing. God 
as ground is truth-itself and ::::;ood-itself. God is supreme in 
value as well as power. Everything that comes into being does 
so under the conditions of the logos. The irrational cannot 
exist. 
But the 1 ogos as the self-manifestinc; nature of God 
must be considered in relation with the abyss, the dark un-
revealed, unknowable depth of God. The ab~>ss ls the essence 
of God, that which makes God God. The abyss is not only the 
source from which every form emerges. The abyss is also a 
depth in which every form disappears. 
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Tillich holds that God as spir:i_ t is a dynami 8 unity of 
;_:;round and abyss. But the e;round nature of God is secondary 
and suborc1inate to the abyss nature of God. It is with this 
basic contradiction of Tillich• s thou:;ht trat most readers will 
have a quarrel. Reason is extremely i1n~ortant in ~tllich 1 s 
God as God is related to existential :man, but in essence God is 
the nonrat ional abyss. 
The followinc theses may oe stated as conclusions drawn 
from tbis investigation. 
l. Tillich defines reason in terms of two functions, 
that of intuition or awareness of God and tl1at of discursive 
reasoning or the consistent relating of experiences to.:;ether. 
Yet Tillich actually develops his systam of thoue;ht in such a 
way that the intuitive function of reason as co}ference is 
neglected and tLe cons:i_stency of reason as static foTI". is em-
phasized. 
2. T!an' s nature, according to Tilli.ch, is that of a 
dynamic unity of two poles, form and nower. Form is logo~ 
and power is the vital foundation. Tlll:lc}"', believes that 
ideally form and power fulfill each other. But the analysis 
of man into the two elements or functions reflects 'rillich' s 
i_mpoverished cone ept of reason as static form. 
3. Though in its essence man's reason is united with the 
Logos of God, in existence man's reason is blurred and distorted, 
11 seeing through a glass darkly." But exlste ntial man is still 
man because his logos is still logos. Human reason, then, though 
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split and distorted still functions to seek, recei.ve, evaluate 
and relate revelation. 
4. The criterion of truth wl1ich TillicJ.1 advocates is 
that of an "experiential efficacy in life," or a co'oe renee of 
meaning. Thoue;h Tillich speaks of the self-authentication of 
the awareness or the Unconditional, he also speaks of the role 
of reason in distinguis>int the true awareness of the Fncondi-
tional from the false awareness oft he Fncondi tional. Thus in 
spite of his broad claim for tloe self-evidence of an experience 
of God, Tillich actually commends the method of rational co-
herence. In his view denonic possess~on destroys the rational 
structure of the mind. Divine ecstasy fulfills ti.le rational 
structure of the mind. 
5. In TilHch's thouc;ht reason (logo'!_) is the analogia 
antis, the ima;,;o dei which is the grou::-:td of unity between God 
and man. It is by virtue of t!is COJC:lmon c;round that a c;anuine 
correlat~on is maintained between question and answer, philosophy 
and theology,man and God. 
6. Tillich 1 s basic and most consistent definition of 
God is that God is the ground and abyss of power and meaning. 
This definition is an amplification of what Tillich means when 
he speaks of God as tloe Uncondi tim.al. But to speak of God as 
sround and abyss of be:i_nc; and T:leani~·j_c does not .'~-'L ve n.eaningful 
content to God. Thus, thoPgh Tillich holds that god s not an 
object to us as subjects, he nevertheless is forced by his 
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apologetic taslc in the Systematic Theology to speak of c,od as 
an epistemolor;ical object and to give content to t'w conception 
of God as if God were ~being. God is esse ip~, bonu.'11 i:£~, 
and verurn ipsum. God is spirit and God is love. Tillich tends 
to move from the assertion tr_at God is the ground of reason to 
the assertion that God is rational. T':lere is a basic inconsist-
ency in Tillich at this point, for he wants to maintain both po-
sitions -- that God is the grormd of all beirlb but not a being, 
and that God is love, truth and goodness, which qualiti_es imply 
a personal being. 
7. Though in theory be seeks to preserve the twofold 
nature of God as ground and abyss, and the unity of the ground 
and abyss in the conception of God as spirit, Tillich insists 
that the essential nature of God, "that which makes God God," 
is the abyss, inexhaustibility, power. Till:ich chooses the 
less than personal to explain personoli_ty, purpose and meani'1C· 
B. l:Iany stat aments in Tillich w'-ioh ao:>e otherwise incon-
sistent along with many positive statements affirming such a 
view have indicated t"-e '_nterpretatioc:l of Tillicl'l as an abso-
lute monist. Tillich believes that tl-ere is only one substan-
tisl subject, God, but that in exist<once there is a real correla-
tion between God and man. The majority of Tillich 1 s utterances 
fall into a consistent pattern if he is interpreted as a monist. 
God actualizes himself, goes out from himself in the historic 
existence of man. But eschatologically God returns into himself, 
a richer spirit for the historic experience. Analogous ideas in 
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Plotinus, Shankara and eregel have been noted. 
9. If one adopts a monistic interpretation of Tillich 
many seeming inconsistencies are reconciled. But there are 
still some outstanding inconsistencies whi.ch cause any reader 
of Tillich to be confused. Some of tr e most o;lari ng incon-
sistencies are as follows: (a) Tillich criticizes C!ezel's 
synth.esis because of its non-temporal nature, but at the sa:ne 
time takes a position quite as superhistorical as Fegel 1 s posi-
tion. (b) Tillich states thlt God is Unconditional, yet he states 
that God is good and that God is love. (c) Tillich insists that 
God is not an object to us as subjects but he says that whatever 
we think about becomes an object for us. (d) A major premise of 
Tillich' s entire system of tl:'ought in th. e Syst ema tic Theology is 
that there is a real correlation between question and answer, 
philoso0hy and tl;.eology, man and God. But in the same ~~ema_tic 
Theology Tillich says that revelation in no way affects ordinary 
knowledge and, what is r.:tore striking, that philoso:)hy and the-
ology have no common basis. 
10. A major difficcclty which confronts any interpreter 
of Tillich is Tillich 1 s habit of shifting his orientation from 
the essential to the existential, from the metaphysical to the 
epistemological, from the ontological to tt(e pl,enomenal, with-
out indlcating to the reader that the shift has been made. 
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